Pundits and policymakers have described the emerging world in a variety of ways: “multipolar,” “polycentric,” “non-polar,” “neo-polar,” “apolar,” “post-American,” “G-zero,” and “no one’s world.” At the heart of these phrases are differing and often uncertain beliefs about America’s position and role in world affairs. Some of them address the issue of America’s “decline,” which remains a matter of intense and inconclusive debate. Many Americans and some outsiders vigorously contest the “decline thesis.” Among those who accept it, sometimes with a dose of reluctance, are those who optimistically argue that the order established by the United States has been so widely accepted, deeply rooted and legitimate that it will continue to define the twenty-first-century world and might even co-opt its potential challengers. They also warn of the dangers that await the collapse of that order, including multipolar rivalry, regional fragmentation, and other evils.

This is not a book about the decline of the US, but the decline of the American World Order. The issue of America’s decline, which I discuss briefly in chapter 2, and the fate of the American World Order are not one and the same, although they are often conflated in public debates. The American World Order is coming to an end whether or not America itself is declining.