Abstract

Can a small state do more than adapt to international rules and actually participate in making them? A comparison of Uruguay and Estonia shows that limited physical scale does not preclude normative influence. Such influence, however, does not arise directly from the size of an economy, population, or armed forces. It derives from a state’s capacity to convert domestic institutions, specialized knowledge, and reputation into internationally valued competence, embed that competence in organizations and coalitions, and then reproduce it as the external environment changes.

This article examines normative influence through the combined lens of Conversion + SOS + Cognitive Sovereignty + RPS. Uruguay primarily converts political and institutional stability, legal reputation, digital governance, environmental solutions, and peacekeeping experience into trust and status. Estonia has built a narrower but more intensive model based on the digital state, cybersecurity, international law in cyberspace, and the capacity to carry national priorities into the agendas of the EU, NATO, and the UN. The comparison reveals two pathways to rule-setting sovereign capacity: a reputational-institutional pathway and an expert-platform pathway.

The central conclusion is that the sovereign agency of a small state need not take the form of unilaterally imposing rules. More realistic forms include participating in the drafting of language, placing issues on the international agenda at an early stage, creating standards and demonstration models, building coalitions, blocking adverse decisions, and raising the cost of ignoring its preferences.

The Research Puzzle

Traditional materialist approaches associate international influence with population, economic scale, military power, control over markets, and the capacity to coerce. On this view, a small state should primarily accept rules created by larger actors. Uruguay and Estonia, however, show that influence may arise not only from concentrations of material power but also from control over expertise, reputation, procedures, and institutional platforms.

Uruguay has stable democratic institutions and a regionally high level of rule-of-law performance. In 2025, it ranked 23rd among 143 countries in the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index and first in Latin America and the Caribbean. Freedom House rated Uruguay 96 out of 100, noting its long tradition of democratic governance and protection of political rights and civil liberties. These characteristics matter not merely as indicators of domestic quality: they generate trust, reduce uncertainty for partners, and allow the state to present its own solutions as reproducible models.

Estonia has built an international specialization around digital governance and cybersecurity. The European Commission describes it as a leader in the digitalization of public services and links the country’s digital sovereignty to governmental resilience, including the storage of backup copies of critical data in overseas “data embassies.” Estonia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts an autonomous cyber-diplomacy, represents national positions in the EU, NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the UN, and since 2018 has maintained an ambassador-at-large position in this field.

The research puzzle, therefore, is not whether small states can exercise influence at all, but how a domestic resource is converted into an external rule and under what conditions that influence persists once the original innovation is no longer unique.

Methodology

Conversion

Conversion denotes the transformation of an initial resource into a capacity, and of that capacity into an expansion of strategic choice. In the cases examined here, the initial resource may consist of stable institutions, administrative competence, digital infrastructure, specialized knowledge, international reputation, or operational experience. Successful conversion requires several transitions:

1. Resource → domestic capacity. Expertise must be embedded in durable organizations, norms, budgets, and personnel systems.
2. Capacity → international offering. A national practice must become intelligible to partners in the form of a model, standard, training program, platform, or diplomatic initiative.
3. Offering → coalition. Institutional effect requires states and organizations willing to support or use the proposal.
4. Coalition → rule. The initiative must enter documents, procedures, technical protocols, or established practice.
5. Rule → sovereign agency. The institutional outcome must expand the set of options available to the state rather than merely enhance its symbolic prestige.

SOS

SOS is used to analyze a state’s capacity not merely to be present in institutions but to incorporate its preferences into rules. For a small state, four levels of outcome are particularly significant:

• placing an issue on the agenda;
• participating in the drafting of language and technical solutions;
• building a coalition around the preferred norm;
• embedding the outcome in a legal act, standard, or regular procedure.

Normative influence must be distinguished from public visibility. Hosting a conference or possessing a well-known brand does not by itself demonstrate rule-setting capacity. Stronger evidence exists when other actors use infrastructure created by the state, adopt its administrative solution, accept a legal interpretation it has advanced, or are compelled to take its position into account in reaching consensus.

Cognitive Sovereignty

Cognitive Sovereignty is the capacity of a state to define a problem independently, collect and interpret data, produce expert knowledge, and propose its own conceptual framework. If a country relies exclusively on imported analysis, its formal diplomatic position may remain dependent on the supplier of knowledge. The analysis therefore considers:

• national centers of competence;
• the durability of the professional corps;
• the connection between experts, diplomacy, and decision-making;
• the capacity to produce independent legal and technical positions;
• the capacity to disseminate knowledge internationally through training and networks.

