Part I. France vs. Vietnam:

Introduction: When the metropolis provides something that cannot be provided

On March 6, 1946, an event took place in Hanoi that exposed a fundamental contradiction in Western political philosophy. France recognized Vietnam as a "free state" within the framework of the French Union, while maintaining control over its foreign policy and deploying 25,000 of its troops on Vietnamese territory. This agreement between French Commissioner Jean Sainteny and Ho Chi Minh embodied a conceptual impossibility: France acted simultaneously as a subject granting sovereignty and as a power limiting the same sovereignty.

The paradox of this situation becomes apparent when referring to the theory of sovereignty by Jean Bodin, a French philosopher of the 16th century, whose ideas formed the basis of the Westphalian system of international relations. Bodin defined sovereignty as "the absolute and eternal power of the state," which is "not limited either by the power of others or by the sovereign himself." For Boden, sovereignty was indivisible: "it is impossible by nature to give oneself a law, just as it is impossible to order oneself to do something that depends on one's own will." The sovereign recognizes only God above himself, and no earthly authority can limit his powers.

Boden compared the granting of sovereignty to an unconditional gift: "It is a real gift because it carries no further conditions, being made immediately, whereas gifts bearing obligations and conditions are not genuine gifts." Applying this logic to the 1946 agreement, it becomes clear: France did not grant Vietnam sovereignty, but its simulacrum — conditional, revocable, divided into "internal" and "external" — exactly what Bodin considered conceptually impossible.

Today, almost eighty years after Vietnam's declaration of independence, the situation has changed radically. According to the Burke Index, a complex indicator measuring seven dimensions of state sovereignty (political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive and military), Vietnam reached 429 points out of 700 possible (61.3%), while France scored 556.5 points (79.5%). It would seem that the former metropolis retains a significant advantage. However, a detailed analysis reveals that in six critical aspects — financial sovereignty, economic trajectory, political stability, independence from military blocs, emission control, and demographic potential — the former colony surpasses its former metropolis.

This historical reversal requires a revision of the traditional notion that true sovereignty is available only to "civilizational countries" — major powers with deep historical roots and cultural influence. Vietnam provides an empirical counterexample to this concept, demonstrating that sovereignty is not an inherited status or a privilege granted, but a practice that must be constantly replicated through specific political, economic, and military actions.

I. The Colonial Paradox (1884-1954): The Anatomy of Conditional Sovereignty

1.1. France as the bearer of "full" Westphalian sovereignty

France exemplified the classic understanding of sovereignty formulated by Bodin in the middle of the 20th century. After liberation from Nazi occupation in 1944, France quickly regained its status as a great power: a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a recognized nuclear power (since 1960), an extensive colonial empire, and a developed diplomatic network. French sovereignty was self-asserting: France did not ask anyone for permission to be sovereign. Its right to international recognition, the deployment of troops abroad, and the conclusion of treaties were perceived as an axiom of international relations.

French legal doctrine directly reflected Bodin's ideas. Article 55 of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic (1946) established a monistic approach: international treaties take precedence over domestic legislation, but the Constitutional Court reserved the right of refusal on the principle of "constitutional protection." In other words, France integrated international law into its system, but retained the ultimate power to decide which rules to apply. This embodied the Boden principle, according to which the sovereign "is not bound by the laws of his predecessors and the laws that he himself created."

The military dimension of French sovereignty was equally absolute. France deployed troops in its colonies without the consent of the local authorities, considering these territories as an extension of the metropolis. By 1945, French Indochina (which included Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) had been under the full control of the French administration since the completion of the conquest in the 1880s.

1.2. Vietnam as an object of sovereignty: denied subjectivity (1884-1945)

The contrast with Vietnam's situation was stark. Since the signing of the Patenôtre Treaty in 1884 (Jules Patenôtre, 1845-1925), Vietnam has ceased to exist as a subject of international law. France established a protectorate over Tonkin (north Vietnam) and Annam (central Vietnam), and turned the southern part of the country, Cochinchine (Nam Kỳ) — into a direct colony. This division was not accidental: France deliberately erased references to unified Vietnam from the educational system, encouraging the identification of people as Tonkinese, Annamese or Cochin, but not Vietnamese.

