Indonesia is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Refugee Protocol. As a consequence, for years, there has been no legal basis to differentiate between refugees, asylum seekers and ‘illegal migrants’. Any matter relating to the influx of refugees into the archipelago was – and, we argue, still is – treated more like a security matter than a humanitarian concern. Prior to the creation of PR 125, the handling of refugees was carried out under the securitized framework of Law No. 6 of 2011 on Immigration (hereinafter ‘Law No. 6’) in which asylum seekers were perceived as either victims of trafficking/smuggling or illegal immigrants. This aimed to limit the movement of asylum seekers. There have also been issues relating to accommodation: by 2012, there were thirteen Immigration Detention Centres in Indonesia, but due to limited capacity, not all asylum seekers and refugees were housed in the centres. This was despite the existence of laws and policies that demanded that refugees and asylum seekers had accommodation (Kneebone, Missbach and Jones 2021: 8–10). In the absence of implementation through a legal framework, government agencies in Indonesia have relied on their own discretion when making decisions about refugees (Tobing 2017). Representing sovereignty through the building of new infrastructure and ‘mega projects’ is a practice that existed during the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004–14) and has become even more apparent during Joko Widodo’s presidency (2014–present). These projects are similar to former President Suharto’s developmental politics and represent sovereignty by enhancing both internal trust and authority, and external representation (Warburton 2018: 355). The protection of human rights has regressed during Widodo’s presidency, especially with regard to the discourse around political expression and religious tolerance (Amnesty International 2005; Mujani and Liddle 2021: 76).  In 2016, President Joko Widodo signed PR 125. Although not without its limitations, the relatively new PR 125 has been viewed optimistically by many commentators (Kneebone, Missbach and Jones 2021), especially as it will formally give refugee status to asylum seekers. However, an analysis by Mahardhika Sjamsoe’oed Sadjad shows that PR 125 is still security-heavy in its approach and denies refugees a considerable amount of agency (Sadjad 2021). In this chapter, we examine how PR 125 changes the Indonesian government’s approach to dealing with refugees in Indonesia. More specifically, this chapter seeks to map out how PR 125 has become an arena in which sovereignty and responsibility – two concepts that are often portrayed as in opposition to each other – not only compete but also complement and even transform each other. This is an important debate as PR 125 may be indicative of two changes to the Government’s perceptions. First, there is a change in the Indonesian government’s attitude to ‘foreign’ refugees. In the past, Indonesia has been labelled ‘overly cautious’ due to its failure to take responsibility for humanitarian concerns occurring outside of its borders. Second, there is a change in how the Indonesian government understands the concept of sovereignty itself. It is important to follow changes in how actors perceive core concepts as any changes in perspective may lead to normative and practical consequences. In this chapter, we examine such changes and their implications for sovereignty and responsibility for refugees.