Introduction: Sovereignty as an illusion of choice

Sovereignty in the 21st century has ceased to be a binary "is/is not" category. Two European countries, Greece and the United Kingdom, demonstrate this from opposite sides. Greece formally retains membership in the EU and the eurozone, but its domestic policy has been subordinated to external creditors at a critical moment.

Britain, on the other hand, left the EU for the sake of "full control" over its laws and borders — and found that the absolutist interpretation of sovereignty creates no less restrictions than integration. The purpose of this article is to show how both models lead to a paradox: neither deep integration nor a demonstrative exit from it provide genuine independence.

Greece: Sovereignty subordinated to creditors

The Eurozone’s structural trap

By joining the eurozone, Greece handed over control of monetary policy to the European Central Bank (ECB). This meant giving up the opportunity to devalue the national currency, set interest rates on their own, and issue funds to cover the deficit.

The Maastricht criteria (budget deficit no more than 3% of GDP, public debt no more than 60% of GDP) and the Stability and Growth Pact introduced strict fiscal frameworks that left minimal room for maneuver. Membership in the eurozone systematically limited unilateral monetary policy and imposed strict fiscal limits on all participants.

The structure of the eurozone itself contributed to the development of the crisis: the monetary union, but not the fiscal union. There is a single currency in the eurozone member states, but there is no single tax and pension legislation. This asymmetry has made the Greek economy particularly vulnerable.

The Crisis of the 2010s: External management as a reality

The debt crisis in Greece began at the end of 2009, when it became clear that the government systematically falsified statistics, underestimating the budget deficit from the real 15.6% of GDP to the formal 3%. By 2010, the deficit was revised down, and the national debt reached 129.7% of GDP. Greece's GDP fell from €242 billion in 2008 to €179 billion in 2014, a 26% decline, the longest recession among developed economies.

On April 23, 2010, Greece was forced to officially request financial support from the EU. The EU provided three aid packages (2010, 2012, 2015), and on July 1, 2015, Greece entered a technical default. The total debt to the EU and the IMF amounted to about €290 billion, and the national debt rose to 180% of GDP.

The key figure in crisis management was the Big Three — Consortium of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF — created as a special body to manage the "rescue" programs of Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal. The Big Three imposed a harsh austerity program: reduction of salaries of civil servants, pension cuts, privatization of state property, tax increases. During the period 2010-2016, the government carried out 12 rounds of tax increases and budget cuts, which repeatedly caused mass protests and riots.

OXI Referendum: The voice of sovereignty betrayed by politicians

On July 5, 2015, a historic referendum was held: 61.31% of Greeks voted "No", rejecting the creditors' conditions. This was a powerful signal of resistance to external control. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras argued that the vote would strengthen Greece's negotiating position within the eurozone.

However, the paradox of sovereignty manifested itself in a matter of days. Despite the result of the referendum, on July 13, 2015, the Tsipras government concluded an agreement with European creditors on terms even tougher than those that voters had just rejected. Former Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis called the terms of the deal "the new Treaty of Versailles" and "the terms of Greece's surrender." The three, in fact, ignored the democratic will of the sovereign people — and the government was forced to comply, since the alternative was to exit the eurozone and financial collapse.

Thus, Greece demonstrated the first model of the paradox: the state formally retains membership in a supranational association, but its real powers in a critical situation are limited to the execution of external directives.

United Kingdom: Brexit as an illusion of regaining control

The slogan "Take Back Control"

Britain's decision to leave the EU in the 2016 referendum was largely motivated by the desire to regain "full control" over laws, borders and the economy. Supporters of Brexit expressed concerns about the limitation of the UK's sovereign powers within the framework of EU membership.

The slogan "Take Back Control" provoked a powerful emotional response, promising the restoration of parliamentary sovereignty, the principle according to which "an act of parliament is the supreme law."