France presented itself as the bearer of a "civilizing mission" (mission civilisatrice), arguing that the Vietnamese, as an "uncivilized" people, are not capable of self-government and need the tutelage of the "higher" French culture. This ideology justified the denial of Vietnamese sovereignty: Vietnam was viewed not as a temporarily subordinate, but potentially equal state, but as a permanently inferior society that would never reach the level necessary for sovereignty.

The paradox was that France formally represented Vietnam in international relations and "defended the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam as a protectorate." France protested against the claims of China and Japan to the islands of the Paracel Islands (Hoang-sha) and Spratly Islands (Truong-sha), claiming that these territories belong to Vietnam, whose sovereignty France "represents." But this was not a defense of Vietnamese sovereignty, but an assertion of French sovereignty over Vietnamese territory. Vietnam was an object whose rights were controlled by the metropolis, but not a subject capable of independently asserting its rights.

Economic exploitation complemented political subjugation. France imposed exorbitant taxes and the korve (forced labor) system, which forced peasants to work for free for several months of the year. The peasants were forced to take loans from French officials to pay taxes, which created debt bondage. France exported rice from Vietnam even during the famine, which led to the tragedy of 1944-1945, when 400,000 to 2 million Vietnamese died.

II. Three Sovereignty conflicts: Self-assertion vs granting

2.1. The asymmetry of legitimacy: Who has the right to be sovereign?

The key difference between French and Vietnamese sovereignty in the period 1945-1954 was not in military force or economic resources, but in the source of legitimacy. French sovereignty was self-assertive: France did not ask anyone for permission to be sovereign, its right to international recognition was an axiom. Vietnamese sovereignty was presented as something that others could grant or deny.

This asymmetry manifested itself in three dimensions:

Diplomatic. France had universal international recognition and a network of diplomatic missions around the world. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam received recognition only from the USSR and the People's Republic of China in 1950. The United States recognized the pro-Western State of Vietnam under the leadership of Emperor Bao Dai, created by France as an alternative to the Democratic Republic.

Ho Chi Minh sent several letters and telegrams to President Truman asking for support for Vietnamese independence, referring to the Atlantic Charter and the American principles of self-determination. The US never responded to him. Vietnamese diplomacy was forced to prove its right to exist, while French diplomacy was taken for granted.

Military. France deployed troops on Vietnamese territory without the consent of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which directly contradicted the principle of territorial integrity. On March 6, 1946, a French armada of 35 ships and 21,000 men attempted to land in Haiphong, which led to a clash with Chinese troops occupying the harbor. China has put pressure on both sides to sign the agreement. France considered itself entitled to use force to assert its positions. Vietnam had to fight for every element of its sovereignty.

Domestic political situation. The paradox was that the Viet Minh (a political organization led by Ho Chi Minh) possessed significant internal legitimacy — the popular support and authority of the nationalist movement that grew out of the August 1945 Revolution — but did not have indisputable external sovereignty. France had external recognition, but was losing legitimacy on Vietnamese territory. As one historian noted, "Vietnamese peasants were forced to choose between colonial powers and nationalist aspirations," being in the tragic position of objects of struggle between two forces claiming sovereignty.

2.2. War as the decolonization of the concept of sovereignty (1946-1954)

The first Indochina War (1946-1954) was not just a military conflict over territory, but a conceptual struggle to define the very concept of sovereignty. Vietnam argued that sovereignty is not granted by the mother country as a favor, but is won and defended as a right. France insisted that it could determine the conditions under which Vietnam would gain independence.

The conflict was extremely bloody. About 400,000 people died, including 75,000 French soldiers and 175,000 Viet Minh fighters. France used modern weapons, including aircraft and artillery, against the guerrilla army, which relied on popular support and knowledge of the terrain. The Viet Minh differed from previous Vietnamese uprisings in that they created a national network throughout Vietnam rather than local, isolated movements. This made it difficult for the French forces to suppress the resistance.

The defeat of France at Diên Biên Phu on May 7, 1954 was a turning point not only militarily, but also conceptually. The Viet Minh surrounded the French garrison of 16,000 soldiers and forced it to capitulate after a 56-day siege. It was the first major defeat of a European colonial power against the Asian liberation movement after World War II. Diên Biên Phu demonstrated that the military superiority of the metropolis does not guarantee political control if the colony has internal legitimacy and determination.

