Introduction

This report provides a comprehensive analysis of Afghanistan's sovereignty using the methodology of the Burke Institute. Sovereignty is assessed in 7 areas: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive and military. Each aspect is assessed on the basis of official data from international and national sources (UN, World Bank, UNESCO, IMF, ITU, FAO, SIPRI, PISA, etc.) without using politicized indexes. The maximum score in each direction is 100; the sum (up to 700) is the accumulated Sovereignty Index (Burke Index).

To adapt and adjust statistical parameters, an international expert survey was conducted for each of the seven components using a single questionnaire of 10 questions with a 10-point scale and one open-ended question.

In total, at least 100 experts from 50+ countries were interviewed for each indicator, taking into account geographical representation and specialization. When calculating and analyzing the data, equalizing coefficients were used, bringing all data to a scale of 0-10 points.

The final index value is the arithmetic mean between statistical data and expert estimates.

Below is an analysis in each area, a summary table and the main conclusions about the specifics of Afghanistan's sovereignty.

Political sovereignty — 8,9

Afghanistan is a member of the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (observer), as well as a number of other international institutions, but after the Taliban came to power in 2021, its representation is often questioned or suspended. Membership does not imply a deep transfer of sovereignty, as in the EU; most decisions are made at the national level with limited international obligations.

Formally, national law takes precedence — Afghanistan is not bound by the rigid framework of international law and is not obliged to unify its legislation with international standards by virtue of the current constitution (banned by the current authorities). The only international restrictions are the fulfillment of obligations under the general UN treaties, but their implementation is irregular and superficial.

The country is characterized by extremely low internal political stability: ongoing armed struggle, terrorist attacks, lack of national consensus, humanitarian crisis and fragmentation of power. The de facto Government (the Taliban) is not recognized by most States, which provokes internal and external conflicts. According to the World Bank (Worldwide Governance Indicators), the Government Effectiveness indicator for Afghanistan in 2024 is extremely low — the country is in the bottom 10% of the world ranking.

The reasons are the inability to provide basic services, the collapse of institutions and the mass exodus of professional staff. The E-Government Index (EGDI, UN E-Government Development Index) - Afghanistan traditionally occupies low positions in the world ranking (2022: 0.2831, which is much lower than the global average). The reasons are poor infrastructure development, massive Internet outages, and an almost complete lack of digital management services.

External and independent polls are not conducted, and repression against dissidents is very severe. Expert opinions and indirect evidence indicate an extremely low level of trust in the Taliban leadership among regional elites and the population, especially among women and urban residents. Since September 2021, there have been no foreign military bases in Afghanistan — after the withdrawal of NATO and US troops, all bases are closed, and there is no direct foreign military presence. Afghanistan does not participate in the activities of large transnational courts (for example, the International Criminal Court), does not recognize their jurisdiction — the actions of the authorities are practically not limited to international judicial institutions.

The system of power relations is highly centralized, and the Taliban governs the country from Kabul with minimal participation in regional self-government. In practice, regional commanders and tribal leaders have some autonomy, but official authority is tightly centralized.

The Taliban is completely closed to public scrutiny; there are no independent checks on the work of intelligence agencies and transparency, judicial or parliamentary oversight. The operations of the special services take place outside the framework of the law and public coverage, the data is classified.

Data completeness assessment: the main indicators are available from international sources, the coverage is 88%.

Economic sovereignty — 15.2

GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) is approximately $2,023–$4,171 in 2024-2025.. This is significantly below the global average and reflects a systemic economic crisis. Afghanistan's foreign gold and foreign exchange reserves (over $9 billion) have been frozen abroad since 2021.

The actual disposal of national reserves is limited; part of the funds has been transferred to international funds, and government access to them is blocked. The national debt amounts to 7.4–8.3% of GDP (2023-2024), which is very low by international standards and reflects the country's low involvement in global financial markets.

The figures are extremely low: about 25-32% of the population (11-15 million people) are in crisis and in need of urgent food aid. The reasons are chronic economic problems, climate shocks, and the weakness of the agricultural sector. About 70% of electricity is imported, and only 40-50% of the population has reliable access.

