RESEARCH
The 2026 National Defense Strategy by the Numbers. Radical Changes, Moderate Changes, and Some ContinuitiesThe Trump administration presents its new National Defense Strategy (NDS) as a break from previous strategies, including that of the first Trump administration. Out are Russia, Europe, and climate change. In are hemispheric security, “warrior ethos,” and burden shifting. Many changes are indeed substantial, even radical, and reportedly received pushback from military leaders during the drafting process. Others, however, may not be as significant as they first appear, and there is some continuity with previous strategy documents. The document also constitutes a different reading experience, departing from the analytic tone of previous strategy documents and often adopting the tone of a political rally. The Practice of Archipelagic States: A Study of StudiesIn 2014, as part of its Limits in the Seas series, the U.S. Department of State published studies assessing the maritime claims of the following 16 states: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Cabo Verde, Comoros, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Indonesia, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Seychelles, the Solomon Islands, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.1 As each study notes at the outset, its “purpose” is to “examine a coastal State’s maritime claims and . . . assess their consistency with international law,” according to the views of the U.S. government. These studies complement the Department of State’s previously published Limits in the Seas studies, including those assessing the maritime claims of Fiji, Jamaica, Maldives, and S˜ao Tom´e and Pr´ıncipe. Collectively, these 20 studies cover all claimed archipelagic states that have promulgated archipelagic baselines enclosing some or all of their islands. This article describes the findings of these studies and assesses the degree to which those states claiming archipelagic status under the law of the sea have conformed to the requirements of international law in promulgating their maritime claims.Brian Melchior
Molinaco, the Comorian Diaspora, and Decolonisation in East Africa’s Indian OceanThe marginal case of the decolonisation of Comoros has gained little attention from historians of Africa. By tracing the evolution of the Mouvement de libération nationale des Comores (MOLINACO) around East Africa’s Indian Ocean basin, this article explores the possibilities and constraints of anticolonial organisation among a diaspora population whose own existence was threatened by the more exclusive political order that emerged from the process of decolonisation. In Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Kenya, and Madagascar, MOLINACO’s activities were shaped and limited by contested issues of racial identity, island genealogy, partisan alignment, and international priorities among both the Comorian diaspora and their ‘host’ governments. Through a transterritorial approach, this article examines the difficulties for minority communities in navigating the transition from empire to nation-state, while also illustrating the challenges MOLINACO faced in its ultimately unsuccessful attempt to impose that same normative model onto the archipelago.George Roberts
Reflections on Zimbabwe-Zambia Relations in the 21st CenturyThe article explores the changing relationship between Zimbabwe and Zambia in the 21st century, focusing on the intrinsic synergy of political and socio-economic factors. Historically, the diplomatic relationship was hinged in shared colonial experiences and liberation struggles, the bilateral ties between these neighboring countries have been significantly influenced by contemporary governance challenges, economic fluctuations, and regional integration efforts. Dual Theoretical Framework of Realism and Constructivism was adopted as a tool for analysing the interplay between power, interests, norms, and ideas in shaping bilateral relations between the two nations. By analysing key events from the early 2000s, a document review methodology was used to illustrate how Zimbabwe and Zambia navigated their shared interests and challenges in a rapidly changing global landscape. The findings revealed that while historical legacies and domestic issues continue to impact relations, there exists a significant potential for enhanced cooperation through strategic partnerships and regional initiatives. The role of organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) is critical in shaping these dynamics. Ultimately, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of Zimbabwe-Zambia relations, offering insights that are essential for policymakers and stakeholders aiming to foster stability and collaboration in Southern Africa Region.Dorothy Goredema
Sovereignty and Security in the Indian Ocean. Why the UK should not cede the Chagos Islands to MauritiusWhen looking at strategic options for military action in the Indian Ocean – and unimpeded access by sea and air to the bordering countries of the Indian Ocean, from South Africa past Somalia, Yemen, Iran, the Arabian Gulf, Indian sub-continent, Indonesia and Australasia – Diego Garcia is a strategic jewel, possession of which is crucial for security in the region and hence our national security. It allows coverage of the choke points south of the Cape of Good Hope, the Bab-el-Mandeb, Straits of Hormuz and Malacca Straits through which a huge quantity of global trade passes. It is no exaggeration to say that Diego Garcia – the largest of the Chagos Islands – hosts the most strategically important US air and logistics base in the Indian Ocean and is vital to the defence of the UK and our allies. Having visited Diego Garcia twice and utilised it in op-plans and routine deployments of carriers and SSNs, I was delighted to read this paper by Policy Exchange which calls on the Government to cease negotiations with Mauritius about cession of the Chagos Islands.Yuan Yi Zhu
