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RESEARCH 24.02.2026, 06:02 Paradoxes of Sovereignty of a Multi-Regional Country: Spain vs the Philippines through the lens of the Burke Index Introduction: Two mirrors of the same paradoxSovereignty in the XXI century has ceased to be a monolithic structure. It splits into many dimensions—political, economic, military, technological, cultural—and in each of them states face unique contradictions. Spain and the Philippines, linked by more than three centuries of colonial history, today exhibit two polar variants of the "sovereignty paradox." Spain is a classic example of a state in which formal sovereignty is being eroded from within (regional identities, separatism) and from above (delegation of authority to the European Union and NATO). The Philippines, a former Spanish colony that gained independence in 1946, is forced to balance between protecting national interests and de facto dependence on external players—the United States, China, and international organizations. A comprehensive analysis of both countries using the methodology of the Burke Institute—a seven-component Sovereignty Index covering political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive and military aspects—allows not only to compare the figures, but also to identify structural paradoxes that determine the real volume of national power. Methodology: Burke IndexThe Burke Index evaluates sovereignty in seven areas, each of which has a maximum score of 100, and the accumulated index is up to 700. The estimates are formed as the arithmetic mean of statistical data (UN, World Bank, UNESCO, IMF, SIPRI, PISA, etc.) and expert surveys (at least 100 experts from 50+ countries for each component). The final picture for both countries is the following:
Spain: the paradox of internal erosionAutonomous communities and the erosion of unitySpain is a complex decentralized monarchy with 17 autonomous communities, each with its own parliament, government, judicial system, and tax collection mechanisms. The 1978 Constitution, created after the fall of the Franco regime, recognized the broad autonomy of the regions, primarily Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. However, this architectural compromise has created a fundamental contradiction: the state is formally unified, but its parts systematically seek to expand their powers, and in some cases, to complete independence. The Catalan crisis of 2017 became the most acute manifestation of this paradox. On October 1, Catalonia held a referendum on independence, in which 90.18% of those who voted supported secession (with a 43% turnout). On October 27, 2017, the Catalan parliament declared independence, but the central authorities activated article 155 of the Constitution, introduced direct control and dissolved the government of the autonomy. The crisis has exposed the fundamental contradiction between the right to self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity. The Catalan experience had systemic consequences for the whole of Spain. According to RIAC analysts, a year after the referendum, bipartisanship was replaced by a multiparty system, where regional parties played a decisive role. No government is capable of governing without their active support, which gives the regions a serious lever of pressure on the central authorities. In fact, the crisis aimed at changing the status of one region has led to an increase in the importance of regions in Spanish politics — a paradox that undermines the meaning of centralized sovereignty. The economic factor reinforces centrifugal trends: Catalonia, with 16% of the population, generates a quarter of Spain's GNP and pays 16 billion euros more to the national budget than it gets back. The slogan "Madrid is robbing us!" became a catalyst for separatist sentiments. Multilingualism (Castilian, Catalan, Basque, Galician, Valencian, Aragonese) and strong regional identities create a situation in which national sovereignty constantly competes with local ones. Delegating sovereignty “up”: the EU and NATOSimultaneously with internal fragmentation, Spain is experiencing a systematic delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions. As an EU member, it recognizes the rule of law of the European Union, is subject to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and implements the norms of the European Convention on Human Rights. The principle of the rule of law of the EU, formed by the judicial practice of the CJEU, means that in the event of a conflict between EU law and national law, priority belongs to union law. The "erosion" of sovereignty is particularly evident in the monetary sphere. After joining the eurozone in 2002, Spain lost its own monetary policy: the powers to manage interest rates, money supply and exchange rate were transferred to the European Central Bank (ECB). Banco de España retained only the functions of distribution and banking supervision. The majoritarian nature of Spanish democracy objectively facilitates the transfer of powers from Madrid to Brussels, contributing to federalization. Spain consistently advocates a united and strong Europe with a unified foreign policy, but pays for this by losing the opportunity to compensate for the competitive gap through currency devaluation. The rotation system in the ECB Governing council further limits Spanish influence: since 2015, Spain