Abstract

The comparison of Togo and Montenegro serves as a test of the external validity of the emergent sovereignty model. The research question is not whether these states possess similar resources or institutions, but whether fundamentally different regional systems generate sovereign agency through the same causal logic: converting resources, structuring dependencies, preserving alternatives, ensuring reversibility, setting boundaries, influencing rules, and reproducing capabilities over time.

The seven-dimensional profiles provided show Montenegro outperforming Togo across all dimensions: 395.9 points versus 283.6, a gap of 112.3 points. Yet this result describes the resource base, not an automatically attained level of emergent sovereignty. The central hypothesis is that the same mechanisms operate in both countries but take different institutional forms: in Togo, through port and transit specialization, West African organizations, and maneuvering between ECOWAS and the Sahel states; in Montenegro, through euroization, NATO, European integration, and the adoption of external institutional rules.

The analysis provides qualified support for the model’s universality. Conversion, Dependence Architecture, Alternative, Reversibility, Boundary, Second-Order, and Reproductive Sovereignty apply to both cases, although their empirical indicators and critical thresholds vary by region. The model’s external validity should therefore be understood as the transferability of causal mechanisms, rather than the identity of institutional forms or index levels.

Research Design

Togo and Montenegro constitute a methodologically challenging but productive pair. The former is embedded in West African monetary, trade, and security arrangements; the latter, in the Euro-Atlantic architecture. Togo uses the CFA franc within the West African Economic and Monetary Union, with its currency pegged to the euro. Montenegro uses the euro unilaterally, without belonging to the Eurosystem or having an independent monetary policy.

This structural analogy is particularly important: both countries gain stability and lower transaction costs through monetary integration while delegating the external determination of monetary conditions to institutions they do not fully control. Their political and institutional environments, however, differ substantially. Montenegro has been a NATO member since 2017 and is negotiating accession to the EU, whereas Togo operates amid the restructuring of West African regionalism, a growing threat from armed groups in its northern regions, and tensions between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States.

The comparison thus follows a most-different-systems design. If the same sequence of mechanisms helps explain the production or restriction of sovereign agency in both settings, this strengthens the case for the theory’s external validity. If a mechanism operates only within one regional architecture, the model’s scope conditions must be refined.

Data and Method

The empirical starting point consists of the supplied seven-dimensional indices. These are treated not as a final measure of emergent sovereignty but as a resource profile from which sovereign agency may—or may not—be generated.

The largest gaps occur in the informational, cognitive, and political dimensions, while the cultural dimension shows the smallest difference. This distribution matters analytically: Montenegro’s higher aggregate score does not eliminate its dependencies, just as Togo’s lower score does not preclude the localized conversion of particular assets, above all the Port of Lomé and its intermediary position between the coast and the Sahel.

The study employs a structured comparison across seven mechanisms:

• Conversion Sovereignty (CS) — the capacity to transform an initial resource into another strategically useful capability.
• Dependence Architecture Sovereignty (DAS) — the capacity to distribute external dependencies so that no single counterpart acquires an exclusive veto.
• Alternative Sovereignty (AS) — the availability of practically accessible alternatives, rather than merely conceivable ones.
• Reversibility Sovereignty (RS) — the capacity to change a previous decision without losing critical functions.
• Boundary Sovereignty (BS) — the capacity to define permissible limits on external involvement and domestic coercion.
• Second-Order Sovereignty (SOS) — the capacity to influence not only particular outcomes but also the rules under which decisions are made.
• Reproductive Sovereignty (RPS) — the capacity to reproduce institutions, expertise, infrastructure, and alternatives over time.

Methodologically, the final level of emergent sovereignty is not derived by simply adding the seven scores again. Instead, the analysis examines a causal sequence: resources must be converted; the resulting capabilities must create alternatives; those alternatives must be operationally switchable; switching must occur within boundaries set by the state; and the accumulated experience must generate rule-making influence and be reproducible over time.