RPS

RPS captures the reproducibility of sovereign capacity. Influence should survive changes of government, personnel, technological cycles, or the international environment. Four indicators are examined:

• cross-party or societal support for the specialization;
• institutionalization of competence rather than dependence on individual leaders;
• regular funding and personnel development;
• adaptation of the model as threats and standards evolve.

Index Profile

The analysis uses the supplied scores for the seven dimensions of sovereign agency. Uruguay’s total is 457.5 out of 700, compared with Estonia’s 389.0. The gap is 68.5 points in Uruguay’s favor, although the aggregate score conceals substantial structural asymmetry.

Uruguay outperforms Estonia in six dimensions, while Estonia has a pronounced advantage in the technological index. This does not mean that Uruguay automatically possesses greater normative influence in every domain. Rather, its agency base is broader and more evenly distributed, whereas Estonia concentrates part of its international effect in the technological and cyber-normative niche.

The indices should be interpreted as an analytical profile, not as a direct measure of the number of international norms adopted at a country’s initiative. A high political or cultural score creates favorable conditions for influence, but a conversion mechanism still lies between the resource and the rule. Conversely, a lower aggregate score does not preclude leadership in a narrow field if the state possesses rare expertise and access to an appropriate institutional platform.

Uruguay: Influence Through Trust

Institutional Capital

Uruguay’s principal convertible resource is its reputation as a predictable democratic state. The IMF associates the country’s international standing with institutional continuity, strong democratic institutions, and environmental sustainability. The U.S. Department of State has noted its stable democracy, transparent regulation, and high level of e-government; Mercosur decisions must be ratified by the national parliament because the bloc does not create directly applicable supranational legislation. This combination of external openness and domestic legal filtering supports Uruguay’s capacity to participate in regional rule-making without fully surrendering control over the domestic effect of those rules.

Reputation is not equivalent to normative power, but it functions as a multiplier. Proposals advanced by a state known for honoring its commitments are perceived as less risky. The BTI report characterizes Uruguay as a reliable international partner and links that reputation to respect for treaties and the rule of law regardless of the partisan composition of the government. As a result, a diplomatic position can acquire weight beyond the country’s material scale.

Regional Platform

Mercosur both expands and constrains Uruguay’s agency. Membership provides access to a large regional space and negotiating forums, but trade policy depends on coordination with larger partners. Attempts to secure greater flexibility for independent agreements with third countries show that a small state can place revision of the terms of participation on the agenda without always being able to convert its position into a new rule.

This points to an important distinction among voice, veto, and positive rule-setting. The ability to delay consensus protects against the most adverse outcomes but does not guarantee adoption of one’s own agenda. Positive influence increases when Uruguay combines a legal argument with a coalition, a technical project, or an external agreement that also creates benefits for other members.

Peacekeeping Specialization

Peacekeeping provides the clearest Conversion chain. Uruguay has long deployed substantial contingents to UN operations and ranks among the largest contributors of personnel on a per capita basis; in February 2025, 935 Uruguayan military personnel and advisers were serving in seven missions. Practical experience generated knowledge, professional competence, and international visibility.

Research indicates that participation enhanced Uruguay’s status and opened access to institutionalized consultations with the UN Secretariat and the Security Council. Uruguayan specialists received senior appointments, while accumulated expertise enabled the country to participate in discussions of peacekeeping policy. This is influence exercised not through coercion but through the indispensability of a practical contribution and the authority of a knowledge provider.

Conversion nevertheless has limits. Peacekeeping status depends on continued UN demand, a national personnel reserve, and the political legitimacy of operations. If participation becomes merely a means of financing the armed forces, or if it is not accompanied by updated doctrine and training, its normative effect may weaken.

The Digital and Climate Dimensions

Uruguay does not possess Estonia’s technological profile, but it has developed institutional digital competence. In 2024, it ranked second in the Western Hemisphere and 25th globally in the UN E-Government Development Index; since 2018 it has belonged to the Digital Nations network. The national digital strategy provides for interoperability, digital identity, electronic signatures, data protection, and adaptation of legislation to international standards.

In the climate sphere, Uruguay uses domestic transformation as a basis for external authority. The World Bank notes that the country worked with it to develop the first budget-support loan in which interest payments are linked to achievement of climate targets. More than 90 percent of the country’s electricity is generated from clean sources, allowing its energy transition to be presented as a demonstration model.

This reveals the dual character of normative conversion. On the one hand, successful domestic policy gives a state standing in international debates over climate finance. On the other, the model becomes a source of sovereign agency only when the country participates in designing financial instruments and criteria rather than merely serving as an example for an agenda defined by others.