The problem with the Comoros solution: affect, citizenship, statelessness and the Kuwaiti BidoonThe Kuwaiti bidoon are a subset of the nomadic population of Kuwait who have been made stateless, classified as illegal residents and increasingly deprived of social rights through changing classifications by the Kuwaiti government. In 2014, the Kuwaiti government attempted to obtain citizenship in the African island nation of the Comoros for the bidoon, which would have provided them with a route to legal residency. But would this have provided a just resolution to the bidoon‘s situation? We argue that justice for the bidoon must not simply serve to resolve their de jure statelessness; it must, instead, attend to the injuries produced by this status, most importantly the harm caused by continuous rejection of their affective attachment to Kuwait. In dialogue with theories of access to citizenship and political identification with a state, we argue that under certain circumstances, providing citizenship can increase the harm experienced by stateless people, and that only providing recognition of their affective tie to a political community can resolve it. Migration Governance in Unsettled Times. How Policymakers Can Plan for Population ChangeA string of populist gains has radically changed both the politics and governance of migration, pushing governments of all stripes toward greater restrictions and reducing the appetite for experimentation. The backlash comes at a particularly fraught time. Advanced economies with aging populations are increasingly reliant on immigrants to sustain their workforces, and more people worldwide are seeking out opportunities to move, whether for work, family, or protection. There is a clear humanitarian imperative to ensure vulnerable populations can access protection through safe and legal channels instead of resorting to dangerous, illicit journeys (from which smugglers are reaping enormous profits). But as public concerns about how population growth could affect the soaring cost of living and as housing pressures have grown, support for even legal immigration has waned. Meanwhile, chaotic scenes at borders and a perception of a loss of control over admissions have prompted quick fixes, at the expense of longer-term, sustainable solutions.Kate Howell
A new direction for students in an AI world: prosper, prepare, protectIn November 2022, OpenAI released its frontier Large Language Model (LL M), ChatGPT. Within five days, ChatGPT had five million users. Within two months, that number swelled to 100 million monthly active users. By August 2025, 700 million users across the globe were using ChatGPT (Mehta 2025). Many of those users are students harnessing LLMs for brainstorming, tutoring, creating, and learning; to work better and faster; and, crucially, to outsource their thinking. Rebecca Winthrop
Why Has Somaliland Not Been Recognised as A Sovereign State?After the collapse of the Somali state, civil war followed, leading people to turn to their ancestral homeland. Consequently, rudimental local administrations were formed with a provision of becoming part of a decentralised governance system in Somalia. However, one region stood differently by declaring itself a separate state, Somaliland, within the boundaries of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. To overcome the objections of African countries about the session, Somaliland claimed that its declaration of independence in 1991 was supposed to be a dissolution of the union rather than a declaration of separation. This idea follows in the footsteps of other failed federations, such as the United Arab Republic, which included Egypt and Syria from 1958 to 1961, or the Senegambia Confederation, which existed between Senegal and the Gambia from 1981 to 1989. These failed political unions symbolized the breakup of that union and the restoration of the protectorate's original, pre-1960 borders. (Gordon, 2023) Britain granted Somaliland independence on June 26 1960, and after four days, it joined with the former UN Italian Somaliland Trusteeship Territory to form the Republic of Somalia. Thus, Somaliland's case differed markedly from the other regions as it wanted to stand as a separate nation-state within Africa. Yet, over thirty years have passed, and Somaliland has not been recognised as a sovereign entity. To answer why it happened, we have to look at the historical factors on state formation in Africa and how newly independent countries treated colonially inherited boundaries.Abdisalam Issa-Salwe
The Trajectory of Contemporary Governance in Lesotho: A Transition towards Coalition GovernmentThis paper examines the success story of the formation of coalition government in Lesotho. Lesotho has since 1970 experienced a chequered history of authoritarian and military rules until 1993 when the country went democratic. Interestingly, within two decades of the country ’s multiparty democratic experience, it has experimented with multiple governmental systems viz; in 1993 1998, it adopted First Past the Post or winner takes all model, and then in 2001, it adopted Mixed Member Proportion model, which brought some stability within the unitary parliamentary governance. In 2012 the latter model gave impetus to a new model of coalition government. Unfortunately, however, the three-party coalition government was interrupted in 20 14 by a military adventurism which gave rise to the 2015 nap elections that led to another seven-party coalition government. Interestingly, another faction occurred from the seven-party coalition and a vote of no confidence was passed by the opposition against the ruling coalition, which led to the early 2017 elections. The third coalition governance of four parties was established after the elections and took its term of five years before the elections of October 2022 that established a “of three parties coalition under the leadership of a prominent businessman. This paper posits that although coalition model has been accepted by the Lesotho people, however, it has come with increasing cost on executive expenditure, as it puts great burden on taxpayers. This paper recommends the inclusion in the democratic discourse (conversation), a blend of the western democratic culture with traditional African culture in administering the affairs of the state since the two are not mutually exclusive.Nomazulu Ngozwana