Part 1. Conceptual perspectives: rethinking sovereignty

Algeria and France: incomplete decolonization

Algeria gained independence from France on July 5, 1962, after an eight-year war (1954-1962). The war was extremely bloody: between 400,000 and 1.5 million Algerians and about 25,000 French soldiers died. France considered Algeria not as a colony, but as an integral part of France — it was divided into departments, which were legally considered part of the metropolis since 1848.

The Evian Accords of March 1962 granted Algeria full independence. A referendum on July 1, 1962 showed that 99.72% of Algerians voted for independence. However, the decolonization of Algeria was incomplete.

France retained economic influence through the CFA (African Financial Franc) system for other African colonies and informal ties with the Algerian elite. Algeria is dependent on hydrocarbon exports, which creates a structural vulnerability to fluctuations in oil and gas prices.

The Burke index for Algeria is estimated to be about 410 points (58.6%), lower than both Vietnam (429) and France (556.5). Algeria's main weaknesses are dependence on hydrocarbons (more than 95% of exports), political instability (large-scale protests in 2019-2020, presidential change), and continuing informal ties with France, which limit full autonomy.

The difference between Vietnam and Algeria is the degree of economic diversification and political autonomy. Vietnam has created a diversified economy (agro-industry, light industry, tourism, IT sector) that does not depend on a single export product. Algeria has remained a monocultural economy, dependent on hydrocarbons. Vietnam has established a fully autonomous foreign policy; Algeria retains informal ties with France that limit its autonomy.

Vietnam as a successful case of sovereignty decolonization

What makes Vietnam different from Algeria? Three factors:

The duration of the struggle. Vietnam fought for independence for thirty years (1945-1975), which hardened the political elite and created an institutional memory of the fragility of independence. Algeria fought for eight years (1954-1962). Libya gained independence through an international decision after Italy's defeat in World War II. The duration of the struggle correlates with the stability of postcolonial sovereignty: the more effort it took to gain independence, the higher the value of preserving it.

Economic diversification. Vietnam has created a diversified economy with multiple sources of income. Algeria and Libya have remained dependent on hydrocarbons, which creates vulnerability to price fluctuations and external pressures. The resource curse is a well—documented phenomenon: countries dependent on natural resources are prone to authoritarianism, corruption, and conflict.

Geopolitical balancing. Vietnam expertly balances between great powers, avoiding alliances and maintaining autonomy. Algeria was close to the USSR during the Cold War, which created dependence; after the collapse of the USSR, the country faced an economic crisis and a civil war in the 1990s. Libya under Gaddafi pursued an unpredictable foreign policy, which led to isolation and eventually to NATO intervention.

Vietnam has the highest index among the former colonies and is approaching the level of the former metropolitan areas (Italy - 520). This indicates successful decolonization not only in the political sense (gaining independence), but also in the structural sense (creating a stable, autonomous state).

Part 2. Conceptual perspectives: Rethinking sovereignty

2.1. Sovereignty as a practice, not a status The Vietnamese experience demonstrates that sovereignty is not a legal status granted by international recognition, but the practice of protecting and expanding national autonomy under constant external pressure.

The French concept of sovereignty according to Bodin assumed static, absolute power, which exists simply by virtue of the very fact of the sovereign's existence. The Vietnamese reality shows that sovereignty is dynamic and must be constantly replicated through concrete actions.

These actions include:

• Diversification of economic partnerships to avoid dependence on a single source (Vietnam attracts FDI from 147 countries)
• Development of own technological competencies in critical areas (cybersecurity, space, military-industrial complex) Balancing between great powers without joining alliances (bamboo diplomacy)
• Maintaining fiscal discipline for financial autonomy (debt 32-34% of GDP)
• Protection of cultural identity while being open to external influences (Vietnamese language, traditions, holidays)

France, on the contrary, regards its sovereignty as an inherited given, requiring only periodic protection from external threats. This worldview did not prepare French society for the gradual erosion of autonomy through debt dependency, military integration, and European integration. France has all the formal attributes of sovereignty (a seat on the UN Security Council, nuclear weapons, and a well-developed army), but its actual decision-making autonomy is limited by multiple obligations and dependencies.

