Introduction

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of Yemen's sovereignty using the methodology of the Burke Institute. Sovereignty is assessed in 7 areas: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive and military. Each aspect is assessed on the basis of official data from international and national sources (UN, World Bank, UNESCO, IMF, ITU, FAO, SIPRI, PISA, etc.) without using politicized indexes. The maximum score in each direction is 100; the sum (up to 700) is the accumulated Sovereignty Index (Burke Index).

To adapt and adjust statistical parameters, an international expert survey was conducted for each of the seven components using a single questionnaire of 10 questions with a 10-point scale and one open-ended question.

In total, at least 100 experts from 50+ countries were interviewed for each indicator, taking into account geographical representation and specialization. When calculating and analyzing the data, equalizing coefficients were used, bringing all data to a scale of 0-10 points.

The final index value is the arithmetic mean between statistical data and expert estimates.

Below is an analysis in each area, a summary table and the main conclusions about the specifics of Yemen's sovereignty.

Political sovereignty — 16.3

Yemen is a member of the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the WTO, the OIC, the IMF, the World Bank and a number of specialized UN agencies. Real control mechanisms are often limited by war and fragmentation of power. National legislation in conflict with international law.

The fulfillment of international obligations is practically limited only by global humanitarian decisions of the United Nations, the rest of the norms are implemented fragmentarily in the controlled territory.

Internal political stability is extremely low — the country remains divided between the internationally recognized government and the Ansar Allah movement (Houthis), the armed conflict continues, regular incidents, foreign strikes and the humanitarian crisis. A partial de-escalation has been recorded recently, but a complete ceasefire has not been established.

Government Effectiveness is one of the lowest in the world: 0.47% percentile (2023, World Bank), the country is in the last group of the global ranking. EGDI is extremely low, there are practically no basic services, the digital infrastructure is destroyed, online public services are available fragmentally in certain territories; integration with international public services is absent due to the war.

The trust rating is extremely low, the institutions of the Presidential Council operate in exile or in partial exile (Riyadh), there is a split between several administrations in the territory; there are no electoral mechanisms.

By the end of 2025, the UAE base in Al-Muha is closed, and foreign armies are not officially deployed. In reality, the foreign military presence is carried out through temporary bases, coordination with the United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia (operations against the Houthis, aviation, and navy).

Yemen is an official participant in a number of international courts (ICC, etc.), it de facto files complaints, but the independence of the courts is limited, decisions are often ignored; enforcement of the ICC and others is insufficient, and regular violations of international humanitarian law.

Power is formally centralized (the Presidential Council), in fact the country is fragmented between the recognized government, the Houthis (Sanaa, north), the Southern Transitional Council and private armed groups; real decentralization.

There is no transparency, the security services are controlled by different forces (the Houthis, the central government, and the southern forces), there are regular detentions and arrests of humanitarian workers and international staff, the flow of information is minimal, and there is no independent public or judicial oversight.

Data completeness assessment: the main indicators are available from international sources, the coverage is 90%.

Economic sovereignty — 19

GDP per capita (PPP) — $3,164 (2024). Gold and foreign exchange reserves are about $5,344 million (as of 2023-2024), the gold reserve is stable at 1.56 tons. The national debt is 66-78% of GDP (forecast for the end of 2025). Yemen does not provide itself with food: The country depends on imports of grain, sugar, and vegetable oil.

Humanitarian food aid is a critical part of the national diet. Energy independence is low: oil and gas are partially exported, and a significant part of gasoline and electricity is supplied by imports (infrastructure destruction, lack of new investment projects). Deposits of oil, natural gas, salt, gold, as well as small reserves of silver, copper, and iron.

Many fields are under-developed due to military operations and weak investments. Most of the water resources are formed by artesian springs, rain and mountain streams. Freshwater reserves are rapidly depleted — the country is one of the world's top water scarcity zones, and desalination and drilling projects are underway.

The national payment system (central bank) operates within the country, but coverage and efficiency are low, and some payments are made using cash and alternative platforms in controlled territories. The main payments within the country are made in the Yemeni rial (YER), but in large operations in the northern territories, US dollars and Saudi riyal are often used due to devaluation.