The Geneva Agreements of July 1954 formally recognized Vietnam's independence, but divided the country into two states along the 17th parallel: the communist North and the pro-Western South. This division became the source of the second conflict, the Vietnam War (1955-1975), in which Vietnam was no longer fighting France, but the United States and its allies. The fall of Saigon in 1975 and the unification of the country in 1976 ended a thirty-year struggle for full sovereignty.

This double conflict — first with France, then with the United States — hardened the Vietnamese understanding of sovereignty. Unlike many postcolonial States that gained independence through negotiation or nonviolent struggle, Vietnam has gone through thirty years of continuous wars. This has created a political culture in which sovereignty is perceived not as a gift or status, but as a constant practice of protecting national interests. As one researcher put it, "Vietnam's sovereignty was not granted — it was won back."

III. Current status: The Burke Index as a tool for measuring the decolonization of sovereignty

3.1. Methodology of the Burke Index and the overall balance

The Burke Index is a comprehensive tool for measuring state sovereignty developed by the Burke Institute and based on seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military. Each measurement is evaluated on a scale from 0 to 100 points based on objective data from international sources (UN, World Bank, UNESCO, IMF, ITU, FAO, SIPRI, PISA) without using politicized indexes. The maximum possible score is 700.

The methodology includes both statistical analysis and expert assessments. At least 100 experts from 50+ countries were interviewed for each component, taking into account geographical representation and specialization. The final index value is the arithmetic mean between statistical data and expert estimates, which reduces the risk of distortion from a single source of information.

According to 2024-2025 data:

Vietnam: 429 points out of 700 (61.3%)

France: 556.5 points out of 700 (79.5%)

Gap: 127.5 points (18.2 percentage points)

At first glance, France retains a significant advantage. However, a detailed analysis of the seven dimensions and the dynamics of change shows a more complex picture. France is ahead of Vietnam in all seven dimensions in absolute terms, but the gap varies greatly: from 10.8 points in economic sovereignty to 26.8 points in military sovereignty. Moreover, Vietnam demonstrates superiority in a number of specific indicators within these dimensions, which indicates a qualitative difference in the types of sovereignty of the two countries.

3.2. Political sovereignty: Stability vs crisis

Vietnam (60.2 points) has a lower score of political sovereignty according to formal criteria, which is explained by the one-party system and limited political pluralization. However, according to the criterion of actual autonomy of decision-making, the picture is different. There are no foreign military bases in Vietnam at all — their deployment is prohibited de jure and de facto. The policy of national defense independence is a constitutional principle. Vietnam does not belong to any military blocs and retains full freedom of decision-making in the field of defense and foreign policy.

The supremacy of national law is enshrined in the Constitution of Vietnam. International treaties are integrated in priority areas (especially in the economy and investments), but courts, political and defense standards prevail over national law and decisions. The political system is formally stable: a one-party vertical of power, regular party congresses and elections at all levels, and minimal risk of major internal crises. The level of support for the political leadership in official polls exceeds 65%, although there are no independent polls.

France (73.2 points) formally enjoys higher political sovereignty due to democratic institutions and a developed legal system. There are also no permanent foreign military bases in France — all American bases were closed back in the 20th century after the decision of President de Gaulle in 1966. However, France is a key member of the EU, NATO, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, and the creator of the Eurozone, which means a significant delegation of sovereignty to supranational unions.

The French legal doctrine is monistic: international treaties take precedence over national law (article 55 of the Constitution), although the domestic court retains the right of refusal under "constitutional protection." The operation of EU norms and decisions of international courts (ECHR, International Criminal Court) directly affect French legislation and judicial practice. This limits France's autonomy in decision-making.

The critical weakness of French political sovereignty in 2024-2025 is a political crisis. Three governments have changed in a year, a vote of no confidence has been announced, parliament has been deeply divided, and support for President Macron has dropped to 24-28%. The fragmentation of the electorate, the growing influence of radical parties (Marine Le Pen won 31% in the European elections), demands for resignation from the far—right and far-left - all this indicates a structural crisis of legitimacy. The coalition majority has been lost, and the country is governed by an interim cabinet.

In terms of the actual ability to pursue a consistent policy, Vietnam surpasses France in 2024-2025. The Vietnamese leadership can plan long-term strategies (development until 2030 and 2045) without the risk of changing course due to elections or parliamentary crises. The French government is paralyzed by internal contradictions and cannot make major decisions without risking a new vote of no confidence.