Togo: Country Context

Togo’s principal convertible asset is the Port of Lomé and its associated logistics infrastructure. The World Bank views the modernization of the rail connection between the port and the Adétikopé Industrial Platform, along with improvements to transport corridors, as a means of strengthening the country’s position as a regional logistics hub. The port provides maritime access for landlocked countries, but this advantage also creates exposure to the political and economic dynamics of neighboring states. World Bank materials have noted that Burkina Faso accounted for approximately 80% of transit through the port, while regional instability and sanctions against Niger had already affected operations.

A second potential channel of conversion is digitalization. The World Bank–supported digital acceleration project envisages connecting approximately 8,000 public institutions, improving internet access for more than one million people, and developing digital skills and entrepreneurship. Yet substantial external financing means that greater technological capacity does not automatically translate into autonomy. It remains necessary to establish whether Togo can maintain the infrastructure, train specialists, and switch suppliers independently once the projects end.

The political environment constrains the conversion of informational and cognitive resources into public correction of government policy. In its 2025 report, Freedom House classified Togo as “Partly Free,” citing the prolonged dominance of the ruling political establishment, repression of the opposition, and a contested constitutional restructuring. The transition to a parliamentary system was completed in 2025 amid opposition objections, while northern regions continued to face pressure from armed groups.

Togo thus combines three processes pulling in different directions: converting geography into logistics rents, attempting to transform external financing into digital capability, and achieving only limited institutional conversion of public information into policy change. This makes the country a particularly useful test of non-additivity: an individual strategic asset may give a state international significance without producing a comparable degree of domestic reversibility.

Montenegro: Country Context

Montenegro is embedded in a denser and more formalized institutional architecture. NATO membership provides access to collective defense, joint planning, training, and military interoperability, enabling a modest national resource base to generate greater security capabilities. The EU accession process offers institutional support and market access but also requires extensive legal adaptation; the pace of integration is directly linked to reforms in democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights.

The economic profile remains vulnerable. The European Commission points to a narrow production base, heavy dependence on services and tourism, and slow progress in the green and digital transitions. Montenegro’s Economic Reform Programme (ERP) for 2025–2027 likewise identifies high import dependence and limited diversification as major structural weaknesses.

Unilateral euroization represents a classic trade-off between resources and agency. Using the euro provides monetary stability and reduces exchange-rate risk, but the Central Bank of Montenegro cannot set interest rates, pursue an independent exchange-rate policy, or fully perform the role of lender of last resort. The conversion of European integration into autonomy therefore depends on whether lost monetary instruments are offset by fiscal buffers, banking supervision, productive diversification, and eventual full participation in European institutions.

Montenegro consequently gains access to more powerful, established functional arrangements than Togo, but many of these arrangements lie within a single, correlated Euro-Atlantic core. Institutional multiplicity does not necessarily imply a plurality of independent alternatives when their rules and crisis responses are closely interconnected.

The Seven Mechanisms

Conversion Sovereignty

In Togo, the primary object of conversion is geographic location. The port, railway, road corridors, and industrial platform can turn a small economy into a provider of regional connectivity. Conversion succeeds when transit activity generates not only fees but also domestic value chains, professional expertise, digital infrastructure, and diplomatic opportunities. It remains incomplete if the economy merely services flows determined by external demand and neighboring countries’ policies.

In Montenegro, conversion centers on institutional integration. The euro, NATO, and the EU accession process turn small size into access to stability, security, markets, and standards. Yet dependence on tourism and imports shows that adopting external institutions has not fully translated into diversified productive capacity.

The same mechanism operates in both settings: sovereignty derives not from the port or membership as such, but from the secondary capabilities built around them. What differs is the input to conversion—transit geography in Togo and institutional compatibility in Montenegro.

Dependence Architecture

Togo simultaneously participates in WAEMU, ECOWAS, AfCFTA, international development programs, and relationships with Sahel states. These overlapping arrangements may reduce dependence on any single partner. At the same time, monetary policy is exercised at the regional level, digital and infrastructure projects depend on external financing, and port traffic is sensitive to a narrow group of neighboring markets.