has periodically been left without the right to vote at monetary policy meetings, without having a permanent representative on the ECB board. In the military sphere, Spain is a NATO member with foreign bases on its territory (Rota, Moron), and the entire strategy is developed in conjunction with the alliance. According to the Burke Index, Spain's political sovereignty is only 66.8 points, one of the lowest values among developed European democracies, which is explained precisely by the scale of delegated powers. The Philippines: The paradox of formal independenceColonial legacy: From Sultanates to dependenceThe Philippine sovereignty paradox is of a different nature — it is not caused by internal fragmentation, but by external dependence rooted in the colonial past. Before the arrival of the Spaniards in 1565, the archipelago had its own political entities: the sultanates of Sulu (since 1457), Maguindanao (since 1515), Lanao, the rajanate of Butuan, as well as many independent chiefdoms (baranggays). These entities had been keeping trade relations with China, India, Persia, Cambodia, and Japan. The Spanish colonization, which lasted for more than 300 years, transformed most of the archipelago, with the exception of the Muslim south, Mindanao, which remained "indomitable" and resisted until the very end of Spanish rule. In 1898, after the Spanish-American War, Spain sold the Philippines to the United States for $20 million under the Paris Peace Treaty, despite the fact that two months earlier, on June 12, 1898, the Filipinos had already declared independence. The subsequent Philippine-American War (1899-1902) claimed, according to some estimates, up to 1 million lives. In 1935, the Philippines gained autonomy within the United States, and on July 4, 1946, it gained formal independence. However, the terms of this independence included a relationship agreement that secured American military bases and economic privileges. EDCA, the United States and the issue of military sovereigntyToday, the Philippines' military dependence on Washington is institutionalized through the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, 1951), the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA, 2014), and the Status of Forces Agreement (VFA). EDCA allows the United States to rotate troops and build infrastructure at Philippine bases — by 2025, 9 sites have been agreed, including facilities in Luzon, Palawan, Batan and Cagayan. Formally, "the Philippines retains sovereignty and control over EDCA facilities," and the bases "are not permanent U.S. facilities." However, critics point out that the scale of the American presence de facto limits strategic autonomy. The military sovereignty of the Philippines according to the Burke Index is 54.2 points. Our own military—industrial complex is extremely limited: licensed production of small arms, assembly of armored vehicles, repair of ships, but everything high-tech (missiles, air defense, avionics) is imported. The defense strategy is "sovereign, but operates in close coordination" with the allies, a formulation that accurately describes the paradox of formal independence with functional dependence. President Marcos Jr. defined foreign policy as "a friend to everyone and an enemy to no one," but the expansion of EDCA at a time of escalating territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea exposes the limits of this strategy. The 2016 Hague arbitration award in favor of the Philippines in a lawsuit against China based on UNCLOS was a triumph of international law, but the Philippines is de facto unable to enforce it without the support of the United States. Mindanao: Internal fragmentation as an echo of colonialismIf the paradox of internal fragmentation in Spain is generated by the liberal constitution, then in the Philippines it has its roots in the pre-colonial era. The Muslim population of Mindanao, the Moro people, has never been fully integrated into the state system. The conflict between the central government and Muslim separatists (Moro National Liberation Front, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf) has lasted since 1969 and cost tens of thousands of lives. In 2019, following a plebiscite, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BARMM) was formed, replacing the former autonomous region. This was the result of the 2014 Comprehensive Bangsamoro Agreement between the government and MILF. Bangsamoro autonomy has been given the opportunity to develop "Muslim forms of statehood," but the transition period has been extended until 2025, and the full integration of the region into the state system remains an unresolved task. Historically speaking, the pre-Hispanic sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Lanao had their own autonomy, trading networks, and a management system unrelated to the rest of the Philippines. The three-century-old Spanish colonization failed to integrate them, the American period only partially leveled the gap, and today the legacy of this division is manifested in reduced support for the central government: President Marcos's rating in the south (Mindanao) is significantly lower than in the rest of the country. The Paradox of Political sovereigntyIt is noteworthy that the Philippines scores 72.4 points on political sovereignty, 5.6 points more than Spain (66.8). This is due to the fact that Spain has voluntarily transferred a