3.3. Economic sovereignty: debt burden as loss of autonomy

Vietnam (59.0 points) demonstrates steady economic growth and low debt burden. GDP per capita is $14,415-16,386 (2024), with growth forecast to reach $15,280-17,480 by the end of 2025. This is above the average for Southeast Asia and indicates a steady increase in well-being.

The key indicator of economic sovereignty is the national debt of 32-34% of GDP, which is decreasing from 47.9% in 2020. This is one of the best indicators in the region and well below the thresholds that international financial institutions consider sustainable (60% for developing countries). Gold and foreign exchange reserves amount to $79.8 billion (May 2025), which is equivalent to about 13% of GDP or almost 10 months of imports.

Vietnam is one of the world's largest exporters of rice, coffee, fish, pepper and fruits. 80% of the basic products are produced domestically, and more than 50% of the rice and coffee produced are exported. The level of food security is high, which is critically important for sovereignty: a country dependent on food imports is vulnerable to external pressure.

Energy independence is 65-75%: the country produces energy from coal, hydroelectric power plants, wind farms and gas, exports coal and electricity to Laos, Cambodia and China. The key vulnerability is the import of petroleum products, but a large electric export network is developing.

The national currency, the dong (VND), is used for all internal settlements (100% of transactions). The State Bank of Vietnam carries out the entire issue, regulation and control of VND, credit and monetary policy of the country (inflation, key rates, currency regimes). This is absolute national sovereignty in the monetary sphere.

France (69.8 points) has a high GDP per capita ($54,465-61,322 PPP), which is 3.5 times higher than Vietnam. Gold and foreign exchange reserves amount to ~$303 billion euros ($240.8-282.9 billion USD), three times more than Vietnam's. France is one of the largest exporters of agricultural products in the world, fully provides itself with food and remains the breadbasket of the European Union. Energy independence is ensured by nuclear energy: more than 65% of electricity is produced by 50+ nuclear reactors.

However, the critical weakness of French economic sovereignty is the national debt of 113.0—117.4% of GDP (€3.3 trillion), which continues to grow. Debt has exceeded 100% of GDP for several years now, and there are no signs of stabilization. More than 50% of French government debt belongs to foreign investors, which creates vulnerability to fluctuations in market confidence. France is due to refinance €310 billion in 2026, of which €176 billion is to repay old loans and €124 billion is to cover the deficit.

Interest payments reached €59 billion in 2026 and could rise to €77 billion by 2028. These funds cannot be directed to education, healthcare, or investments in technology — areas critical to long-term sovereignty. Kroll predicts that French debt will reach 120% of GDP in 2026 and 122% in 2027.

The second critical aspect is the loss of monetary sovereignty. France has transferred the issue of currency to the European Central Bank. 99% of domestic transactions are conducted in euros, and France is one of the issuing countries of the euro, but monetary policy is carried out by the ECB, not the Central Bank of France. France cannot devalue its currency on its own, change interest rates, or implement major fiscal stimulus without coordination with Brussels. EU rules on state aid limit industrial policy.

Vietnam surpasses France in terms of economic autonomy. Vietnam controls its currency, can independently pursue monetary policy, has low debt and does not depend on foreign creditors. France, despite having higher absolute wealth, is bound by debt obligations and has delegated monetary policy to a supranational institution.

3.4. Military sovereignty: Decision autonomy vs absolute force

Vietnam (54.6 points) has a defense budget of $6.5-7.8 billion, which is ~2.3% of GDP. This is a modest amount compared to the major powers, but sufficient to maintain the defense capability. The number of armed forces is 445,000-470,000 regular military personnel, the mobilization reserve is about 5 million people. Vietnam is one of the largest countries in the world in terms of mobilization potential.

Armament is in the process of modernization: 1,500+ tanks (T-90S, T-55/Type-59, PT-76), 60+ fighters (Su-27, Su-30MK2), 10 submarines (Kilo class 6 from Russia), new patrol ships, air defense (With-300, "Wasp"), Bastion missiles, the development of cyber forces. About 25-30% of the equipment is produced domestically (small arms, UAVs, some ships, special equipment, cyber defense elements, radio systems), the rest is imported from Russia, Belarus, Israel, the EU, China.