Estonia: Influence Through Specialization

The Digital State as a Laboratory

Estonia has transformed administrative digitalization into an international specialization. Its model rests not on a single portal but on a combination of electronic identification, legal frameworks, interoperability, secure data exchange, and institutional coordination. Studies of X-Road describe the platform as a foundation for secure decentralized data exchange; elements of it have been used in Finland, Iceland, and the Faroe Islands through the Nordic Institute for Interoperability Solutions.

Conversion occurs in three forms. First, a domestic solution becomes an exportable technical architecture. Second, training and cooperation create a network of specialists familiar with the Estonian approach. Third, national experience gives diplomats standing to participate in defining European and global principles of digital governance. In 2025, Tallinn hosted the EU–Latin America and Caribbean policy dialogue on e-government, including interoperability and mutual recognition of electronic signatures.

Cyber Diplomacy

Following the 2007 cyberattacks, Estonia transformed vulnerability into an area of specialization. It has consistently advanced the proposition that existing international law applies in cyberspace, participated in UN processes, and developed forums for discussing legal positions. In 2021, during Estonia’s presidency, the UN Security Council held its first formal open discussion on cybersecurity. This is an example of agenda-setting: the state used a temporary procedural resource to institutionalize an issue.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence in Tallinn strengthens this knowledge ecosystem. Its Tallinn Manual has become an influential resource for lawyers and policy experts examining the application of international law to cyber operations. The Manual, however, is not the official doctrine of Estonia, NATO, or any other organization and remains a nonbinding scholarly work. It therefore cannot automatically be treated as a norm created by the Estonian state.

Estonia nevertheless derives an indirect normative effect: it provides the platform, connects experts and states, shapes the language of debate, and links the national brand to the legal architecture of cyberspace. This is platform influence—control not over the final content of a norm, but over the infrastructure in which knowledge is produced, tested, and disseminated.

Resilience and the “Data Embassy”

The “data embassy” illustrates a transition from domestic security to institutional innovation. The 2017 Estonia–Luxembourg agreement established a regime for hosting critical government data abroad while preserving Estonian control over it; the project became the first operational example of such an arrangement. Unlike purely technical backup, the model combines cyber resilience, an international agreement, and questions of jurisdiction.

This is especially important for Cognitive Sovereignty. The state preserves not only data but also the capacity to continue legally significant digital processes during a crisis. At the same time, a new dependence arises on foreign territory, infrastructure, and a partner state. Sovereign agency increases when treaty guarantees, ownership of server resources, encryption, redundancy, and alternative sites prevent the host state or a private provider from becoming an irreplaceable channel.

Coalitional Influence

Membership in the EU and NATO gives Estonia platforms within which its specialized knowledge can have greater institutional effect. The country hosts NATO’s cyber defense center, participates in the Alliance’s defense and innovation initiatives, and supports collective policy toward the eastern flank. External threat simultaneously constrains strategic freedom and increases the value of Estonian expertise to allies.

This model depends on coalitions more heavily than Uruguay’s reputational strategy. An Estonian proposal becomes influential when it is perceived as a solution to a Europe-wide or transatlantic problem. The risk is that the national position may dissolve into that of larger allies or be viewed exclusively through the prism of conflict with Russia. Sustainable influence therefore requires maintaining a universal language of international law, technical interoperability, and digital rights rather than relying solely on security arguments.

Comparison of Mechanisms

The Uruguayan model corresponds more closely to its high political, cultural, informational, and cognitive indices. The country possesses a broad base of legitimacy that allows it to translate domestic stability into external reputation. Its economic and technological scores, however, constrain its capacity to scale projects without external financing and partners.

Estonia’s profile is more uneven. Its technological score of 70 is the only dimension in which it substantially outperforms Uruguay, and this advantage underpins its most visible international brand. The comparatively low military and economic scores in the supplied data mean that its rule-shaping capacity must rely on allied platforms rather than autonomous coercion or market scale.

The Seven Dimensions of Agency

Political

Uruguay’s 18.2-point advantage reflects a higher assessment of the resilience of its political institutions. International rankings confirm the country’s strong performance in democratic governance, although problems remain with judicial delays, prison conditions, and representation of certain groups. Political stability supports RPS: external commitments and specializations are more likely to survive a change of cabinet.

Estonia also has a resilient institutional system, but its foreign-policy agenda is more strongly shaped by security. The European Commission has noted the high degree of digitalization in the justice system, implementation of the anti-corruption plan, and a favorable environment for journalists, while recommending further reforms in court administration and access to information. This demonstrates that normative authority requires continual domestic validation.