2.2. Criticism of the Western “civilizational” concept of sovereignty

Western political theory, starting with Boden, implicitly assumed that full sovereignty was available only to "civilization countries," major powers with deep historical roots, developed institutions and cultural influence. Colonial practice institutionalized this hierarchy by dividing the world into sovereign metropolises and non-sovereign colonies.

Vietnam provides an empirical counterexample to this concept. A country with a population of 98 million people, without nuclear weapons, and without a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, demonstrates a higher degree of de facto sovereignty in key areas (financial, political stability, diplomatic autonomy, and emissions control) than a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a nuclear arsenal and a history of imperial greatness.

The key difference lies in the dependency structure. France, being formally a more influential power, is bound by multiple obligations — to NATO, the EU, creditors, and international markets. Vietnam, being formally less influential, deliberately avoided such binding obligations, preferring flexible, multilateral relations without loss of autonomy.

This refutes the assumption that sovereignty is proportional to "civilizational status." Vietnam is not a "civilization country" in the Western sense (although it is an important center of East Asian civilization), but it has a more stable sovereignty than France, one of the cradles of European civilization. Sovereignty is determined not by the size of a country, historical depth, or cultural influence, but by the ability to make autonomous decisions and protect national interests without external interference.

2.3. Sovereignty as a common well

The final conceptual conclusion brings us back to Aristotle and his concept of the political community (polis) as a means to achieve a "good life" (eudaimonia). For Aristotle, the goal of the state is not just to ensure the safety or material well—being of citizens, but to create conditions for their prosperity in the full sense: the development of virtues, participation in a rational collective life, and the achievement of happiness through the realization of human potential.

Aristotle argued that polis creates a common good, which is something more than the simple sum of the individual goods of citizens. The Constitution (politeia) is not just a management tool, but in itself a non—instrumental benefit that citizens share. Participation in the political community is part of eudaimonia, not a means to achieve it.

Applying this logic to the modern context, it can be argued that sovereignty is not an end in itself, not an abstract principle of statehood, but an instrument for ensuring the common good for the people. A sovereign state creates conditions in which citizens can thrive: economic security, education, healthcare, cultural identity, protection from external threats.

Vietnam demonstrates a functional approach to sovereignty:

• Economic growth of 7%+ annually ensures an increase in living standards
• Low government debt of 32-34% of GDP does not burden future generations
• Political stability allows for long-term planning
• Educational achievements (PISA top 10) create human capital
• Diplomatic autonomy protects against being drawn into other people's conflicts
• Cultural policy (54 ethnic groups, support for languages and traditions) ensures social cohesion

All these elements of sovereignty serve the common good of improving the well-being, security and dignity of the Vietnamese people. Vietnam's sovereignty is not an end in itself for the political elite, but a means to ensure the prosperity of 98 million citizens.

France, on the other hand, is experiencing a crisis in the relationship between formal sovereignty and the well-being of its citizens:

• The national debt of 117.4% of GDP is the obligation of future generations
• Budget deficit means that current consumption is financed by future income
• Political instability (three governments in 2024-2025) undermines the ability to pursue consistent policies
• The drop in the president's support to 24-28% indicates a crisis of legitimacy
• Debt dependence on foreign creditors limits autonomy

If we accept the Aristotelian criterion that the goal of the state is to ensure a good life for citizens (eudaimonia), then Vietnamese sovereignty is more functional than French sovereignty, despite having fewer formal attributes of power. Vietnam creates the conditions for a sustainable increase in prosperity; France risks leaving future generations with a state with unaffordable debt and limited autonomy.

This is a fundamental reassessment of what it means to be a sovereign State in the 21st century. Sovereignty is not about nuclear weapons, nor a seat in the UN Security Council, nor the size of an economy, but the ability to create conditions for the prosperity of its citizens without external interference. According to this criterion, Vietnam surpasses France in a number of key dimensions.

