Introduction

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of Venezuela's sovereignty using the methodology of the Burke Institute. Sovereignty is assessed in 7 areas: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive and military. Each aspect is assessed on the basis of official data from international and national sources (UN, World Bank, UNESCO, IMF, ITU, FAO, SIPRI, PISA, etc.) without using politicized indexes.

The maximum score in each direction is 100; the sum (up to 700) is the accumulated Sovereignty Index (Burke Index). To adapt and adjust statistical parameters, an international expert survey was conducted for each of the seven components using a single questionnaire of 10 questions with a 10-point scale and one open-ended question.

In total, at least 100 experts from 50+ countries were interviewed for each indicator, taking into account geographical representation and specialization. When calculating and analyzing the data, equalizing coefficients were used, bringing all data to a scale of 0-10 points.

The final index value is the arithmetic mean between statistical data and expert estimates.

Below is an analysis in each area, a final summary table and the main conclusions about the features of Venezuelan sovereignty.

Political sovereignty — 28.4

There are no foreign military bases in Venezuela itself; all military installations are exclusively national. The participation of foreign troops is possible only by direct agreement and for exercises — there are no recorded cases of long-term deployment.

Venezuela operates on the principle of the priority of its own constitution over international agreements: any obligations are implemented through ratification in Parliament and cannot contradict sovereignty. The political situation is extremely tense: after the presidential elections in 2024, the country was gripped by a wave of protests, accusations of fraud, a crackdown on the opposition and systemic repression.

The trust rating remains artificially high only among civil servants and those who support the government; in general, the legitimacy of the government is being challenged both internally and externally.

The WGI indicator is one of the lowest in Latin America: management efficiency is 14-17 percentile (2024, World Bank), corruption, conflict, and low transparency are recorded. EGDI — 0.478 (2022), below the global and regional average; electronic public services are partially available (taxes, registration, health), but full-featured single windows and integration with local systems are inferior to the leading countries in the region.

Public trust in the leadership remains extremely low: after the 2024 elections, most analysts and sociological agencies record majority distrust, mass protests, population outflow, control is consolidated within a narrow elite of power; official support for Maduro is no more than 30-33%.

Venezuela is an active participant in the United Nations, the Arab League, OPEC, NAM, and CELAC; some of its trade, judicial, and monetary obligations are delegated through these structures, but all key decisions are made at the national level. The Republic officially participates in many procedures of international courts (including the ICJ in the Essequibo case), but after the sanctions campaigns, a number of decisions and jurisdictions are not recognized or ignored; disputes about the legitimacy of decisions continue.

Power is extremely centralized: all key institutions, the army, parliament, and law enforcement agencies are controlled by one party and the president, and decentralization is reduced to municipalities and formal self-government.

The total closeness of the security sector, the actions of the special services are regulated directly by the executive branch, there is no open parliamentary and judicial control; regular reports of abuses and harassment of opponents of the regime.

Data completeness assessment: the main indicators are available from international sources, the coverage is 97%.

Economic sovereignty — 22.1

GDP 7,530-8,600 USD (2024, World Bank/Statista/CEIC/Trading Economics). One of the lowest estimates in Latin America, 2-3 times lower than the pre-crisis level.

Gold and foreign exchange reserves are 10.3 billion USD (end of 2024), which is equivalent to about 6 months of imports. National debt is 146-164% of GDP (2024), according to various sources: Statista — 164.3%, FocusEconomics — 146% of GDP; consistently the highest debt in Latin America.

The country provides up to 75% of domestic demand through its own production (the main crops are corn, rice, fruits, sugar), but import dependence on meat, butter, and grain remains, with regular supply disruptions, humanitarian programs, and subsidies for the poor.

Completely energy independent: Venezuela produces oil (the world's leader in proven reserves), gas, and electricity are almost entirely generated by hydroelectric and thermal power plants, and the country is a net exporter of oil.

The world leader in proven oil reserves (>300 billion barrels), large reserves of gas, gold, bauxite, iron ore, and rare earth metals. The country has one of the largest freshwater reserves in the Andes region: the main rivers of the Orinoco and its tributaries provide water supply in the central and eastern regions, but the water supply infrastructure requires modernization.

The Bolivar Digital national payment system is integrated into major banks, mobile applications, the system works alongside international solutions (Visa, Mastercard), and is periodically subject to restrictions due to sanctions.

The main settlements in domestic trade are in bolivars; against the background of hyperinflation, up to 35-50% of retail and a significant part of large transactions are in dollars and euros, despite the formal ban. The Central Bank of Venezuela (Banco Central de Venezuela) is responsible for issuing the bolivar (VES) and regulating monetary policy, but many decisions are limited due to sanctions and external debts; solvency depends on replenishing reserves and export earnings.