The issuing center is the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY), which is located in Aden (officially recognized government). In the north, there is a parallel administration controlled by Ansar Allah, and monetary policy is fragmented and poorly regulated.

Data completeness assessment: the main macroeconomic indicators are available from official sources (World Bank, IMF), coverage is 91%

Technological sovereignty — 15.1

R&D costs are less than 0.05% of GDP, and financing is practically nonexistent due to the war and budget crisis. There is no import substitution — all high-tech equipment, communications, machinery, and medical equipment are purchased abroad, and there is no local production.

Enrollment in higher education is about 5% of the population over the age of 25 (2014 data, the dynamics has deteriorated). The war and infrastructure problems have led to a decrease in the availability of universities.

Internet penetration is 17.7% (7.29 million people); for the majority of the population there is no stable access, growth is less than 3% per year. 82% of the country's residents are offline. There are no state-owned digital platforms, and digitalization of public services is fragmented and absent in a large part of the territory.

Personal and foreign communication and education solutions are used. Almost all of the office equipment, computing equipment, software, TV and medical equipment are imported. Digital public services are practically undeveloped; from time to time, electronic references, distance education and basic services are available locally, but the services are destroyed and not integrated.

There is no autonomy — the entire biomedical sector (tests, drugs, laboratories) operates on the basis of imports and humanitarian aid. It is completely missing — even basic industrial equipment is sent from abroad, local developments are not reported. There is no own production, and the dependence on imports is total — chips, processors, and electronic components are imported from abroad.

Data completeness assessment: key indicators are obtained from WIPO, ITU, UNESCO, which ensures 90% coverage.

Information sovereignty — 34

The national CERT is not organized; the NCSI cybersecurity index is 7.79 points (158th place), the global index is 182nd place. Basic projects with ITU and individual measures to protect critical services are being implemented, but there is no full-fledged system. There is no independent national IXP in Yemen.

The Internet infrastructure is controlled by the state-owned operator YemenNet and foreign providers. Communication has been repeatedly blocked, and channels are damaged during the conflict. All major media outlets (newspapers, radio, TV, the Internet) broadcast in Arabic; there are separate editions in Turkish and English in history, but Arabic now prevails.

The level of stability is low — Google, Meta, and Microsoft services are widely used. There are practically no national digital platforms; a significant part of communications passes through global social networks. The share of local content (news, radio, TV) is 45-50%. The rest is foreign content (TV series, movies, music), Western and Middle Eastern influences are significant.

There are only a few developments, some local startups and educational platforms, and the main solutions for business and education are foreign. Online public services are extremely locally available, partial digitization of banking and educational services; the majority of the population is deprived of widespread access to digital public services and electronic platforms.

There are no national cloud platforms, and most databases, banking services, and business services are supported using foreign or regional cloud solutions.

Mobile operators are Yemen Mobile, MTN, Sabafon; all infrastructure is imported, standards, equipment, SIM cards are imported from abroad, state control is limited by war and territorial division. Data protection legislation formally applies to digital services (regulated by banks and Telcos), but standards are extremely low, there is no control, standards do not comply with international practice, and there is no actual control.

Data completeness assessment: infrastructure indicators are available from ITU, CIRA, OECD, and specialized sources, with 95% coverage.

Cultural sovereignty — 46.9

There are 5 UNESCO sites in Yemen (2023): the Old fortified City of Shibam, the historical center of Sanaa, the historic city of Zabid, the Socotra archipelago and the sights of the Sabean Ancient Kingdom (Marib); 9 sites are also nominated. The contribution is the unique Arabic architecture (multi-storey clay houses, Sanaa, Shibam), monumental mosques, rich written tradition, jewelry traditions, ancient ruins, decoration of household items, the phenomenon of "Manhattan Desert" (Shibam).