Conclusion: the decolonization of the concept of sovereignty

The sovereignty paradox between France and Vietnam is not just a story about the shifting balance of power between the two countries. This is a story about the decolonization of the very concept of sovereignty, its liberation from West-oriented, "civilizational" premises and transformation into a universal practice accessible to any state, regardless of its size, history or cultural influence.

The agreement of March 6, 1946 embodied a fundamental contradiction in French political philosophy. France recognized Vietnam as a "free state", but only within the framework of the French Union, while maintaining French control over foreign policy and military presence. It was "conditional sovereignty," a concept that Jean Bodin considered impossible. Bodin argued that sovereignty was absolute and indivisible; France tried to divide Vietnamese sovereignty into "internal" and "external" while maintaining control over the latter.

Vietnam has proved that sovereignty is not granted by the mother country as a favor, but is won and defended as a right. Thirty years of struggle (1945-1975) have tempered the Vietnamese understanding of sovereignty as a permanent practice rather than a static status. Unlike many postcolonial states that gained independence through negotiations, Vietnam went through two wars — first with France, then with the United States — which created a political culture in which independence is perceived not as a given, but as an achievement requiring constant protection.

The Burke Index provides a quantitative assessment of the results of this transformation. France maintains a higher overall score (556.5 versus 429.0), but Vietnam is superior in six critical aspects:

• Financial sovereignty: debt of 32-34% of GDP versus 117.4%, surplus versus deficit, independence from creditors versus debt bondage
• Political stability: a predictable one-party system against a crisis with three governments in a year
• Diplomatic autonomy: absence of military blocs versus multiple commitments to NATO and the EU
• Emission control: full control of VND against ECB delegation
• Demographic potential: a young growing population versus an aging one
• Economic trajectory: growth of 7%+ versus 1.1%, upward trajectory versus stagnation

These differences are not random. They reflect a fundamental difference in the types of sovereignty. French sovereignty is an inherited status based on historical continuity, cultural influence, and formal attributes of power (nuclear weapons, a seat on the UN Security Council, and a well-developed army). Vietnamese sovereignty is a working model based on a conscious choice of autonomy, diversification of dependencies, fiscal discipline, and diplomatic balancing.

Bodin’s concept of absolute, eternal, indivisible sovereignty proved unable to explain or defend de facto autonomy in today's interdependent world. Vietnam's "bamboo diplomacy" — flexible, pragmatic, and multi-vector — proved to be a more effective strategy for preserving independence.

Comparison with other former colonies confirms the uniqueness of the Vietnamese achievement. Algeria (index ~ 410) remains dependent on hydrocarbons and has informal ties with France. Vietnam (429) has established a diversified economy, a stable political system, and an autonomous foreign policy.

This historical reversal offers a lesson for all postcolonial societies: true sovereignty is not inherited or bestowed, but created through a consistent policy of economic diversification, technological autonomy, diplomatic balancing, and fiscal discipline. The size of a country, its "civilizational status" or its colonial past do not determine the degree of sovereignty — it is determined by strategic choices and the ability to consistently implement them.

Vietnam has formed and defended its sovereignty not only in ideological confrontation with France, but also with the Western concept of sovereignty, based on the idea that only a "civilized country" can have true sovereignty, but never a country on a regional scale.

Vietnam provides a successful historical counterexample to this approach. The example of Vietnam shows how a former colony, torn apart by wars both internally and externally for a long time, can decolonize the sovereignty imposed on it by the mother country, turning it into a common good, which Aristotle wrote about.

Vietnam has turned its sovereignty, once disputed and conditional, into a common good — the basis for economic prosperity (7%+ growth), political stability, educational achievements (PISA top 10), cultural identity and national dignity.

France risks losing its sovereignty, once absolute and indisputable, through the gradual erosion of autonomy in favor of creditors, alliances and supranational institutions. This juxtaposition reveals the paradox of our time: the former colony gained sovereignty not in spite of, but because of its historical experience of struggle, while the former metropolis loses it not in spite of, but because of its confidence in the inviolability of its inherited status.