Data completeness assessment: the main macroeconomic indicators are available from official sources (World Bank, IMF), coverage is 91%.

Technological sovereignty — 19.6

Expenditure on R&D 0.3–0.69% of GDP (latest available data: World Bank — 0.69% in 2016, BTI — 0.3% in 2014); downward trend after 2017 due to budget cuts and the crisis.

An import substitution policy is being implemented, especially in the oil and gas and machine-building sectors, the production of domestic parts and assembly elements for infrastructure; the level of technological independence in key areas remains low, and the main items continue to be imported.

21.5–23% of the population aged 25+ have higher education (2015-2023, CEIC/UNESCO); the system suffers from brain drain, budget cuts, low salaries of teachers, massive delays in sessions, but the network of universities and colleges remains. 72-75% of the population have regular Internet access (2024), but the quality of communication and the speed of Internet services are among the worst in the region; major disruptions in certain areas, infrastructure needs to be updated.

The Bolivar Digital state system, the Seniat (taxes) portal, electronic medical records systems, and the Venezuelan SAIME ID platform are working; many services are intermittent, and some functions are integrated with global platforms. Critically high: more than 90% of software, server hardware, chips, and specialized equipment are imported, and there is no in-house production of chips or IT solutions for large-scale use.

EGDI — 0.478 (2022, UN), a basic range of services is available (taxes, medical insurance, licenses), but there is no broad digital integration and a “single window”, penetration is below the average European and regional levels. There are several centers (IVIC, universities), but the industry does not cover basic needs — the country is almost completely dependent on imports and humanitarian programs for vaccines, diagnostics, and basic drugs.

There is no own industrial production of robots and automated systems for the heavy industry and defense sector; there are separate university and university research projects, import of parts and systems from China, Russia, and Europe.

Venezuela does not have industrial production of chips and microelectronics; all solutions in critical infrastructure and crisis management are imported, there are no serial local companies and government programs.

Data completeness assessment: key indicators are obtained from WIPO, ITU, UNESCO, which ensures 92% coverage.

Information sovereignty — 31.7

Venezuela ranks 83rd in the world on the National Cyber Security Index (NCSI - 24.17 points), a position well below average; ITU GCI is in the third tier out of five, CERT Venezuela operates, but there are no regular international exercises and broad initiatives. There are 3 active IXPs in the country: NAPVE CARACAS, NAPVE MCBO (Maracaibo), NAPVE VLN (Valencia); the network provides internal traffic exchange, nodes serve large providers, but capacity and stability are limited.

Almost all media outlets are in Spanish: state—owned TeleSUR, Venezolana de Televisión, private Venevision, Globovisión, El Nacional, El Universal; opposition resources are partially blocked, foreign media (CNN Español) are restricted to broadcasting. Venezuela is critically dependent on Google, Microsoft, Meta, and AWS clouds and services, but some services work through Russian, Chinese, and Venezuelan alternatives; restrictions (government regulation, blocking) apply to Western platforms.

70% of TV content is produced nationally (news, talk shows, TV series, sports, government line), the share of online content is less, and foreign platforms and YouTube dominate. National portals (Bolivar Digital, SAIME, Seniat) and individual fintech platforms are used, but most of the corporate, infrastructure, and banking software is imported; local startups are in medical and educational services.

Access to basic digital public services is up to 72% of the population with an EGDI of 0.478; penetration is limited by the quality of infrastructure, disruptions in the regions and a shortage of equipment in the poor. National data centers, public clouds account for less than 30% of the market, most server solutions and storage are foreign platforms, and implementing their own clouds is difficult due to sanctions.

The operators (Movilnet, Digitel, Movistar) are registered in the country; the main equipment is imported, part of the market is controlled by the state and private companies, but serviced by Western or Chinese solutions. Data regulation is implemented through the Ley de Protección de Datos Personales Law (2021), the national registry has been implemented, security and storage requirements, and penalties for violations; real coverage is low, and most services are not certified according to international data protection standards.

Data completeness assessment: infrastructure indicators are available from ITU, CIRA, OECD, and specialized sources, with 95% coverage.

Cultural sovereignty — 74.9

Venezuela has 3 UNESCO World Heritage Sites:

• Ciudad Universitaria de Caracas (University campus, architectural monument) • Coro and its Port (colonial city, architectural complex)

• Canaima National Park (one of the largest waterfalls and biosphere national parks in the world). The country is an important center of Latin American culture: literature (Romulo Gallegos is an award—winning reformist writer), painting, music academies, the legacy of pre-Columbian Indian civilizations, early Modern architecture, the television and film industry, fashion, and the school of Latin American philosophy.

