Burke Index | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
RESEARCH 17.11.2026, 07:48 The Paradox of Protection without Self-Sufficiency Abstract State autonomy does not necessarily require a fully autonomous defense system. Costa Rica has constitutionally abolished its standing army while retaining police forces and the possibility of organizing military forces for national defense in the circumstances specified by its Constitution. The Lithuanian model, by contrast, combines a national defense function with collective defense and an allied military presence. Comparing these cases makes it possible to examine the functional adequacy of the sovereign core, rather than the quantity of national military power: the capacity to make binding decisions, maintain effective governance, provide an initial response, and translate external support into national action. The central analytical framework links Minimum Sovereign Core + Credible Optionality + Managed Interdependence + RS. The principal argument is that delegating particular security functions is compatible with sovereign agency as long as the state retains the institutions and capabilities necessary to manage that dependence. The Research Puzzle Why does the absence of a standing army not necessarily imply an absence of sovereign capacity, while possessing national armed forces does not guarantee defense self-sufficiency? Costa Rica illustrates the first part of the puzzle. Article 12 of its Constitution prohibits the army as a permanent institution but provides for the necessary police forces. It also permits the organization of military forces for national defense or pursuant to a continental agreement, while maintaining their subordination to civilian authority. The Costa Rican model thus rejects a particular permanent organization of military power, rather than relinquishing protection, coercion, or civilian control over security institutions. Lithuania illustrates the second part. Its legal doctrine of national security combines independent resistance with requests for international assistance: defense must not be postponed until external support arrives. A dichotomy between “national protection” and “protection by others” is therefore insufficient. The analysis must establish which functions the state performs independently, which it provides jointly with partners, and which capabilities it retains to coordinate these levels. Theoretical Framework Minimum Sovereign Core The minimum sovereign core is understood here as a set of functions without which the state ceases to be an autonomous participant in its own security system. It cannot be reduced to a prescribed army size or a percentage of defense expenditure. A functionally adequate core will differ across threats and circumstances. The article identifies six components:
This is a working analytical construct, not a universal standard of international law. Its purpose is to identify which capacities must remain within the state even when a substantial share of the means of protection is provided jointly. Credible Optionality Credible Optionality means the availability of feasible courses of action rather than merely nominal options. In security, an alternative must meet several conditions: it must be legally permissible, organizationally prepared, adequately resourced, and available when needed. The possibility of requesting assistance is not equivalent to the ability to receive and use it in time. Alternatives do not necessarily entail a choice between competing military alliances. They may include backup communications, different supply channels, additional training partners, civilian response mechanisms, and multiple ways of sustaining critical state functions. Managed Interdependence Managed interdependence emerges when the state understands the structure of its external support and possesses the means to align its use with national decisions. It entails a clear division of authority, compatible procedures, explicit conditions of assistance, and the capacity to assess the consequences of dependence. An external partner may provide equipment, training, or military support. The state, however, must retain the ability to identify its needs, establish legal conditions, and integrate the assistance received into its own system of governance. RS: Reversibility In this article, RS is used in the stipulated analytical sense of the reversibility of decisions and configurations of dependence. Complete reversibility in security is unattainable: personnel training, infrastructure, and interoperability develop over extended periods. The substantive question is therefore not whether cooperation can be abandoned immediately, but whether it can be adjusted without undermining critical functions. It is important to distinguish the reversibility of strategic alignment from the reversibility of individual decisions within it. Replacing a supplier, changing coordination procedures, and leaving a collective defense system are fundamentally different actions. Method and Limitations The study offers a structured comparison of mechanisms rather than an experimental test of the effectiveness of two security models. The principal limitation is the difference in threats. Costa Rica cannot be assessed as though it operated in Lithuania’s military and political environment, nor can the Lithuanian model be transferred to another country without regard to context. The supplied index scores are not accompanied by a methodology: the underlying indicators, weights, observation period, and uncertainty of the estimates are unknown. Differences between them are therefore used to formulate questions, rather than treated as evidence of the causal superiority of a particular policy. The sources comprise constitutional and legal documents, the North Atlantic Treaty, official materials on international cooperation, and institutional reviews. Announced future capabilities are distinguished from those already established. It is especially important not to equate the absence of a standing army with the transfer of the entire defense function to another state. Costa Rica and Lithuania represent different ways of organizing protection, rather than two variants of a single mechanism of delegation. Comparison of Index Scores The original values come from the data supplied for the study. Differences are calculated by subtracting Costa Rica’s score from Lithuania’s.