In 2025, a major energy project ($10 billion) was signed to develop its own generation — the goal is to increase energy independence and reduce imports. The estimated market value of mineral resources exceeds $1-3 trillion, including lithium, copper, iron, uranium, and gold. More than 1,400 deposits have been identified throughout the country.

The annual potential is up to 75 billion cubic meters of water (55 billion — surface, 20 billion — underground). The problems are limited access, weak infrastructure, and localized crises, especially in Kabul. Since 2021, the APS (Afghanistan Payments System) system has been operating, a national payment platform under the control of the central bank. It includes bank cards, electronic transfers, and mobile payments; electronic public services and AfPay (national card) are being actively introduced. Afghanistan (AFN) is used in most domestic payments, the share of foreign currencies in daily settlements is minimal.

The central bank conducts currency auctions to support the exchange rate, controlling the movement of the currency and limiting illegal exports. The issuing center is Da Afghanistan Bank, which issues the national currency and conducts monetary policy (including currency auctions, control over lending).

Credit policy is tightly regulated, and there are restrictions on international transactions and access to external finances due to sanctions and political isolation. Data completeness assessment: the main macroeconomic indicators are available from official sources (World Bank, IMF), coverage is 80% Technological sovereignty — 12.4 0.0% of GDP: official expenditures on research and development are practically non-existent, according to the UN and global economic databases; the country is among the latest in this indicator. Import substitution in high-tech sectors is minimal; the vast majority of equipment, software, communications and computing equipment is imported or donated.

Recent data: ~190 thousand university students (2024), enrollment is about 8.5% per age group. Women have been denied access to higher education since the end of 2022, and real enrollment has declined and remains one of the lowest in the world. 18.4% of the population (7.88 million users) at the beginning of 2024.

One of the lowest rates in the world; most of the population remains outside the digital space. The most significant are the Afghanistan Payments System (APS) and the national AfPay card for payments. There are no developed national social networks, search engines, cloud platforms, messengers; dependence on foreign services. Import dependence is absolute: most of the computers, communications, and infrastructure come from abroad, especially from China, Pakistan, and Southeast Asian countries.

Major localization projects are not being implemented. There are very few digital services, and the vast majority of functions are implemented offline. Since 2021, the development of the e-government portal has been interrupted; services are limited. There is virtually no biotechnological autonomy; all drugs, diagnostic systems, and reagents are imported or supplied by international humanitarian organizations.

There is no industrial and scientific base for robotics; there is not a single notable local production, research or implementation. There is no in-house production of chips and microelectronics; full import dependence on basic components. All the devices are imported, and not a single local factory is functioning.

Data completeness assessment: key indicators are obtained from WIPO, ITU, UNESCO, which provides 83% coverage.

Information sovereignty — 19.7

Afghanistan belongs to the countries with the initial level of cybersecurity development: Tier 5 (“Building"), score from 0 to 20 on the ITU Global Cybersecurity Index (2024/2025). The National Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT/CERT) is formally included in the ITU list, listed as established, but is in the process of formation and development.

There is a project to further institutionalize CIRT and build a national cybersecurity strategy. The only Internet traffic exchange point (IXP) in Afghanistan is NIXA in the National Data Center in Kabul, with about 32 (half) registered ISPs connected to it. A "fiber ring" is developing between major cities (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-I-Sharif, etc.). There is an infrastructure project to connect 20 additional regions, the main focus is on the development of fiber, but financial and legal issues regarding the ownership of cables remain unclear.

Afghan media are experiencing severe restrictions: there is an increase in harassment of journalists (+56% of violations in 2025), increased pressure on women in the media, and the introduction of direct bans on women's voices and participation.

National languages (Daria, Pashto) are present in print and on the air, but the vast majority of independent media are closed or relocated abroad, and strict censorship and self-censorship are in effect in the country. The share of content in national languages is predominant among the current ones (Kabul Nov, Tolo TV, etc.), but international programs and current political and economic topics are prohibited.

Technological independence is extremely weak: most of the equipment is of foreign origin (formerly Huawei, Ericsson, Nokia; now partly Russian). After the departure of the main Western suppliers, Russian solutions (Protey, Rostelecom) for mobile communications were introduced in 2024, which slightly increased the “sovereignty” of the infrastructure, but direct dependence on external technologies and services could not be avoided.