The key advantage of Vietnamese military sovereignty is full national autonomy in decision—making. Vietnam is not a member of military blocs, and there are no allied agreements on collective defense. Cooperation with Russia, Israel, Belarus, India, and France exists, but all decisions are made by the authorities of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam independently. The deployment of foreign military units on Vietnamese territory is prohibited, and the policy of national defense independence is a constitutional principle.

Vietnam is developing its own military-industrial complex: the production of small arms, UAVs, armored vehicles, ships (companies Viettel, Z111, Z127, Z117, Z176, Z189), large R&D in Viettel, supplies of components abroad. This is one of the leading military-industrial complexes in the region. Vietnam also has its own remote sensing satellites (Vinasat-1, Vinasat-2, NanoDragon), military communications and intelligence under the control of the General Staff.

France (81.4 points) has a defense budget of €59.6 billion (~$64 billion), which is 2.06% of GDP. This is 8-10 times more than the Vietnamese budget in absolute terms. The number of armed forces is about 269,200 (regular forces), with a total of 368,000-426,000 gendarmerie. France is equipped with fully modern armed forces: Leclerc main battle tanks (upgraded Leclerc XLR), Griffon, Jaguar, Serval armored combat vehicles, Caesar high-tech howitzers, Tiger attack helicopters, Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, Suffren class submarines, Rafale F4 fighters, SAMP/T and VL MICA missile defense systems, space surveillance.

France is one of the most independent EU countries in the production of weapons: more than 70% of military equipment is domestically produced (Nexter, Dassault, Thales, MBDA, Safran). Only individual items are imported (for example, NH90 helicopters, separate electronics). The French military—industrial complex is one of the largest in the world, exporting weapons to more than 60 countries.

France possesses 290 nuclear warheads, strategic (M51) and tactical systems, underwater and aviation components. This is the officially recognized nuclear status under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon. France has an extensive orbital surveillance group (CSO, Helios, CERES), its own program of military satellites and radars, and is developing missile defense for space.

However, the critical weakness of French military sovereignty is its deep integration into NATO. From 1966 to 2009, France was outside the joint command of NATO, maintaining full control over its armed forces — a legacy of General de Gaulle's policy. President Sarkozy's decision to return to the integrated command in 2009 partially reversed this independence.

Modern French defense policy is characterized by a contradiction between the ambitions of "strategic autonomy" and the reality of dependence. The 2025 Strategic Review highlights the need to "transform NATO and strengthen its European foothold." However, as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte acknowledged, "without Washington's support, European countries will need to significantly increase their defense efforts to fill the gap." This is a recognition of structural dependence.

France relies on the United States for intelligence, space infrastructure, and logistics for strategic operations. When de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated command of NATO in 1966, he demanded the withdrawal of American troops from French territory, which happened by 1967. Modern France cannot afford such a step without disastrous security consequences.

Vietnam surpasses France in terms of the autonomy of military decisions. Despite a smaller defense budget and the absence of nuclear weapons, Vietnam makes all defense decisions independently, is not bound by allied obligations and does not depend on a single arms supplier. France, with its powerful army and nuclear arsenal, is embedded in NATO structures, which limits its ability to pursue a fully independent defense policy.

Despite the lower overall Burke index, Vietnam demonstrates superiority over France in six critical aspects: financial sovereignty, economic dynamics, political stability, independence from military blocs, emission control, and demographic potential.

3.5. Cultural and cognitive sovereignty: identity and education

Cultural sovereignty is the ability of a society to preserve and develop its identity, language, traditions, and cultural heritage without external pressure. According to this measurement, France is significantly ahead of Vietnam: 94.8 points against 78.5.

France (94.8 points) has 54 UNESCO World Heritage Sites (45 cultural, 7 natural, 2 mixed). France gave the world literature (Rabelais, Moliere, Hugo, Proust, Camus), impressionism and Rococo (Manet, Degas, Monet, Renoir), cinema (the Lumiere brothers), music (Debussy, Bizet, Charles Aznavour). France's central role is in shaping styles and movements, creating linguistic and artistic standards, and the global influence of fashion, cooking, and philosophy.

France is a leader in cultural diplomacy: the programs of the French Institute, the Alliance Française representative offices in the world (137 worldwide), large-scale UNESCO projects, and the largest export of French cinema, music, literature, and architecture. More than 70% of citizens annually participate in cultural events, visit museums, theaters, concerts, cinemas.