Togo’s relations with the Alliance of Sahel States illustrate a potential balancing strategy. The country maintained its ECOWAS membership while expanding contacts with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and positioning itself as an intermediary between competing regional arrangements. Such diversification expands agency, however, only if obligations remain compatible and transit does not become dependent on a single bloc.

Montenegro distributes functions among NATO, the EU, international financial institutions, and bilateral partners. Yet security, regulation, currency, trade, and much investment are oriented toward the Euro-Atlantic architecture; the EU accounted for 28% of foreign direct investment inflows in 2024. Its dependencies are thus institutionally numerous but partly correlated. Under DAS, Togo potentially enjoys greater flexibility across blocs, while Montenegro has a more stable but concentrated system.

Alternative Sovereignty

For Togo, alternatives involve the ability to redirect transit, diplomatic, and financial relationships among coastal West Africa, Sahel states, and a broader range of external partners. Yet alternatives must be assessed in terms of cost: the port depends on overland corridors, security, and demand in neighboring countries. The formal existence of several partners does not guarantee functional substitutability.

In Montenegro, alternatives largely exist within its chosen European trajectory: different investment sources, tourism markets, energy routes, and coalitions within the accession negotiations. Changing the underlying framework itself—the EU and NATO—would be far more costly. Togo therefore potentially has greater room to maneuver among external centers, whereas Montenegro has greater scope for diversification within its chosen center.

Reversibility Sovereignty

In Togo, reversibility is constrained by debt obligations, project dependence, and the need to keep the port operating continuously. The IMF noted rising public debt and a postponement of the target date for reducing it, although the risk of debt distress had been lowered to moderate. The more infrastructure depends on a single creditor, operator, or standard, the higher the cost of changing course.

For Montenegro, the critical test is unilateral euroization. Abandoning the euro is theoretically possible, but in practice would require creating a currency, a monetary regime, and confidence in both. Full EU membership, meanwhile, could transform a unilaterally assumed dependence into institutional participation. This illustrates that reversibility does not always mean exit: it may instead involve moving from the status of rule-taker to that of participant in rule-making.

Boundary Sovereignty

In both countries, the boundaries of external involvement are determined jointly by the state and external regimes. Togo must reconcile openness to investment, security in the northern regions, and informational control. Stronger emergency measures may expand the state’s operational capacity but weaken domestic accountability, thereby reducing society’s ability to correct strategic decisions.

Montenegro sets limits on foreign investment and domestic policy within the framework of EU and NATO norms. Voluntary legal adaptation can strengthen state institutions while narrowing unilateral discretion. The criterion for BS is therefore not the number of external constraints but participation in setting them, transparency in undertaking obligations, and the ability to protect critical functions.

Second-Order Sovereignty

Togo can convert the centrality of its port and its intermediary relationships into influence over regional trade and security rules. Its position between ECOWAS and the Sahel countries potentially provides diplomatic leverage, although institutional influence is constrained by domestic legitimacy, limited expert resources, and dependence on external financing.

Montenegro still primarily adapts to EU rules rather than shaping them. Nevertheless, accession negotiations create channels for exemptions, transition periods, and administrative learning, while NATO membership provides a seat in collective decision-making. Its SOS is consequently stronger in security than in monetary policy, where it uses the euro without representation in Eurosystem governing bodies.

Reproductive Sovereignty

Togo must reproduce its port infrastructure, skilled workforce, digital competencies, fiscal sustainability, and state presence in the north. External financing can initiate this process, but sustainability emerges only when operations, maintenance, training, and tax-based financing are localized. Connectivity and logistics projects establish the foundations for reproduction without automatically demonstrating that it can be sustained.

Montenegro reproduces agency through administrative adaptation to EU standards, military interoperability, and the stability provided by the euro. Its main risks are a narrow production base, import dependence, reliance on tourism, and the loss of independent instruments for macroeconomic adjustment. Long-term outcomes depend on converting integration into domestic competencies rather than continually substituting external structures for internal capabilities.