An arithmetic check confirms both totals. Relative to the maximum of 700 points, the scores amount to approximately 60.5% for Costa Rica and 70.7% for Lithuania. The gap is approximately 10.2 percentage points on the scale. The largest differences occur in the technological and military dimensions. Together, they account for 40.7 points, or approximately 57.1% of the total gap. The military dimension, however, accounts for only part of the difference: 17.7 out of 71.3 points. Even within the supplied model, Lithuania’s advantage therefore cannot be reduced exclusively to the possession of an army. Costa Rica’s score of 41.2 points in the military dimension also requires methodological clarification. It does not imply the existence of a standing army and can be interpreted only once the index’s content is disclosed: whether it captures coercive functions, resilience, international support, or other parameters. Costa Rica: Protection without an Army Retaining the Coercive Function Costa Rica’s constitutional framework preserves state forces for maintaining public order while prohibiting a standing army. Civilian subordination also applies to forces that may be organized in the circumstances specified by the Constitution. Legal documents also confirm the existence of the Border Police, the National Coast Guard Service, and the Air Surveillance Service. The substantive focus of analysis is therefore the distribution of functions among civilian security bodies, rather than the absence of all coercive instruments available to the state. For the minimum sovereign core, the capacities to enforce the law, oversee security institutions, coordinate agencies, and ensure continuity of governance are especially important. International Cooperation The agreement between Costa Rica and the United States on cooperation to suppress illicit trafficking was signed in 1998 and entered into force in 1999. Official treaty records associate it with joint patrols. Its legal framework provides for coordination among competent authorities, information exchange, and joint law enforcement procedures. This agreement, however, cannot be presented as a comprehensive guarantee of Costa Rica’s military protection. Cooperation against illicit trafficking has a defined scope and is not equivalent to a collective defense commitment. From the perspective of conversion, it is important to establish whether such assistance enhances national capacities to identify threats, conduct lawful operations, and sustain expertise, or merely compensates temporarily for a lack of domestic means. Civilian Capabilities The OECD associates Costa Rica’s investment attractiveness with its skilled workforce while also identifying skills shortages and infrastructure constraints. This supports treating human capital and the quality of governance as resources for resilience. It does not, however, establish that particular social outcomes were directly caused by the abolition of the army. A more appropriate hypothesis is that a smaller permanent military burden may expand the scope for civilian investment if fiscal and political decisions actually direct resources toward these areas. Even successful civilian development does not eliminate the need to finance security. In this model, expenditure does not disappear but is distributed among different functions and organizations. The Model’s Limits The limits of the Costa Rican model are defined by the state’s capacity to maintain effective governance, rather than by the absence of an army itself. If civilian institutions lose the ability to enforce decisions, protect personnel and infrastructure, or use external assistance within the framework of national law, a deficit of sovereign capacity emerges. Demilitarization and state weakening are therefore distinct processes. The former may be a deliberate institutional strategy; the latter begins when functionally necessary control is lost. Lithuania: Autonomy within an Alliance Two Commitments The North Atlantic Treaty combines the national development of defense capabilities with collective assistance. Article 3 provides for maintaining individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. Article 5 establishes an obligation to assist a member under attack, with each ally taking such action as it deems necessary, potentially including the use of armed force. Two clarifications follow. Collective defense entails binding obligations, yet it does not prescribe an identical, mechanically predetermined response by every ally. The analysis must consider the legal basis of assistance, actual procedures, force preparedness, and the capacity of the national state to act alongside allied forces. National Action Lithuania’s legal doctrine provides for universal and unconditional defense, the use of state resources, and resistance by citizens. International assistance is to accompany independent defense, rather than replace it with an expectation of external support. Within the logic of the minimum core, national capacity encompasses both national armed forces and legitimate governance, resilient communications, mobilization procedures, and civilian support for defense. Such a core need not secure victory unaided. Its function is to preserve the state’s agency and the conditions under which allied assistance can be effective. Giving Guarantees Material Form Official German materials describe the permanent stationing of the 45th Armored Brigade in Lithuania and its anticipated readiness from 2027. The stated planned strength is 4,800 military personnel and 200 civilian employees. This example illustrates the distinction between a political promise and institutional and material preparation. A permanent presence entails personnel, infrastructure, and long-term commitments. Future readiness, however, cannot be treated as already fully achieved. Assessing reliability requires distinguishing an adopted decision, actual deployment, and a demonstrated capacity to perform assigned tasks. For the host country’s sovereign capacity, it also matters how effectively its own institutions ensure legality, infrastructure coordination, and operational continuity under conditions of a joint presence. Sustaining Civilian Capabilities Official materials from Lithuania’s Ministry of National Defense include civil-military coordination, cooperation with municipalities, and societal mobilization within the comprehensive defense approach. This confirms that defense resilience is understood more broadly than armed formations. To be sure, national capacity also depends on the institutional structures that underpin the functioning of the state and society. The existence of such a concept, however, does not establish equal readiness across all its components. Verification requires evidence of implementation, personnel training, and the correction of identified shortcomings. The Minimum Sovereign Core The principal finding of the comparison is the need to distinguish the means of protection from the capacity to govern protection. Particular means may be purchased, provided jointly, or obtained from partners. The state, however, must retain sufficient capabilities to define tasks, make decisions, and oversee implementation.