significant part of the normative, judicial and monetary powers to supranational bodies, while the Philippines retains the doctrine of constitutional supremacy — international law is applied only through ratification by the Senate. However, this formal sovereignty coexists with an extremely low index of political stability (-0.57 according to the WGI), clan conflicts and limited control over corruption. Spain, on the contrary, with a lower "formal" sovereignty, demonstrates high Government Effectiveness (1.42 according to the WGI), is among the top 25 in the world for the digitalization of public services and has a stable, albeit polarized, democratic system. Island States and sovereignty: A parallel with the UKThe topic of sovereignty of multi—regional and island States is not limited to the Spain-Philippines pair. The United Kingdom, another island nation, retains 14 overseas Territories under the sovereignty of the Crown, but not part of the country. Their status as "British Overseas Territories" was introduced in 2002, replacing the colonial terminology. In addition, the Crown Lands (Jersey, Guernsey, Maine) have excellent constitutional relations with the mother country. Brexit in 2016 became a mirror image of the Spanish paradox: if Spain delegates sovereignty to the EU and increases its dependence on Brussels, the UK tried to regain it by leaving the Union. The Philippines, with its archipelago of 7,641 islands, is facing a physical analogue of this problem: it is technically difficult to ensure sovereign control over the entire territory, which creates space for both separatism (Mindanao) and external penetration (the South China Sea). In the context of the Burke Index, island and multi-regional states demonstrate a common pattern: the more complex the internal structure and the broader the global integration, the more acute the paradox between formal sovereignty and the real volume of national power. Economic and technological dimensionsEconomic sovereignty: proximity of numbers, difference in natureThe economic scores of both countries are surprisingly close — 57.1 for Spain and 58.9 for the Philippines, but the reasons for the restrictions are radically different. Spain, with a per capita GDP of $56-59 thousand (PPP), is a developed economy with a national debt of 101.8% of GDP and lost monetary sovereignty. The Philippines, with a GDP per capita of $11-13 thousand (PPP), is a developing economy with a national debt of 63.1% of GDP, but with a sovereign central bank (BSP) and full control over monetary policy. Spain covers 85% of its food needs with its own production and generates 72% of energy internally, but depends on gas and oil imports. The Philippines provides itself with rice, corn and fish, but is vulnerable to climate disasters and imports wheat and butter. The technological gapTechnological sovereignty is the largest area of divergence: 61.2 for Spain versus 50.6 for the Philippines. Spain invests 1.49% of GDP in R&D (a historical record), implements the PERTE Chip program for the localization of microelectronics (€12 billion), has 52% of young people with higher education and 96% Internet penetration. The Philippines spends only 0.32% of GDP on R&D; 78-85% of components and technologies are purchased from outside; the country holds a strong position only in semiconductor assembly and packaging, but not in fundamental technologies. Cultural sovereignty: a common stemCultural sovereignty is the highest component of both countries (89.3 and 86.8, respectively). Spain is the third largest UNESCO site in the world (50), the heiress of Velasquez, Gaudi, Picasso, Almodovar, and the world center of culinary and tourism. The Philippines is a synthesis of Spanish, American, Malay and Arabic traditions, with 6 UNESCO sites, a unique "fiesta culture", epic songs "Hudhud" and "Darangen" on the intangible heritage lists, and 180 ethnic groups. High cultural scores are not an accident: it is cultural identity that serves as the "anchor" of sovereignty in the context of its erosion in other directions. For Spain, this is compensation for losses from integration into the EU; for the Philippines, it is the symbolic foundation of independence gained after four centuries of colonial rule. Conclusion: lessons from two paradoxesA comparison of Spain and the Philippines using the Burke Index reveals a fundamental conclusion: sovereignty in the modern world is not a binary "is/is not" category, but a spectrum determined by the interaction of internal and external factors. By delegating part of the sovereignty to the EU and NATO, Spain gets access to collective security, the single market and institutional stability but pays the price with the loss of monetary autonomy and the aggravation of regional separatism. The Philippines, while formally enjoying higher political sovereignty, is in practice limited by technological dependence, a military alliance with the United States, and the inability to independently protect territorial waters. Both paradoxes have a common root: in a world of global alliances and transnational institutions, absolute sovereignty is a fiction. The question is not whether the state delegates part of the power, but which part, to whom, and on what terms, and to what extent cultural and institutional stability make it possible to preserve the "core" of national identity. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