There are no proprietary cloud/IT solutions, and the government mainly uses foreign platforms and tools. Since 2021, more than 43% of media outlets have stopped working, most journalists have left or were forced to change their profession, the share of their own media content actually produced has dropped sharply, and government/propaganda materials predominate.

About 94% of popular Internet content (according to the most visited sites) is hosted and serviced outside the country, only about 6% have a local cache version. The market for IT services and developments is growing mainly due to simple solutions, there are few significant local products: most are designed as services in the field of telecommunications, finance and management.

The “leaders” include M-Paisa (mobile payments) and TechNation (integration), there are attempts at local SaaS development, but there is no infrastructure and human resources for large-scale products. The best software solutions in the country are adapted Western services.

At the beginning of 2025:

• About 17.7% of the population uses the Internet.

• 22.3 million active mobile connections (51.6% of the population have SIM cards).

• Almost 70% live in the mobile coverage area, with maximum penetration in cities (Kabul, Herat, Mazar-I-Sharif).

• The main digital services — mobile communications (3G/4G), mobile payments, Cloud solutions and national data storages are very limited: Afghan GeoPortal has been implemented for government geodata.

The difference is the government's strategy for implementing cloud OSS/BSS solutions for the telecom sector, in addition, Data Warehouse as a Service is being developed, but there are no national “sovereign cloud" projects. 3G/4G networks operate mainly on foreign software/equipment, however, after the departure of Western vendors (Ericsson, Nokia), the Russian 4G core network was introduced in four provinces in 2024, covering up to 10 million people.

The main operators are AWCC, Roshan, and Etisalat. SIM cards — 18 million registered, mobile services depend on imports and external partners. The regime is extremely fragmented: cases of leaks (for example, data from the ARAP program) show the lack of an effective legal regime and weak judicial control over data protection.

Individual bans on the publication of personal data are implemented urgently after incidents, there is no clear national policy for the protection of personal information and the GDPR system-there is no such regulation.

Data completeness assessment: infrastructure indicators are available from ITU, CIRA, OECD and specialized sources, coverage is 84%.

Cultural sovereignty — 54.6

Afghanistan officially has two UNESCO World Heritage Sites: the Jama Minaret and the Bamiyan Valley Cultural Landscape. There are 4 new sites on the tentative list: the City of Herat, the City of Balkh (Ancient Bactria), Bend-i-Amir, Bagh-e Babur.

Afghanistan has made a significant contribution to world civilization through the objects of the Silk Road, Buddhist and Islamic art, architecture, miniature painting, poetry and traditional crafts. Bamiyan is one of the most important ancient centers of Buddhism, and ceramics, carpet weaving, calligraphy, and oral poetry traditions are known far beyond the borders of the country. Women's contributions (embroidery, weaving, poetry) are a separate internationally recognized contribution.

There are state awards in art within the country (the "National Prize in Art and Culture" series). Afghan artists participate in the international TAF Emerging Artist Award — South Asian nominees are selected annually and published internationally (2025 included Afghan participants).

Traditional identity is built around poetry and oral transmission, music (rubab, dilrab), national crafts, festive rituals (Navruz, Yalda), specific clothes and cuisine. Traditions include national holidays, women's embroidery, carpet weaving, folk dancing and folklore, which are highlighted at cultural evenings and exhibitions.

Officially, the Ministry's conservation and restoration work is underway to preserve national languages, traditions and historical monuments, but in fact small nations (for example, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks) face discrimination and persecution - support is formal, and the situation regarding state protection of small ethnic groups has worsened since 2021.

According to the Ministry of Culture, more than 5,600 cultural and archaeological sites (museums, monuments, archaeological complexes) have been registered in the country, and 668 new sites have been found and registered in the last 3 years alone.

The Archaeological Museum has 60,000 exhibits; more than 6,700 new artifacts have been identified during the year. In 2024-2025, projects were implemented jointly with UNESCO to preserve cultural industries (assessment, restoration of Bamiyan and Jama Minaret, support for Afghan artists in the diaspora).