There is a national literary award, the Romulo Gallegos Prize (one of the largest in the world), as well as annual state awards for contributions to theater, music, art, and cinema; prizes are awarded by the Ministry of Culture and specialized art foundations. Strong Spanish, African, Native American and European components: national holidays (Carnival, Easter, Independence Day), music festivals, crafts, Creole cuisine, dancing (Horopo), costumed parades, individual identity by region/state.

Venezuela recognizes more than 40 indigenous peoples, the law on the rights of small ethnic groups is in force, schools and cultural centers in Indian-inhabited areas (Varao, Yanomami, Pemon, etc.) are funded, bilingual education is supported, folklore and traditions are protected. More than 120 major museums, galleries, theaters, 30 archaeological zones, hundreds of architectural monuments, cinemas and educational academies have been officially registered; the infrastructure covers all regions of the country.

Venezuela annually holds various international festivals (the Caracas International Film Festival, the El Sistema Music Festival), actively participates in UNESCO, the Arab League, the United Nations, promotes joint expositions and scientific conferences, and art exchanges with the Russian Federation, China, and the EU. Cultural brands are officially registered (El Sistema is the national music system, cocoa and coffee as heritage sites, the school of architectural modernism, Latin American cinema, crafts), legal protection is provided through the Ministry and cultural institutions, export brands are designated internationally.

The cuisine includes arepas, espetada, allipaca, hacienda, cocoa, coffee (one of the largest exporters), traditions of Afro-Latin-Spanish gastronomy, dishes from maize, bananas, seafood, Latin American sweets, spices; strong influence of the Andean, Caribbean and Amazonian regions.

Up to 68-72% of citizens and 55-60% of the general population annually attend cultural events (cinemas, concerts, museums, theaters, exhibitions, regional holidays), official involvement is maintained and maintains a steady level despite periods of crisis.

Data completeness assessment: basic indicators are available in UNESCO and national statistics, coverage is 92%.

Cognitive sovereignty — 38.6

The human development index is 0.709 (2023), the country is in the “high” HDI category, but below the global average, the positions in Latin America are average.

Actual expenditures are 1.3—1.4% of GDP (2024, World Bank), but earlier (before the 2014 crisis) this figure was higher than 6% of GDP; the actual budget base of the education system has been significantly reduced. 97.6% (2022-2024), youth — 98.7%, women — 95.7%, men — 95% (according to UNESCO/World Bank); Venezuela is one of the leading countries in literacy in the region. Venezuela does not participate in PISA tests, but data from third-party studies (BTI, UNESCO) indicate a significant lag in reading and math skills among high school students, especially in poor and rural areas.

It is estimated that 18-21% of all university graduates are STEM (including medicine, natural sciences, engineering, mathematics, IT); the greatest demand is for technical, chemical and biomedical industries.

The official language is Spanish. The languages of more than 40 indigenous peoples are recognized — bilingual primary and basic education is provided in educational institutions in the areas of settlement of small ethnic groups; schools and cultural centers receive state support.

There are 10-12 large government research centers in the country (IVIC, institutes at universities, the National Agency for Science and Technology), dozens of laboratories at universities; however, the budget of most has been reduced. Up to 35% of the platforms for distance and blended learning are Venezuelan developments (based on universities, the Ministry of Education and government agencies); the rest are purchases and licensed software.

There are federal and regional programs (Ministerio del Poder Popular de Educación Universitaria grants, scholarships for students in science and tech, support for research talents through FONACIT and CONICIT), the total coverage is tens of thousands of scholarships annually, the volume was reduced during the crisis years.

Data completeness assessment: education indicators are available in the UNDP, UNESCO, OECD, coverage is 83%.

Military sovereignty — 41.2

Defense spending of 1.6% of GDP (Statista, 2024) was higher than 2-5% in previous years; the real figures depend on the exchange rate and inflation, and are fixed in the budget structure with the help of the National Development Fund. 109,000-150,000 (active FANB personnel: army, Navy, Air Force, National Guard), plus 220,000 — national militia (paramilitary structures, reserve), up to 8,000 official reservists and 45,000-100,000 national police.