Economic

Uruguay’s 8.1-point advantage is modest and does not make the country a large market. Its influence arises instead from policy quality and the capacity to create pilot financial solutions, as in the World Bank climate-linked loan. For RPS, it is important that such innovations build the state’s own expertise rather than remain one-off projects of an external partner.

Estonia compensates for its limited domestic market through participation in the EU single market and exports of digital competence. Dependence on European rules, however, means that its own influence is exercised mainly before a norm is adopted—through coalitions, expert networks, presidencies, and the preparation of technical solutions.

Technological

Estonia’s 17.6-point advantage is the central asymmetry of the pair. Technological competence becomes sovereign when the state controls the architecture, data, legal foundations, and the capacity to restore systems. The “data embassy” and distributed backup arrangements demonstrate an effort to build reversibility and continuity into the digital state.

Uruguay is developing digital governance and alignment with international standards, but its normative niche is not yet as clearly identified with a distinctive technological platform. Democratic governance of digital platforms could become one such specialization: the government plan for 2026–2029 provides for a permanent interagency mechanism on human rights, information integrity, and protection of civic space online.

Informational

Uruguay’s 13.9-point advantage may be associated with access to information, resilience of the public sphere, and trust in institutions. Informational sovereign agency, however, requires not only openness but also the capacity to counter disinformation without undermining freedom of expression.

Estonia’s informational model is closely connected to cybersecurity and digital registries. Its strength lies in the technical integrity of systems; its vulnerability lies in dependence on digital infrastructure and heightened exposure to cross-border information threats. The informational and technological domains therefore cannot be assessed in isolation.

Cultural

The 19.1-point gap is Uruguay’s largest advantage. A cultural resource becomes normative when the image of a moderate, law-governed, cooperative state makes partners more receptive to its initiatives. A positive reputation, however, does not guarantee that its preferences will enter the text of an international decision; professional diplomacy and a coalition strategy remain necessary.

Estonia uses a different cultural narrative—the “digital state,” resilience, and innovation. Its advantage is the clarity of the brand; its weakness is the risk of simplification: international audiences may see the technological success without recognizing the legal and organizational conditions without which replication does not work.

Cognitive

Uruguay’s 15.6-point advantage indicates a higher aggregate assessment of its capacity to produce and retain knowledge. Peacekeeping demonstrates how practical experience generates authority and access to rule-related discussions. To deepen conversion, the country needs to connect universities, government agencies, and diplomacy through durable centers of specialized expertise.

Despite its lower index score, Estonia performs strongly in a specific niche. The Tallinn Manual, cyber-diplomatic mechanisms, and international training have created a dense knowledge network around Tallinn. This confirms that concentrated competence can partially offset a narrower overall cognitive base.

Military

Uruguay has an 11.2-point advantage, but its military influence is not based on the capacity for autonomous coercion. Peacekeeping missions allow it to convert limited forces into international status, professional experience, and access to UN consultations.

Estonia’s military agency operates through NATO. The Alliance provides deterrence but makes the capacity to influence collective priorities critically important. The linkage between cyber expertise and the defense architecture increases Estonia’s value, although final decisions depend on the consent of larger allies.

What Counts as Influence

To test the central argument, it is useful to distinguish four forms of normative effect.

Rule Formation

The strongest form is the incorporation of a state’s preference into a binding norm, a decision of an international organization, or a technical standard. For both countries, such cases are rare and generally require a coalition.

Agenda-Setting

A state succeeds in having an issue recognized as an international problem. Estonia’s promotion of cybersecurity in the UN Security Council most clearly illustrates this form.

Interpretive Influence

A state’s experts, or platforms hosted by it, shape the language, categories, and available interpretations. The Tallinn Manual belongs at this level: it is influential, but it is not binding law and does not express Estonia’s official position.

Defensive Influence

A small state uses procedures, coalitions, or consensus rules to block an adverse outcome or preserve an exception. This capacity is a full-fledged form of sovereign agency even though it does not create a new general rule.