Major events: ECO Cultural Night, exhibitions of calligraphy, poetry and musical evenings — with the participation of international organizations. Brands such as Afghan carpet, ceramics, embroidery, and Bamiyan landscape have received international status and partial legal protection (through the UNESCO, WIPO, and Afghan Cultural Fund programs).

However, systemic brand protection is not enough, unauthorized exports and copying of products occur, and the intellectual property protection mechanism is weak.

The cuisine of Afghanistan is recognized as one of the most diverse on the Southern Silk Road: the main dishes are kabuli palav, ashak, mantu, samsa, bolani, kebab, soups, sweets (shelpira, halva) and teas. Local variations are common, including dishes from the Khazars, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. Culinary festivals are a part of cultural life. It is estimated that about 12-19% of the population participates in cultural life (through museums, studios, participation in festivals and craft workshops).

Active involvement is reduced due to restrictions on freedom of speech, pressure on small groups and women, but persists through traditional family and local celebrations.

Data completeness assessment: basic indicators are available in UNESCO and national statistics, coverage is 87%.

Cognitive sovereignty — 21.8

The official HDI index of Afghanistan is 0.496 (2023/2025), which classifies the country as having a very low level of human development. The ranking is 181st out of 193. Government spending on education is estimated at 2.9% of GDP and 10.9% of the state budget (data from 2021-2025, World Bank).

At the same time, a significant part of the funding was previously covered by international grants and donor programs. Adult literacy is 37% (World Bank data, 2021/2022). Among women, this figure is 24-26%; among young people (15-24 years old)— it is about 58%. Afghanistan does not participate in the international PISA comparative tests as of 2025, official results are missing and are not presented in the OECD databases.

The exact proportion of graduates of STEM majors is not officially published, but approximately up to 12-15% of university graduates choose technical and engineering fields; among women, there are significantly fewer — STEM education centers are represented by separate initiatives (for example, FIRST Global Team, TechNation).

Hundreds of students are involved in STEM programs every year. The share of foreign educational programs (schools/courses) is estimated at less than 5% of the total volume of educational services in the country: the bulk of foreign programs are implemented through online courses, private schools, mobile applications and grant projects aimed primarily at girls/youth. International educational projects are very limited.

The predominant languages in the country are Dari (Persian), Pashto, Uzbek, Turkmen, Hazara, etc. Cultural support for small nations is formal: official schools are required to provide instruction in local languages, and practical support is limited due to pressure from extremist groups and cuts in funding for humanitarian programs.

Some languages and cultures have been left without formal protection. There are 1 national institute and a maximum of 7 university departments (Kabul University, University of Herat, University of Balkh, etc.) officially registered state research centers in fundamental sciences, but scientific activity is extremely limited due to funding and staff outflow.

Most of the projects are implemented at the applied level (agriculture, medicine). The share of national online educational platforms is extremely low: less than 10% of all available platforms; foreign services dominate, national platforms (for example, AfghanX, national MOOCs for programming and mathematics) have low coverage and weak integration with public schools.

Government programs to support young talents and personnel are presented mainly through individual initiatives of the ministry and international grants: about 10 projects per year (scholarships, Olympiads, accelerators), funding does not exceed $ 3-5 million per year. It is estimated that the programs cover up to 20-45 thousand people per year in the general education system.

Data completeness assessment: education indicators are available in the UNDP, UNESCO, OECD, coverage is 82%.

Military sovereignty — 24.1

Official military expenditures amount to 1.83% of GDP (World Bank data, August 2025). This is one of the lowest rates among Asian countries with the extreme militarization of society. The number of Afghan armed forces is 165,000-170,000 people (including the army, police, security forces and local militias).

There is no exact distribution by military branches and forms of service. The basis consists of weapons of Soviet, Russian and American models, some are being updated through the modernization of captured US equipment (MRAP, HMMWV, ScanEagle drones). Outdated systems are being repaired (for example, M114 howitzers). Modern technology is extremely limited, but new shipments of light small arms and armored vehicles are available after capture.