There are state orders (the Order of Glory, the Order of Service, the Order of the Star of the Republic, the Order of Marib), individual music, art, literary prizes, permanent exhibitions and museum awards. Vibrant Arab and Muslim identity, unique folklore and tribal traditions, jewelry and applied art, jambiya (traditional dagger), national costumes, holidays and customs (Ramadan, Eid al-Fitr, tribal rituals, henna and silver jewelry).

Formally, there are state programs for the preservation of the heritage of Jewish, Bedouin, Hadramaut and Mahri cultures; in practice, support is extremely limited by the conflict and fragmentation of the country.

Hundreds of monuments: historical cities, mosques (the Grand Mosque of Sanaa), bazaars, palaces (Dar al-Hajar), swimming pools, fortresses, natural and architectural ensembles; there are over 6 thousand historical buildings in Sanaa alone. Yemen participates in exhibitions and joint cultural events with the United Nations, UNESCO, museums in Russia, Europe and the Middle East; there are initiatives to preserve heritage under the auspices of UNESCO and international foundations. UNESCO heritage sites, architectural traditions, jewelry, jambiya, costume, music and literature are supported — they are defined as protected cultural brands and objects of intangible heritage.

The base consists of rice, mutton, goat meat, banana fruits and coffee, salta, linda, faha, flat loaves, spices, yoghurts, honey, seafood (on Socotra), seasonings, tea, sweets and vegetables. An estimated 30-35% of the adult population is involved in regular cultural, religious and tribal events (holidays, weddings, markets, workshops); in large cities, coverage is higher — up to 45%.

Data completeness assessment: basic indicators are available in UNESCO and national statistics, coverage is 88%.

Cognitive sovereignty — 24.6

HDI — 0.470 (2023), Yemen belongs to the group of countries with a very low level of human development, ranks 184th in the world. Government spending on education accounts for approximately 9.5% of GDP, one of the highest rates in the Arab world. Literacy among adults is 70.3% (2025), among men — 85.1%, among women — 55%; among youth (15-24 years old) — 90.2%.

Yemen does not participate in PISA, there is no reliable international academic performance data; the estimated majority of graduates show results below the global level. The share of STEM graduates is estimated at about 12-15% of the total number of university graduates.

The share of foreign programs and students is up to 8-9% (local visa data, foreign online courses, university studies under the programs of the OIC, Egypt, Turkey and the International Islamic University).

The official language is Arabic, small groups (Mahras, Hadhramaut, Socotri) are allowed local schools and cultural projects, and practical support is limited by conflict. There are no more than 7 fundamental state research centers, the main concentration is at the universities of Sanaa, Aden, Hodeidah, and Ibb. National platforms account for less than 10% of all digital educational courses, and the vast majority of distance and e-learning are foreign.

Government programs to support young researchers and students are represented by a limited number of awards, scholarships, and grants with external (international/humanitarian) funding; the total coverage is no more than 5-7% of young people.

Data completeness assessment: education indicators are available in the UNDP, UNESCO, OECD, coverage is 86%.

Military sovereignty — 22.7

Military spending is estimated at 2.1–2.5 billion dollars, which is equivalent to about 11-13% of GDP in 2014-2024. In recent years, the indicator has fluctuated, and the budget has been extremely uneven due to the war and international aid.

The number of armed forces is about 66,700 people (the regular army; this figure varies depending on the different centers of power). The mobilization reserve potentially includes up to 9 million people of military age. Most of the equipment is obsolete Soviet and Western tanks (T—54/55/62, T-72, M60A1), armored personnel carriers (BTR-40/50/60), armored vehicles, light armored vehicles, barrel and rocket artillery, Soviet and Western air defense systems; the Houthis have drones, missiles and Iranian systems.

Almost all weapons are imported (USSR, Russia, Belarus, USA, Iran, China, Arab countries), local assembly and repair are possible at individual enterprises, but there is no full production cycle.

The border in the north and west is partially controlled; formally, the control is carried out by the army and special services, in fact, the demarcation between the internationally recognized government, the Houthis and the Southern Transitional Council (the Saudi and Omani borders are particularly problematic).