Weapons are multicomponent: T-72B1B, AMX-30 tanks, Scorpion light tanks, BMP-3, BTR-80A, Dragoon-300, a large number of Soviet and Western artillery systems (2S19 Msta-S, Buk-M2E, S-300, Tor), Air defense — S-300 (24), Buk-M2E (12), Tor (12), Pechora, Igla, 440+ missiles and MANPADS; Air Force — Su-30MKV, F-16, Mi-17, Mi-35, light attack aircraft, shock components poorly represented, lack of developed UAVs.

Our own industry produces cartridges, small arms, partially armored personnel carriers and equipment repairs through DIANCA, Cavim, Venesat, but not more than 10-15% of the military fleet; all heavy weapons, aircraft fleet, and main artillery systems are imported from Russia, China, Iran, Ukraine, and EU countries.

It is carried out by the army, the National Guard and the border guard; there are periodic breakthroughs, smuggling, "gray zones" in the jungle and the border with Colombia and Brazil, but in general the country controls the main border points and ports.

The official reserve is 8,000 people (Global Firepower 2025), + up to 220,000 as part of the Bolivarian militia (mobilization militia). All military decisions are made at the national level by the President and the Minister of Defense; there is no participation in major military blocs, cooperation with Russia, China, Iran, Cuba, and the CSTO is conducted in consultation, but not in the format of collective defense. DIANCA (fleet repair/construction), Cavim (cartridges, small arms, armored personnel carriers, ammunition) are working; heavy machinery and aircraft are not produced — purchases are made through global partners (Russia, China).

There are no major assembly or integration projects. There are no nuclear weapons; Venezuela has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is not developing strategic weapons of mass destruction.

The National Space satellite Venesat-1 (since 2008, has been out of service), new projects with China and the Russian Federation are planned, classical intelligence is enhanced with technical components (communication systems, software from China and the Russian Federation), extensive tactical and operational surveillance, there is no data on missile defense and defense satellites for 2025.

All parameters are reflected in the annual reports of SIPRI, UNODA, the Ministry of Defense, the official portals of state—owned companies (Embraer, IMBEL) and the UN/NGO industry databases — 89% coverage.

Final Summary Table

The main conclusions

Strengths. Resource and energy autonomy: The world's leader in proven oil reserves, large reserves of gas, gold, and hydro resources; full energy independence, a key position in global oil geopolitics.

Formal control over the territory and military structure: A large, relatively modern army (up to 150,000 people). active personnel), an extensive national defense system, sovereignty over all borders, and the absence of a permanent foreign military presence.

Cultural and ethnic identity: Three UNESCO sites, high level of cultural engagement (72% in cities), preservation of indigenous languages and traditions, developed institutions of national awards and mass cultural policy.

Coverage of basic education and literacy: One of the highest literacy rates in the region (97.6%), the presence of an extensive university system, support for bilingual education in areas inhabited by small nations.

Weaknesses. Economic and financial instability: GDP per capita (PPP) is $7.5–8.6 thousand, massive external debt (146-164% of GDP), reserves are depleted under the influence of sanctions and export restrictions, high inflation, dollars are used on a par with the bolivar. Import dependence on high-tech, IT, and defense: more than 85-90% of electronics, chips, servers, and software are imported; all heavy equipment, most of the aviation, and key industrial and medical technologies come from China, the Russian Federation, and the EU.

Institutional degradation and corruption: Government Effectiveness (WGI) — 14th-17th percentile, high corruption risks, weak control over intelligence agencies, extremely low transparency, lack of an open political process.

Social and political turbulence: Protests, government breaks with society, escalation of police and military powers, mass emigration, low trust in leaders, de facto centralization of decisions without institutional balance. The decline in educational and R&D indicators: Research expenditures of less than 0.7% of GDP, brain drain, reduction of university budgets, the share of STEM graduates <21%, low representation in international rankings and PISA programs.

Vulnerability of digital infrastructure: EGDI — 0.478, network failures, slow implementation of national clouds, a large proportion of foreign platforms and services, low cybersecurity positions and lack of proprietary chips. Overall, Venezuela's cumulative sovereignty index is 256.5 out of 700 possible points (below the average of 36.6%), which places the country at 169 in the world top.

Venezuela has the most important parameters of formal and resource sovereignty (borders, army, oil, cultural base), but suffers from institutional, macroeconomic and technological “seams". The system relies on militarization, patriotism and national assets, but is limited by factors of sanctions pressure, import dependence, degradation of public administration and high political and social instability.

The sovereignty profile indicates that Venezuela is a country with de jure full sovereignty, developed military and territorial institutions, leading natural resources and a firm position on international issues.

Systemic risks include commodity dependence, an unstable economy, sanctions pressure, the need for policy coordination with external allies, a high level of internal political centralization and, as a result, limited "flexible" autonomy and reforms.