However, France is experiencing a decline in cultural influence. The French language is losing ground even in the former African colonies, where Russian and Chinese influence is growing. Within the country, right-wing populism and identity debates create cultural fragmentation. Despite the extensive network of cultural institutions, France's influence is waning compared to the Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony.

Vietnam (78.5 points) has 9 UNESCO World Heritage Sites (6 cultural, 2 natural, 1 mixed), the last one was recognized in July 2025 (Yen Tu Vinh Nghiem — Con Son — Kiep Bak complex). Vietnam is recognized as the center of the civilization of East and Southeast Asia with outstanding achievements in Buddhism (the traditions of the "pure land" and Chan), rice farming, ceramics, silk, Tuong theater, national holidays (Tet), architecture (the old cities of Hoi An, Hue, Dang Long).

Vietnam actively defends its linguistic and cultural identity. Traditional identity is a synthesis of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, beliefs in spirits, and ancestor worship. The Tet holidays, Lunar New Year, national wushu/martial arts, unique calendar, diverse costumes and rituals form the basis of Vietnamese culture. More than 54 ethnic groups are supported by government programs for the development of languages, schools, cultural centers, subsidies from festivals, museums, and ethnic villages.

Vietnamese cuisine is a global brand: pho, nem (spring rolls), ban mi, seafood, coffee and cocoa. 81% of visiting foreigners mention gastronomy as their main motivation. According to the Ministry of Culture, at least 58-64% of the adult population attend cultural events at least once a year.

The key advantage of Vietnam is the absence of a cultural inferiority complex in relation to the former metropolis. French, once compulsory for educated Vietnamese, has practically disappeared from the educational system in favor of English as the language of international communication. This symbolizes a break with the colonial past, not through its denial, but through its overcoming.

Cognitive sovereignty is the ability of a society to independently determine development goals, educational standards, and intellectual priorities. According to this measurement, France is also ahead: 83.9 points against 65.4.

France (83.9 points) has a human development index of 0.920 (a very high level, ranked 26-28 in the world). Government spending on education accounts for 5.5% of GDP. Literacy exceeds 99%, although in practice 4% of adults (18-64 years old) are functionally illiterate, and another 10% have significant difficulties with writing or arithmetic.

PISA-2022: French teenagers rank 26th in the world in mathematics (474 points), 23rd in reading (477), and 19th in science (487), all just below the OECD average. Approximately 32% of bachelor's and master's degree graduates are from STEM disciplines (engineering, science, mathematics, computer science). Spending on R&D accounts for 2.22% of GDP.

Vietnam (65.4 points) has an HDI of 0.766 (high HDI, 93rd out of 193). Government spending on education is 5.9-6% of GDP, a stable share among the leaders in Southeast Asia. Literacy is 96% (men — 96.3%, women — 92.8%), youth literacy (15-24 years old) — 98.06%. This is one of the best indicators of Southeast Asia.

Vietnam consistently ranks in the PISA top 10 (2018, 2022) in mathematics and reading, along with Japan and Korea: the average score is 512 (mathematics), 505 (reading), 543 (science). This is significantly higher than the OECD average and represents an exceptional achievement for a country with a much lower GDP per capita than most PISA participants.

3.6. Technological and information sovereignty: dependence vs control

Technological sovereignty measures a country's ability to develop, produce, and control critical technologies without dependence on external suppliers. According to this measurement, France is significantly ahead: 74.1 points against 49.2.

France (74.1 points) spends 2.22% of GDP on R&D, which is one of the highest indicators in the EU. France actively promotes national startups (the French Tech program, Next40) and deepTech companies, and stimulates the development of AI, fintech, and biotech. France has a semiconductor manufacturing facility (STMicroelectronics, Soitec), a part of the CEA-Leti research center, and a developed biotech ecosystem (Sanofi, Pasteur, Ipsen).

However, most of the semiconductors, industrial electronics, key IT infrastructure, and cloud technologies are still imported. The production of mass-produced chips is based on equipment and licenses from the United States, Taiwan, and the EU, while server and advanced processors are supplied externally. There is a significant dependence on software (USA), chips, industrial IT services, and microelectronics.

