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 RESEARCH 27.10.2026, 10:38 The Paradox of Geographic Dependence and Strategic Maneuver: Mongolia and Portugal  Share on media Abstract Geographic peripherality does not produce a single political outcome. Mongolia, situated between Russia and China, and Portugal, located on Europe’s Atlantic periphery, illustrate different ways of organizing external connectivity: the former seeks to offset territorial constraints through its “third neighbor” policy, while the latter combines European integration with Atlantic and Lusophone ties. Embassy of Mongolia: Foreign Policy; European Commission: Mongolia; Government of Portugal: Foreign Policy Priorities This article proposes that the differences between the two countries be explained not by their distance from international centers, but by the density of genuinely available strategic alternatives. The central analytical nexus is Alternatives, Reversibility, Boundaries, and SOS. It makes it possible to examine whether practicable options for external engagement exist, how costly it is to switch among them, who determines the boundaries of dependence, and whether the state can influence the institutional conditions of its participation. The indices provided for this study are 366.7 points for Mongolia and 472.4 for Portugal. The article’s central argument is that geography constrains the space of choice, but sovereign agency depends on the extent to which a state can convert available connections into substitutable routes, durable coalitions, and manageable institutional relationships. Research Problem The paradox of this pairing is that distance from major economic centers may be associated either with a concentration of dependence or with an expansion of external opportunities. Mongolia is landlocked and borders only Russia and China; European institutions explicitly characterize its position in terms of a combination of economic dependence on China and energy dependence on Russia. European Commission: Mongolia Portugal likewise occupies a peripheral position relative to Europe’s continental core. Yet its external connectivity includes maritime shipping through Sines, a direct digital link to Brazil, and participation in European institutions. EllaLink; EUR-Lex: Voting in the Council of the EU; Port of Sines: Multipurpose Terminal The comparison should therefore begin not by asking which country is “farther from the center,” but by asking how many independent conditions must be satisfied for it to make use of an alternative. An additional trading partner does not necessarily create a new route. A new route does not necessarily provide independence from the previous operator. A formal right to change policy does not mean that such a change is economically and politically feasible. From this perspective, sovereign agency is understood as the practical capacity of a state to formulate its own priorities, choose the means of implementing them, and adjust course without incurring unacceptable costs. This definition distinguishes the legal existence of sovereignty from the actual availability of strategic maneuver. Method and Limitations The study is structured as a comparison of two distinct architectures of dependence. It compares not identical geographic conditions, but the mechanisms through which spatial position is converted into political opportunities or constraints. The following working definitions are used for the four central mechanisms. Because the original methodology and the full expansion of SOS were not provided, its meaning is defined operationally below, without claiming that this is the only possible interpretation of the designation.
It is also necessary to distinguish four forms of diversification: partners, routes, technologies, and institutions. They cannot automatically be treated as interchangeable. A foreign investor, for example, may alter the structure of capital without eliminating dependence on the territory through which output is exported. The study has an important limitation: the indices provided are not accompanied by descriptions of the underlying indicators, weights, observation period, or normalization procedure. The article therefore does not establish statistical causality between geography and scores. Instead, it offers a mechanism-based explanation by comparing the authorial assessments with documented features of external connectivity. Comparison of the Indices The numerical values in the table are drawn from the data provided for the study. Differences are calculated as Portugal’s score minus Mongolia’s.