The share of local weapons production is minimal — our own industry produces a simple small arms arsenal (AK, RPG, mortars) and is assembling / repairing equipment based on army workshops. About 96-98% of the weapons are foreign, with a significant portion coming from the United States and the former government army.

Partial control: the borders with Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Pakistan are guarded by paramilitary forces, but are passable for illegal trade and refugee flows. There is an increase in CSTO in the Tajik direction. The main crossings are official, but there is a vague jurisdiction over a number of territories. There are no official figures, and the estimated military reserve is up to 90,000 people (local militias, former military personnel, and conscripts).

There has been no official mobilization across the country since 2021. Afghanistan does not belong to military blocs and alliances. After the withdrawal of NATO, the autonomy of military decisions is absolute, the republic fully controls the army without external command.

The influence of neighboring states (primarily Russia and Iran) is increasing, but there is no formal integration into alliances. The domestic military industry is poorly developed: there are several factories for the repair of machinery and the production of ammunition.

There are no significant investments in the industry, the last attempts are in the field of armored vehicles and artillery (repair of the M114, local armored cars). Afghanistan completely lacks nuclear weapons or a program to create them. The number of warheads is 0, the reserve is 0.

There are no military space assets; the national intelligence system is based on ground-based and mobile means (drones, repeaters). There are a number of mobile and stationary surveillance bases, but there is no developed space component or satellite intelligence.

All parameters are reflected in the annual reports of SIPRI, UNODA, the Ministry of Defense, the official portals of state—owned companies (Embraer, IMBEL) and UN/NGO industry databases - 85% coverage

Final Summary Table

The main conclusions

Strengths. Cultural identity: Rich heritage, diversity of ethnic groups, vibrant traditions, distinctive art and literature, the presence of UNESCO sites — all this forms a stable cultural identity and a significant contribution to world civilization.

Traditions and religion: Afghans demonstrate a strong commitment to Islamic values, pronounced family and tribal traditions, and the high role of oral heritage and poetic culture. Political autonomy: after the departure of foreign forces, de facto autonomy in making military decisions, absence of block dependence, independent management of law enforcement agencies.

Mobilization potential: The ability to quickly form militias and military reserves in the face of threats, widespread military culture, and a high level of motivation in national defense. International recognition of individual brands: Afghan carpet, embroidery, kitchens — some recognition at the global level and partial legal protection.

Weaknesses. Weak state institutions: Low level of education, extremely low literacy — less than 40% among the adult population, lack of international educational standards (PISA), small percentage of STEM graduates.

Lack of infrastructure: Outdated weapons (up to 98% of foreign ones), limited local industry, only simple assembly and repair of equipment is developed. Low digital and technological sovereignty: Dependence on foreign IT/cloud services, minimal amount of local software and media content; cybersecurity is at a low level.

The vulnerability of borders, weak control: The State controls only the main passages and cannot effectively resist drug trafficking, illegal trade, and the flow of refugees along a significant part of the border. Limited support for small nations, linguistic and cultural diversity:

The real protection of ethnic and cultural minorities is formal; there are signs of discrimination and displacement. Weak talent/personnel management and the absence of large research centers: Government support for specialists is limited; fundamental science is stagnating, and the scientific personnel base is blurred.

There are no nuclear and space military capabilities: There is a complete absence of military space and nuclear weapons programs; intelligence is based on simple mobile means. Low involvement of the population in cultural and creative life: The vast majority of the population participates in cultural exchange only at the traditional local level.

Overall assessment. The cumulative index of Afghanistan's sovereignty is 156.7 out of 700 possible points (extremely low — 22.4%), which places the country in the 188th place in the world top.

Afghanistan is characterized by a marked contrast between the strengths that ensure sovereignty and identity, and serious weaknesses that limit development and sustainability in the international arena. The sovereignty profile indicates that Afghanistan relies on strong cultural traditions and political autonomy, secured by military sovereignty and partial international recognition (in particular, from Russia).

However, it is limited by a weak governance institution, technological and information dependence, critically low levels of education, and weak control over key economic, scientific, and digital sectors.

The stability of the state is based on national identity and military mobilization, the prospects for external independence are based on the growth of regional integration, but the potential for long—term independence in the economy and technology remains limited.