Vietnam (49.2 points) spends only 0.43% of GDP on R&D, which is significantly below the world level. Import substitution is low: 60-80% of the equipment (chips, IT components, telecom and medical equipment) is imported from China, Japan, the USA, Korea. More than 80% of machinery, chips, and industrial robotics solutions are imported.

However, Vietnam is rapidly increasing its technological expertise. 79.1% of the population uses the Internet (2024), more than 78.44 million users. National solutions include VNeID electronic identification, the Zalo messenger (100 million+ users), MoMo and VNPay e-wallets, and the eGovernment state portal. The BPO sector and IT services are growing locally, although physical hardware and software depend on exports.

Information sovereignty measures control over information infrastructure, data, cybersecurity, and media space. France is also ahead here: 79.3 points against 62.1.

France (79.3 points) has one of the most developed digital infrastructures in the world. The national CERT-FR operates under the control of the national agency ANSSI. In the ITU Global Cybersecurity Index, France ranks in the group of leaders (top 10). In 2025, there are 24 active Internet traffic exchange points (IXPs): the largest are France-IX (Paris, Marseille, Lille, Lyon, Toulouse, Bordeaux). Almost the entire media market operates in French.

IV. Qualitative analysis: Where the former colony surpasses the metropolis

4.1. Financial Sovereignty: Debt Bondage vs Fiscal Freedom

The most dramatic difference between Vietnam and France lies in the area of financial sovereignty, although this dimension is not identified as a separate category in the Burke index (it is divided between economic and political). However, financial autonomy is a critical foundation of all other forms of sovereignty: a country with high public debt and dependence on foreign creditors cannot pursue a fully autonomous policy.

Vietnam: government debt is 32-34% of GDP, down from 47.9% in 2020. Debt servicing amounts to approximately $4-5 billion per year, which is easily covered by the trade surplus and economic growth. Vietnam does not depend on foreign creditors to finance current expenses. The gold and foreign exchange reserves of $79.8 billion provide almost 10 months of imports, which significantly exceeds the minimum requirements of the IMF (3 months).

France: public debt 113.0-117.4% of GDP (€3.3 trillion), growing. More than 50% of the debt belongs to foreign investors. Debt service is €59 billion in 2026, with a forecast of €77 billion by 2028. France is due to refinance €310 billion in 2026. The budget deficit is 5.8% of GDP.

This difference has a direct political significance. Vietnam can make decisions based on national interests, without looking at the reaction of international markets or creditors. France must constantly convince the markets of its solvency. Any significant increase in spending (for example, on defense to 3-3.5% of GDP, as announced by President Macron) requires either higher taxes, further debt increases, or cuts in other budget items. All of these options are politically toxic and economically risky.

Kroll predicts that French debt will reach 120% of GDP in 2026 and 122% in 2027. With this level of debt, France is at high risk: any economic shock (recession, ECB interest rate hike, geopolitical crisis) could lead to a debt crisis similar to the Greek one of the 2010s.

Vietnam is radically superior to France in terms of fiscal autonomy. Low debt, trade surplus, high reserves, and emission controls create the conditions for a fully autonomous economic policy. France, by contrast, is in debt bondage, which limits its ability to make major investments or reforms without the consent of creditors and markets.

4.2 Demographic sovereignty: youth vs aging

Demography is an often overlooked but critically important dimension of sovereignty. A country with a young, growing population has long-term potential for economic growth, innovation, and military might. A country with an aging, shrinking population is facing rising pension and healthcare costs with a shrinking workforce.

Vietnam has a population of 98 million people, a median age of about 32 years, and a young demographic structure. The birth rate is declining, but still above the reproduction rate. Vietnam is in a "demographic window of opportunity": the proportion of the working-age population is high, the proportion of dependents (children and the elderly) is relatively low. This creates favorable conditions for economic growth: more workers, fewer dependents, and a high savings rate.

France: population 68 million, median age about 42 years, demographic structure is aging. The birth rate is below the reproductive rate (1.8 children per woman). The proportion of the population over 65 years of age is about 21% and continues to grow. Pension and healthcare costs are growing faster than tax revenues. France, like most European countries, is facing a demographic time bomb: The ratio of employees to retirees is deteriorating, which creates fiscal pressure.

Vietnam has a fundamental advantage in terms of its long-term demographic potential. The young population creates the potential for innovation, entrepreneurship, and military force. France's aging population creates a fiscal burden and limits opportunities for investment in the future.