The table presents an analytical model, rather than describing identical legal powers in the two states. “National” here does not imply exclusively domestic production or the absence of foreign participation. It refers to retaining the responsibility and expertise without which the state cannot meaningfully manage external contributions. The Reliability of External Support Five criteria are proposed for assessing external support.
Costa Rica’s cooperation against illicit trafficking and Lithuania’s collective defense should not receive the same assessment merely because both involve external partners. The legal scope of these relationships differs. Even a strong guarantee, however, does not eliminate the need for national institutions. Assistance must be translated into specific lawful actions, which requires capable recipients. Reliability is thus a characteristic of the entire system of interaction, rather than merely of the external partner’s intentions. Reversibility without Self-Destruction Reversibility in security should be understood as the capacity to change particular elements of cooperation while preserving essential functions. For Costa Rica, relevant subjects of inquiry may include the terms of technical assistance, personnel training, and the allocation of national law enforcement tasks. For Lithuania, they include flexibility in procurement, procedures, and coordination within its chosen alliance architecture. Reversibility does not require a constant readiness to abandon every long-term relationship. A durable commitment can itself become a resource for protection. A problem arises when dependence no longer permits adjustment even as conditions clearly deteriorate, or when the state loses the capacity to assess the cost of continuing cooperation. It is therefore useful to distinguish three levels:
The deeper the level, the less realistic it is to demand rapid and inexpensive switching. Stress-Testing Sovereign Capacity The following scenarios are research tests rather than forecasts.
The test must not be reduced to whether the state can withstand every threat without partners. Such a standard substitutes absolute self-sufficiency for functional adequacy. A more substantive assessment establishes which functions are preserved when support is partially disrupted, for how long, and with what consequences. Specific time thresholds cannot be assigned without specialized data. Alternative Explanations Differences in index scores may reflect not only the quality of security arrangements but also the technological base, the external environment, historical development, and the characteristics of the methodology itself. It cannot be concluded that possessing an army automatically increases overall sovereign agency. Nor can abolishing an army be regarded as a universally applicable means of strengthening civilian institutions. Reverse causality must be considered: stronger institutions may enable a particular security model, rather than merely emerge as its result. It is especially important not to conflate collective defense, law enforcement cooperation, and the transfer of authority to an external state. They create different rights, obligations, and risks. The comparison therefore explains mechanisms through which dependence and autonomy can coexist, but does not establish a single optimal model for all small states. Testable Hypotheses 1. Sovereign capacity depends on functional adequacy, rather than the organizational designation of a security institution. Assessment must consider actual authority and capabilities. 2. External assistance is more effective when the national recipient is institutionally strong. Governance, personnel, and legal procedures are critical. 3. Collective defense strengthens autonomy when national action is preserved. It must not institutionalize passive waiting for assistance. 4. Abolishing a standing army is compatible with sovereignty when the necessary coercive and civilian core is retained. 5. The reliability of support depends on material and organizational preparation, rather than political declarations alone. 6. Technical irreplaceability can constrain autonomy despite formal national control. 7. Civilian resilience and military capacity can reinforce one another. Their budgetary relationship cannot be assessed solely as competition for expenditure. 8. The reversibility of individual decisions matters more than the abstract possibility of abandoning all external ties. 9. Weak national threat assessment increases dependence on external interpretations of the situation. 10. The minimum core has a reproductive structure. Its adequacy depends on both current resources and the renewal of capabilities. Practical Priorities For Costa Rica The first priority is to assess the adequacy of civilian security bodies according to the functions they perform, rather than the absence of a military organization. The second is to accompany external assistance with the development of national capabilities. A substantive outcome should be the retained capacity to evaluate, maintain, and use the means received. The third is to assess continuity of coordination among law enforcement, border, and other civilian services. The division of functions among agencies must not create gaps in responsibility. The fourth is to avoid treating social development as automatic evidence of security. Human capital supports resilience but does not replace the necessary protection of institutions. For Lithuania The first priority is to develop the national core as a condition for effective collective defense, rather than as an attempt to replicate every capability of the alliance. The second is to assess the allied presence in terms of actual readiness, distinguishing plans, deployment, and demonstrated capabilities. The third is to sustain the civilian components of resilience, including the municipal level and the continuity of essential state functions. The fourth is to retain expertise in procurement, maintenance, and interoperability. External provision must not eliminate the national capacity to understand the country’s own systems. Theoretical Implications Costa Rica and Lithuania demonstrate different organizational responses to a common problem: how to provide protection without complete self-sufficiency. In the first case, a standing army is constitutionally excluded, yet coercive and defense functions remain; in the second, national defense is combined with international assistance and collective commitments. The central distinction lies neither between possessing and lacking an army nor between independent and joint provision of particular means. It lies between a state capable of governing its system of protection and a state that has lost the functions necessary to do so. The minimum sovereign core is the capacity to preserve legitimate decision-making, institutional continuity, and national action, and then translate external support into outcomes of national policy. Complete defense self-sufficiency is not a necessary condition for emergent sovereignty, so without this core even substantial assistance may fail to become an autonomous capacity of the state. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