An arithmetic check confirms both totals. Normalized against the maximum of 700 points, the scores are approximately 52.4% for Mongolia and 67.5% for Portugal, a gap of 15.1 percentage points on the scale. The largest differences occur in the economic and technological dimensions: together they account for 48.7 points of the total 105.7-point gap. The smallest difference is in the military dimension, at 1.5 points. Within the assessment system provided, Portugal’s advantage is therefore associated primarily not with military power but with economic, technological, political, and cognitive capabilities. These scores, however, cannot be used to measure directly either the number of independent routes or the degree of control over infrastructure. That requires a separate analysis of specific channels of dependence. Mongolia: Connectivity Through Its Neighbors Trade Concentration According to Mongolia’s National Statistics Office, in 2024 the country traded with 163 states, yet China accounted for 91.4% of its merchandise exports. The WTO profile for the same year likewise reports China’s share at 91.4%. Mongolia National Statistics: Foreign Trade; WTO: Mongolia Trade Profile These figures illustrate the distinction between the breadth of international contacts and the distribution of economically significant flows. A large number of trading partners does not eliminate the concentration of the principal source of export revenue in a single direction. European Commission data for 2025 place China’s share of Mongolia’s merchandise exports at 87.5%. This figure should be considered separately from the 2024 series, given differences in sources and possible revisions; in either case, it indicates persistently high concentration. European Commission: Trade with Mongolia. For strategic autonomy, what matters is not only to whom a commodity is sold but also how quickly it can be redirected. In the case of bulk commodity shipments, a new buyer must be accompanied by transport access, sufficient border-crossing capacity, acceptable tariffs, and commercially viable logistics. Diplomatic expansion of the circle of partners may therefore proceed faster than expansion of the physical space of choice. Energy Dependence The European Commission identifies dependence on Russian energy resources as one of Mongolia’s principal structural features. National statistics show that in 2024 petroleum products accounted for 71.4% of the value of Mongolia’s imports from Russia. European Commission: Mongolia; Mongolia National Statistics: Foreign Trade. The latter figure cannot be interpreted as Russia’s share of all Mongolian petroleum-product imports: the denominator is different. It nevertheless demonstrates the importance of energy goods within the bilateral import channel. The combination of export and energy concentration creates a multilayered dependence. The state must simultaneously preserve revenue from commodity sales, access to fuel, and the functioning of the transport system. Even if these functions are tied to different neighbors, their combination may constrain the scope for abrupt foreign-policy reorientation. Dependence itself, however, does not establish the existence of continuous external coercion. It is more accurate to speak of a structure of vulnerability: it raises the potential costs of particular decisions but does not imply that Mongolia lacks a policy of its own. The “Third Neighbor” Policy Mongolia deliberately develops relationships beyond its two territorial neighbors. Its official diplomatic materials link this strategy to the revised Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2011. Embassy of Mongolia: Foreign Policy. In June 2026, the EU again affirmed its support for the “third neighbor” policy, while the two sides highlighted cooperation in education, research, and renewable energy. EEAS: EU-Mongolia Joint Committee, 2026. Such engagement should be regarded as a genuine expansion of opportunities, but its functions must be distinguished. An educational partner can improve the quality of public administration. A financial partner can broaden access to capital. A technological partner can provide equipment or expertise. Yet none of these relationships, by itself, creates an independent overland route to the sea. The effectiveness of the “third neighbor” policy must therefore be assessed in relation to specific tasks. In some areas it can provide substantial substitutability among external supports; in others, it can only improve the terms of interaction within an unchanged geographic configuration. Investment Without a Change in Geography Oyu Tolgoi is illustrative: the Government of Mongolia owns 34% of the enterprise and Rio Tinto 66%; Rio Tinto manages operations on behalf of the owners. Rio Tinto: Oyu Tolgoi. This example makes it possible to distinguish state participation in ownership from control over technology, management, and external logistics. A state equity stake creates certain rights, but by itself it does not reveal the full structure of practical control. Another example is the agreement with Orano on the Zoovch-Ovoo project, signed on January 17, 2025. Company documents envisaged a four-year development period before production began, so the agreement cannot be presented as an already fully realized industrial alternative. Orano: 2024 Activity Report; Orano: Agreement with Mongolia. For the analysis of sovereign agency, the arrival of a new investor is not sufficient in itself. It is necessary to determine whether the project creates national capabilities, broadens the range of buyers and financing channels, provides access to technical information, and preserves the possibility of revising particular terms. Portugal: The Periphery of Multiple Systems European Participation Portugal participates in the European institutional system, in which most legislative decisions of the Council of the EU are adopted by qualified majority, while unanimity is required in certain areas. Under the standard qualified-majority procedure, thresholds apply both to the number of member states and to population; a blocking minority must include at least four states and satisfy the applicable voting conditions. EUR-Lex: Voting in the Council of the EU This means