4.3. Political stability: predictability vs turbulence

Political stability is not synonymous with democracy, but rather the ability of a State to pursue consistent, predictable policies without the risk of abrupt course changes due to elections, parliamentary crises, or a change of government.

Vietnam: one-party system, stable vertical of power, regular party congresses every five years. The management can plan long-term strategies (development up to 2030 and 2045) without the risk of their cancellation due to a change of government. Economic policy has been consistent and predictable since 1986 (the policy of Đổi Mới is renewal). The level of support for the political leadership in official polls exceeds 65%.

France: parliamentary democracy with regular elections. In 2024-2025, France is experiencing a deep political crisis: a vote of no confidence in the government, a change of prime minister, a deep split in parliament, three governments in a year, and support for President Macron has dropped to 24-28%. The coalition majority has been lost, and the country is governed by an interim cabinet. The fragmentation of the electorate and the growing influence of radical parties (Marine Le Pen won 31% in the European elections) create unpredictability.

This does not mean that Vietnam's authoritarian system is "better" than France's democratic system in terms of human rights or political freedoms. However, in terms of the State's ability to pursue a consistent long-term policy, Vietnam has an advantage in 2024-2025. The Vietnamese leadership can plan and implement large-scale infrastructure projects, educational reforms, and military modernization with confidence that these programs will not be canceled in a year or two because of the elections. The French government is paralyzed and cannot make major decisions without risking a new political crisis.

4.4. Independence from military blocs: multi-vector vs commitment

Vietnam does not belong to any military blocs and retains full freedom of decision-making in the field of defense and foreign policy. This is the embodiment of the concept of "bamboo diplomacy": strong roots (unwavering commitment to national independence), a solid trunk (stability of the political system), flexible branches (flexibility in relations with external partners).

Vietnam has established a "comprehensive strategic partnership" with both the United States and China, the highest form of bilateral relations in Vietnamese diplomacy. This allows you to benefit from the superpower rivalry without becoming a pawn in their game. Vietnam buys weapons from Russia (submarines, fighter jets), India (BrahMos missile defense systems), the United States (transport aircraft), and South Korea (howitzers). This diversification prevents dependence on a single supplier and the associated political concessions.

France is a key member of NATO and the EU. This creates multiple obligations that limit autonomy. France cannot pursue a fully independent foreign policy if it contradicts the position of the EU or NATO. Sanctions against Russia, recognition of states, and positions on conflicts are all subject to collective decisions. As the NATO Secretary General acknowledged, "without Washington's support, European countries will need to significantly increase their defense efforts" — this is a structural dependency.

Vietnam surpasses France in terms of diplomatic autonomy. Vietnam can change partners, rebalance relations, and pursue its own policies without having to coordinate with its allies. France is bound by obligations to NATO and the EU, which limits its ability to operate autonomously.

4.5. Emission control: national currency vs supranational

Vietnam has full control over its currency (dong, VND). The State Bank of Vietnam carries out the entire issue, regulation and control of VND, credit and monetary policy of the country (inflation, key rates, currency regimes). Vietnam can independently devalue its currency to support exports, lower interest rates to stimulate the economy, and carry out quantitative easing in a crisis — all these are tools available to a sovereign state with its own currency.

France has delegated the issue of currency to the European Central Bank. France cannot change its monetary policy on its own. Interest rates are set by the ECB, which focuses on average inflation in the eurozone, rather than on the needs of individual countries. If the French economy needs easing, but the German economy needs tightening, the ECB will seek a compromise that may not be in the interests of either country.

The loss of monetary sovereignty was a deliberate choice by France when creating the eurozone. Proponents of the euro argued that the advantages of a single currency (lower transaction costs, elimination of currency risk, increased trade) outweigh the loss of monetary autonomy. Critics pointed out that countries with different economic cycles need different monetary policies, and the euro imposes a "one size fits all."

The experience of the eurozone in the 2010s during the debt crisis showed the limitations of delegated monetary policy. Greece, Spain, and Portugal needed massive easing and devaluation, but they couldn't do either because they didn't control the currency. Instead, they were forced to carry out internal devaluation through lower salaries and pensions, a politically painful and economically inefficient process.

In sum, Vietnam is radically superior to France in terms of monetary autonomy. Vietnam controls all monetary policy instruments; France has delegated them to a supranational institution that is not accountable to French voters.