Comparison of Mechanisms

The comparison confirms that identical mechanisms can appear in different institutional forms. It does not, however, establish that their effects are equally strong: Montenegro’s NATO membership differs legally and organizationally from Togo’s more flexible security relationships, just as Montenegro’s unilateral euroization differs from Togo’s participation in a regional monetary union.

Testable Hypotheses

1. Conversion hypothesis: an increase in the Port of Lomé’s capacity will strengthen Togo’s sovereign agency only if accompanied by growth in domestic value added, tax revenue, and local expertise.
2. Correlated-dependence hypothesis: Montenegro’s multiple ties to the EU, NATO, and the euro generate fewer alternatives than their formal number suggests because they belong to a common geopolitical core.
3. Cross-framework maneuvering hypothesis: Togo’s simultaneous engagement with ECOWAS and the Sahel states increases its bargaining capacity as long as its obligations do not become incompatible.
4. Institutional-conversion hypothesis: progress toward EU membership increases Montenegro’s SOS if the country moves from adopting rules to participating in their formulation.
5. Monetary-asymmetry hypothesis: monetary integration increases short-term stability in both countries but reduces RS in the absence of sufficient fiscal and liquidity buffers.
6. Domestic-reversibility hypothesis: restrictions on political competition and information reduce Togo’s capacity to correct an unsuccessful foreign policy course, regardless of the number of its international partners.
7. Reproduction hypothesis: externally financed infrastructure increases RPS only when supported by domestic maintenance, workforce training, and sustainable budget financing.
8. External-validity hypothesis: if measures of switchability, exit costs, and the localization of expertise predict changes in agency similarly in both countries, the seven-mechanism model is transferable across regions.

Indicators for Empirical Testing

Empirical testing requires indicators that supplement the static index:

• the share of a single country or bloc in trade, investment, debt, and infrastructure financing;
• the concentration of transit cargo by country of origin and destination;
• the share of domestic value added and employment in the port, tourism, and digital economies;
• the time and cost of replacing suppliers of critical technology, energy, or financing;
• the volume of liquid and fiscal reserves available in the event of an external shock;
• the number of functionally independent, rather than merely legally separate, external channels;
• the domestic share of infrastructure operations, maintenance, and training;
• participation in the decision-making bodies of regional organizations;
• the capacity to maintain critical public services after external assistance ends;
• changes in these indicators over a period of at least ten years.

A counterfactual stress test is particularly important. For Togo, scenarios should include the closure of a transit corridor, termination of a major donor program, or conflict between ECOWAS and the Sahel framework. For Montenegro, scenarios should include a sharp decline in tourism, the cessation of a major investment flow, a banking shock in the absence of a fully functioning lender of last resort, or delayed EU accession.

Conclusion

The preliminary findings support a qualified universality of the model. Togo and Montenegro indeed rely on different resources and institutions, yet in both cases emergent sovereignty is generated through the same causal sequence: a resource is converted into a function; dependencies are distributed; alternatives emerge; switching costs are assessed; boundaries are established; influence over rules is acquired; and capabilities are reproduced over time.

Montenegro has a stronger initial profile and a more institutionalized architecture. Its advantage lies in the reliability of its external arrangements and its ability to import security, standards, and stability. At the same time, euroization, a narrow production base, and the concentration of relationships around the Euro-Atlantic core constrain some alternatives and instruments of reversibility.

Togo has a smaller resource base, but the Port of Lomé and the country’s position among different West African arrangements create points of disproportionate strategic significance. Converting these into sustainable agency depends on diversifying transit, localizing technological and managerial expertise, ensuring debt sustainability, and maintaining the domestic capacity to correct political decisions.

The strongest evidence for the theory, therefore, is not equality of levels but the recurrence of the logic through which sovereignty is produced. The region determines the form of resources, institutions, and constraints, while the seven mechanisms provide a common analytical language. The theory passes a preliminary test of external validity, but a definitive conclusion requires dynamic data and tests of the proposed hypotheses against critical episodes.