Testable Hypotheses

1. Institutional Trust Hypothesis. The more resilient the domestic legal and administrative system of a small state, the greater the probability that its national practice will be recognized internationally as reproducible.
2. Niche Concentration Hypothesis. A small state achieves greater normative effect by concentrating resources in a limited number of domains than by dispersing them across a broad range of initiatives.
3. Platform Hypothesis. Hosting an international center, conference, or expert network generates influence only when national institutions participate in the production of knowledge rather than merely providing its logistical infrastructure.
4. Coalition Conversion Hypothesis. An expert proposal becomes a rule only when a coalition exists of states for which it solves a problem of their own.
5. Reputational Multiplier Hypothesis. Proposals from a state with a reputation for honoring commitments receive greater support when technical quality is held constant.
6. Crisis Acceleration Hypothesis. Experienced vulnerability stimulates innovation and international specialization when permanent institutions and funding emerge after the crisis.
7. Cognitive Control Hypothesis. Dependence on external analysis reduces a small state’s capacity to shape norms even when it has a formal voice in an international organization.
8. Reproducibility Hypothesis. Normative influence survives a change of government only when supported by a professional corps, a budgetary base, and cross-party legitimacy.
9. Dual Dependence Hypothesis. The more successful a niche brand becomes, the greater the risk of a new dependence on a single technology, organization, or external threat that sustains demand for the expertise.
10. Defensive Agency Hypothesis. The capacity to block or modify an adverse norm may have a greater sovereign effect for a small state than symbolic authorship of an initiative.

Risks and Limitations

The first limitation concerns causality. The international prominence of digital Estonia or democratic Uruguay does not prove that reputation itself caused adoption of a particular norm. Rigorous testing requires process tracing of negotiations, draft documents, delegation positions, and interviews with participants.

The second limitation is the risk of conflating national influence with organizational effects. The Tallinn Manual was produced by independent experts with support from a NATO center and is not Estonia’s official doctrine. Similarly, the climate instrument developed jointly by Uruguay and the World Bank cannot be attributed entirely to one state.

The third limitation concerns different regional architectures. Estonia operates within the EU and NATO, which have denser supranational and collective mechanisms than Mercosur. A direct comparison of the number of formal decisions without accounting for the institutional environment would therefore distort the result.

The fourth limitation concerns aggregate indices. They capture the condition of the seven dimensions but do not show what share of resources is actually converted into an external rule. Further research requires additional indicators: the number of initiatives incorporated into international documents; positions held by a country’s nationals in international secretariats; the number of states using national models; coalition durability; and the budget of diplomatic and expert infrastructure.

Practical Implications

For Uruguay

Convert the general reputation for high-quality governance into several clearly defined normative specializations: peacekeeping, democratic digital governance, climate finance, and human rights in the digital environment.

Create a permanent mechanism linking the foreign ministry, AGESIC, universities, the armed forces, and relevant regulators.

Use peacekeeping experience not only as a personnel contribution but also as a source of doctrine, training, mission evaluation, and proposals for the protection of civilians.

Pursue Mercosur procedures that give smaller members not only the right to delay a decision but also the ability to initiate pilot regimes and flexible coalitions.

Maintain parliamentary and public oversight of imported digital and climate standards so that international compatibility does not become cognitive dependence.

For Estonia

Maintain a clear distinction among the national position, the expert platform, and the official norm so that the cyber-diplomacy brand does not rest on exaggerated claims of authorship.

Expand technological specialization toward legal safeguards, digital rights, artificial intelligence, and democratic resilience.

Diversify the infrastructure of “data embassies” and cloud services so that no single jurisdiction or provider becomes irreplaceable.

Systematically translate expert proposals into coalition documents within the EU, NATO, and the UN, measuring not the number of events but changes in language, procedures, and standards.

Develop an independent fundamental research base in order to preserve Cognitive Sovereignty as technologies change and the current cycle of interest in cybersecurity comes to an end.

Conclusion

The comparison confirms the central argument: small-state status doesn’t preclude rule-setting sovereign capacity, but it changes its form. Uruguay and Estonia cannot systematically impose norms on major powers through market power or military coercion. Their agency emerges at other points in the international process—agenda-setting, preparation of expertise, coalition-building, interpretation of rules, provision of infrastructure, and protection of their own boundaries of participation.

Uruguay demonstrates a broad reputational-institutional model. Its advantage rests on democratic resilience, legal predictability, peacekeeping experience, and the capacity to convert domestic practices into trust. Estonia demonstrates a concentrated expert-platform model: technological advantage, cyber diplomacy, and international platforms enable it to influence the language and agenda of digital regulation.

The 68.5-point difference in the aggregate indices in Uruguay’s favor indicates a broader base of sovereign agency but does not negate Estonia’s advantage in the technological niche. Aggregate potential and actual normative influence therefore do not automatically coincide. Conversion is decisive: the capacity to transform a resource into competence, competence into an international offering, the offering into a coalition, and the coalition into a reproducible rule.

For a small state, sovereignty is expressed not only in the right to say “no.” A more mature form of sovereign agency emerges when the state can make its knowledge useful to others, embed its preferences in a collective decision, and preserve the ability to revise the course it has adopted. It is precisely the combination of Conversion, SOS, Cognitive Sovereignty, and RPS that turns limited scale from a permanent disadvantage into a source of specialization and normative influence.