There is no officially specialized reserve; mobilization takes place when necessary, the reserve is formed by civilians with service experience, volunteers and tribal formations. The autonomy of military decisions is limited by the influence of external actors — coalitions with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Iran (through the Houthis) regularly operate, and there is a lot of influence from foreign advisers; in the current situation, there is no absolute autonomy.

Limited: local repairs, assembly, small-scale production of ammunition and primitive means of warfare, as well as the launch of artisanal missiles; there is no large-scale industry. There are no nuclear weapons, and the country has not developed a progressive nuclear program.

There are no military satellite, space, or advanced electronic systems of their own. Intelligence is conducted by special services with the support of foreign partners, using classical methods (people, interception).

All parameters are reflected in the annual reports of SIPRI, UNODA, the Ministry of Defense, the official portals of state-owned companies (Embraer, IMBEL) and the UN/NGO industry databases - 87% coverage

Final Summary Table

The main conclusions

Strengths. Unique cultural identity and global heritage: Five UNESCO sites and an outstanding contribution to world culture (architecture, folklore, cuisine, historical cities, traditions). Tribal cohesion, mobilization resource: A broad tradition of self-organization, tribal and family patriotism, high involvement of the population in social and religious institutions (up to 30-35%).

Geostrategic position: Control over access to the Red Sea, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, a significant role in special operations, regional security and transport corridors. Defense innovations and asymmetric tactics: Developed missile, drone and naval assets, the ability to adapt to a lack of resources through guerrilla and hybrid warfare methods.

Strong patriotism and resistance: The ability to long-term resistance to the largest military and political blocs in the region, high resistance of the population to external pressure and sanctions.

Government spending on education: on paper, one of the highest in the region (9.5% of GDP). Hydrocarbon and mineral reserves: Oil, gas, ores, and salt form the basis for future recovery.

Weaknesses. Extremely low internal stability: A deep split between north and south, war, split institutions, several decision-making centers, and an almost complete lack of centralization of power. Political and managerial inefficiency: Government Efficiency is one of the lowest in the world, there is a lack of transparency, control over intelligence agencies, and judicial independence is extremely low.

Crisis-type economy: GDP per capita is $3,164 (PPP, 2024), public debt is 66-78% of GDP, reserves are running out, currency and food vulnerability. Full technological, educational, and digital import dependence: There are practically no R&D expenses, only 17.7% of the population has access to the Internet, and the share of STEM graduates is low.

The infrastructure of public services, education, and medicine has been destroyed: e-government is practically undeveloped, healthcare depends on external assistance, and mass destruction.

Limited real defense autonomy: Lack of modern in-house weapons production, total dependence of combat units and military solutions on coalitions and foreign supplies/advisers. Strategic shortage of resources and water: Catastrophic shortage of fresh water, high food dependence.

The legal regime of personal data and cybersecurity: there are practically no modern digital and legal standards, data protection is nominal, and there is no sovereign CERT.

Overall assessment. Yemen's cumulative sovereignty index is 178.6 out of 700 possible points (Extremely low — 25.5%), which places the country in the 183rd place in the world top.

Yemen is a country with great culture and traditional patriotism, able to withstand the most difficult conditions due to high self-organization, fighting spirit and original defense solutions.

However, state institutions are disintegrated, the economy and the digital sphere are destroyed and completely import-dependent, the education system and the personnel reserve are degraded due to war and poverty, real sovereignty is extremely limited by external influence and internal conflict.

Recovery is possible only after overcoming the civil war, moving towards institutional reform and integration with the international humanitarian and investment space. The sovereignty profile indicates that Yemen is a country with great cultural, tribal and mobilization inertia, strategically important for regional security, but in fact sovereignty is fragmented and controlled by many forces (external and internal).

Power, economy, governance, and infrastructure are disintegrated, real digital and technological autonomy is almost nonexistent; defense independence is extremely limited by arms exports and broad foreign influence. Yemen's sovereignty is not a centralized institution, but a set of local, cultural, tribal, military, and humanitarian autonomies with high "combat readiness" and low institutional stability, which makes the country a "model of a crisis state" in the Arab and global region.