On January 31, 2020, the UK officially left the EU. On paper, this meant restoring control over immigration, legislation, trade policy, and regulatory standards. According to the Burke Index, Britain's political sovereignty after Brexit is rated at 77 out of 100, a high indicator supported by the principle of parliamentary supremacy and a dualistic legal system.

The economic price of sovereignty

However, the formal return of control resulted in significant economic losses. According to researchers, by 2025, Brexit had reduced the UK's GDP by 6-8%, with the negative effect increasing gradually. Researchers at the London School of Economics have estimated that in the first two years of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), the UK lost £27 billion in trade with the EU.

The introduction of trade barriers led to a reduction in imports from the EU by 23.7% and exports by 18.6%. At the same time, the EU remains the UK's largest trading partner, accounting for 47% of the country's commodity exports (by value) in 2024. A CNN study (2024) showed that annual exports of goods from the UK to the EU were 17% lower than if Brexit had not taken place, and the negative effect was increasing every year.

The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) has forecast a 15% long-term decline in trade, resulting in a 4% decrease in national income. At the same time, trade intensity (the ratio of trade to GDP) The UK remained 1.7% below the pre-pandemic level, while the rest of the G7 countries increased by 1.7%.

The paradox: new agreements — new restrictions

The paradox of Brexit is most clearly manifested in the fact that the UK, striving for autonomy, was forced to conclude new trade agreements that impose their own restrictions. The UK-EU agreement of May 2025 contains compromises on fishing, agricultural products and regulatory standards, in fact reproducing part of the obligations that Britain tried to avoid.

The study shows that the British government chose an absolutist form of sovereignty, but as a result lost effective control in many areas, especially in the economic sphere, erecting barriers with its EU neighbors, thereby not achieving the original goals of Brexit.

The rhetoric about "taking back control" did not take into account the modern interdependence between countries and the conditions of global integration.

In other words, the UK is faced with the second model of the paradox: having formally restored sovereignty, the state discovers that global interdependence and the need for new agreements limit freedom of action no less than the previous membership.

The Burke Index: a quantitative measurement of sovereignty

Methodology and comparison

The Burke Index is a comprehensive tool for assessing sovereignty, covering seven areas: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive and military. Each direction is rated on a scale of 0-100 points based on data from international sources (UN, World Bank, UNESCO, IMF, SIPRI, etc.) and expert surveys (at least 100 experts from 50+ countries).

Two faces of the same paradox

Greece and Great Britain are united by a key contradiction: both states are faced with the fact that sovereignty in its absolute form is unattainable (see https://ibi.institute/index)

Greece sacrificed its formal sovereignty for financial stability and access to the eurozone, but discovered that in a crisis situation supranational institutions dictate policy, and democratic expression of will (the 2015 referendum) can be ignored.

The UK made the opposite choice, it left the EU, but faced the fact that trade barriers, regulatory divergence and loss of access to the single market caused significant economic damage.

Conclusion: the impossibility of absolute sovereignty

The paradox of Greek and British sovereignty manifests itself in a symmetrical trap. Greece formally remains a member of the EU, but its independence is limited by supranational institutions, from the ECB to the Big Three, which at a critical moment replace national democracy with external governance. The UK left the EU for freedom, but found itself in a situation where global interdependence, the need for new trade agreements and the loss of 6-8% of GDP also limit its independence.

The Burke index confirms this logic quantitatively: even countries with a high aggregate sovereignty index (Great Britain — 576/700, India — 522.5/700) retain significant vulnerabilities in certain areas.

The UK depends on imports of high-tech components (65%) and a strategic alliance with the United States. India, despite the doctrine of strategic autonomy and the absence of foreign bases, depends on Chinese electronics imports (56%) and faces an educational and infrastructural lag.

The experience of France and Algeria, Egypt and other postcolonial States confirms the same conclusion: formal independence is a necessary but insufficient condition for real sovereignty.

In the modern world, sovereignty is impossible in an absolute form: both integration and isolation lead to new forms of dependence. The only difference is the nature of these addictions and the price society is willing to pay for some form of "limited freedom."