that a small state does not possess a universal right to block decisions unilaterally. Its influence depends on the subject of regulation, the procedure, and its capacity to assemble coalitions. At the same time, participation in a common system of rules differs from the position of a purely external recipient of those rules. For Portugal, strategic maneuver involves not only finding another partner but also working within existing institutions: coordinating positions, building coalitions, and influencing the substance of decisions. Such maneuver should not be equated with complete independence from the European architecture. Its significance lies in the ability to participate in the governance of interdependence. Atlantic Infrastructure The Port of Sines provides Portugal with maritime connectivity; its multipurpose terminal operates under a public concession. Port of Sines: Multipurpose Terminal. In the digital sphere, the operational EllaLink system directly connects Sines with Fortaleza, Brazil, creating a route between Europe and Latin America that does not require the traditional transit through North America. In this case, Atlantic location becomes more than a feature of the map: it becomes the basis for specific infrastructural functions. Yet the presence of a seaport or cable does not in itself imply full national control over the service-delivery chain. Assessing autonomy therefore requires additional examination of concession terms, reserve capacity, maintenance, commercial rights, operator dependencies, and domestic capabilities. Hosting infrastructure on national territory and possessing the capacity to manage its strategic functions are not the same thing. Limits of Diversification The Portuguese case should not be idealized. A published summary of a report by the energy regulator ERSE states that approximately 95% of the gas entering the country in 2025 passed through the Sines terminal. Lusa / Renascença: Gas Supply Through Sines. This is an important counterexample: the ability to obtain gas by sea from multiple suppliers can coexist with concentration at the domestic entry point. Diversification of the resource’s origin is therefore not equivalent to diversification of the infrastructure through which it is received. The OECD also emphasizes the importance of reliable interconnections through Spain for Portugal’s further integration into the European electricity market. OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2026. Maritime openness therefore does not eliminate all spatial constraints. In some sectors Portugal has direct oceanic channels; in others, it remains dependent on the Iberian network configuration. Alternatives: The Quality of Available Substitutes The central difference between the two cases does not lie in the presence or absence of external partners. Both states cultivate international ties. Mongolia, however, does so while maintaining a very high concentration of merchandise exports toward China, whereas Portugal combines European participation with an operational direct Atlantic digital route. European Commission: Trade with Mongolia; EllaLink; Embassy of Mongolia: Foreign Policy Analytically, a nominal alternative should be distinguished from an operational alternative. The former exists in agreements, political declarations, or investment intentions. The latter makes it possible to perform a specific task within acceptable time, cost, and legal constraints.
This yields a methodological rule: alternatives should be counted not by the number of flags involved, but by the number of independently operational ways of performing a critical function. Reversibility: The Feasibility of Switching Reversibility does not mean the ability to undo any decision without loss. It refers to the capacity to adjust course while preserving the core functions of the economy and the state. For Mongolia, it is useful to distinguish switching among buyers, among border crossings, and among external transport spaces. These changes differ in depth. Redirecting cargo through another crossing may improve operational resilience without changing dependence on the same market or transit state. For Portugal, it is likewise necessary to distinguish the revision of particular infrastructure contracts, a change of commercial supplier, and a change in basic European institutional affiliation. The existence of several foreign-policy vectors cannot be assumed to make these actions equally easy. In practical terms, reversibility should be measured by switching time, additional costs, legal constraints, technical compatibility, the availability of reserves, and consequences for the population. If a transition requires resources that the state does not possess during a crisis, the alternative remains largely formal. The most important indicator of strategic maneuver is therefore not merely the availability of a fallback option, but the capacity to sustain vital functions during the transition. Boundaries: Controlling the Limits of Dependence Control over the boundaries of dependence cannot be reduced to prohibiting foreign ownership. A state may retain a large equity stake in an enterprise while remaining dependent on external management, technology, or markets. The combination of state participation and Rio Tinto’s operational management at Oyu Tolgoi shows why these parameters must be examined separately. Rio Tinto: Oyu Tolgoi Five questions are proposed for analyzing the boundaries of dependence:
For Mongolia, such a test should accompany the assessment of major extractive and energy projects. For Portugal, it should accompany the analysis of port concessions, energy entry points, and digital infrastructure. In every case, the objective is not to eliminate interdependence but to prevent a situation in which a single external actor simultaneously becomes an indispensable source of capital, technology, maintenance, and market access. SOS: Influence over the Terms of Participation Institutional compensation for geography occurs when a state is able to influence the rules governing access, transit, investment, or joint decision-making. Mongolia has channels for exercising such influence: its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, the regular Joint Committee, and engagement under the “third neighbor” policy. EEAS: EU-Mongolia Joint Committee, 2025; EEAS: EU-Mongolia Joint Committee, 2026 The existence of a negotiating forum, however, does not imply an equal capacity to alter the terms of every critical dependency. What must be assessed is the concrete outcome: improved access to financing, workforce training, changes in contractual position, creation of new infrastructure, or expansion of markets. Portugal has a channel for participating in the formation of European rules, but the nature of its influence depends on decision-making procedures and coalition interaction. EUR-Lex: Voting in the Council of the EU. SOS therefore cannot be measured solely by the number of international organizations to which a state belongs. The more substantive question is whether its position produces an institutional effect and whether it retains the capacity to adjust unfavorable conditions. The Dynamics of Strategic Maneuver A geographic constraint becomes particularly severe when an existing dependence reproduces itself. The following analytical chain is possible: concentration of export revenues creates fiscal sensitivity; that sensitivity reduces resources available for reserves and modernization; the absence of reserves raises the cost of switching; and the high cost of switching reinforces the original concentration. The importance of financial buffers for Mongolia is emphasized by the World Bank: its 2025 public finance review links the country’s resilience to strengthening the fiscal framework, improving investment efficiency, and reducing dependence on volatile mining revenues. World Bank: Mongolia Public Finance, 2025. The reverse feedback loop emerges when external revenues are used to create capabilities, reserves, and technically compatible infrastructure solutions. In that case, today’s openness increases the number of tomorrow’s options rather than merely the current volume of trade. Portugal is not immune to adverse dynamics either. In its 2026 survey, the OECD points to population aging, skills shortages, housing constraints, and the need to raise productivity. OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2026. Within the proposed model, this means that infrastructural advantages require domestic reproduction. A state cannot sustainably manage complex external relationships if it loses human capital, investment capacity, and regulatory quality. Testable Hypotheses The following propositions are research hypotheses rather than established quantitative regularities.
Practical Directions For Mongolia The first priority is to distinguish diplomatic, financial, technological, and transport diversification. The “third neighbor” policy should be assessed through measurable functions: new capabilities, access to equipment, backup financing channels, and commercially viable market outlets. The second priority is to combine infrastructure investment with financial buffers and improvements in the quality of public spending. This orientation is consistent with the World Bank’s recommendations for strengthening Mongolia’s fiscal resilience. World Bank: Mongolia Public Finance, 2025. The third priority is to test major projects for the bundling of dependencies. Particular attention should be paid to cases in which a single counterparty becomes critical simultaneously in financing, technology, operations, and market access. The fourth priority is to develop domestic legal, engineering, and analytical capabilities. Their purpose is not to replace all foreign specialists, but to enable the state independently to understand the terms of cooperation and assess the feasibility of alternatives. For Portugal The first priority is to test the independence of externally diverse channels. Multiple suppliers or international vectors may rely on a common terminal, energy hub, or constrained domestic route. The second priority is to complement Atlantic infrastructure with domestic capabilities and resilient land-based interconnections. The importance of cross-system connections through Spain is emphasized by the OECD. OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2026. The third priority is to treat European integration as a domain of continuous negotiation. Coalition-building capacity, procedural knowledge, and the quality of national expertise matter more than an assumption that a universal veto exists. The fourth priority is not to equate the location of infrastructure with control over it. Port, energy, and digital projects should be assessed in terms of access rights, maintainability, operator substitutability, and resilience to disruption. Theoretical Result The comparison of Mongolia and Portugal refines the central argument: geography affects sovereign agency not directly, but through the structure of available connections and the costs of changing that structure. The Mongolian case demonstrates the limits of diversification when the expansion of diplomatic and investment relationships outpaces changes in material connectivity. The Portuguese case demonstrates the possibilities of combining institutional participation with Atlantic channels, while also revealing sector-specific bottlenecks and dependence on particular infrastructure nodes. EEAS: EU-Mongolia Joint Committee, 2026; European Commission: Trade with Mongolia; EllaLink; Lusa / Renascença: Gas Supply Through Sines; OECD Economic Surveys: Portugal 2026. The opposition between a “geographic trap” and “free maneuver” would therefore be an excessive simplification. A more precise analytical continuum runs between dependence that the state can regulate and partially reconfigure, and dependence whose alteration requires unavailable resources or unacceptable losses. Emergent sovereignty arises not when space ceases to constrain the state, but when the state can sustain several practically feasible ways of acting within those constraints. For Mongolia, this entails the gradual expansion of functional alternatives while preserving interdependence with its neighbors. For Portugal, it entails converting existing multichannel openness into a resilient system of redundancy, capabilities, and institutional influence. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||