Abstract

This article develops a conceptual extension of the seven-dimensional model of sovereignty underlying the Sovereignty Index (the Burke Index). It argues that the proposed subtypes of sovereignty should not be understood as a simple extension of the original model or as additional dimensions alongside its seven components. Rather, they constitute an analytical second-order level derived from the interaction of the dimensions already identified by the index. Whereas the Burke Index assesses the resources and functional capacities available to a state, the concept of emergent sovereignty shifts the analysis to the next level: it examines how these resources interact, reinforce one another, compensate for one another, and are converted into a new capacity for autonomous strategic action.

Keywords: sovereignty; Burke Index; emergence; sovereign agency; interdependence; strategic alternatives; reproduction of sovereignty.

1. The Original Model and the Problem

The Sovereignty Index (the Burke Index) provides a comprehensive framework for measuring a state's actual autonomy across seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive, and military sovereignty. Each dimension is assessed on a scale of up to 100 points, while the aggregate score—up to 700 points—constitutes the cumulative index value. The assessment is based on data from official international and national sources, supplemented by an international expert survey. The final score for each dimension is calculated as the average of statistical indicators and expert assessments.

This architecture establishes a resource-based understanding of sovereignty: the index captures the volume of sovereign resources and functional capacities available to a state in each of the seven domains. At the same time, the additive logic of aggregating the seven dimensions leaves an important aspect outside the analysis: the nature of the relationships among them. It is precisely this dimension that constitutes the subject of the present study.

The proposed approach is grounded in the principle of emergence: a new systemic quality arises not through the simple addition of new elements, but through the interaction of elements that are already present. Accordingly, emergent sovereignty should not be treated as an “eighth” type of sovereignty added to the seven dimensions of the Burke Index. It is rather a systemic property that emerges from a particular configuration and dynamic interaction among those dimensions.

The central research question can therefore be formulated as follows: How does the interaction among the seven dimensions of the index generate an aggregate capacity of the state to preserve a space for autonomous strategic choice under conditions of interdependence?

2. The Seven Dimensions as the Structural Foundation

The foundational level of the model consists of seven parameters or dimensions of sovereignty:

1. Political sovereignty;
2. Economic sovereignty;
3. Technological sovereignty;
4. Information sovereignty;
5. Cultural sovereignty;
6. Cognitive sovereignty;
7. Military sovereignty.

These dimensions can certainly be regarded as the basic components of a state’s sovereign capacity. Yet the presence of each dimension in isolation does not determine the state's ability to act effectively under conditions of interdependence. What becomes crucial are the relationships among them: the capacity of one dimension to reinforce another, compensate for its deficiencies, generate new opportunities, or, conversely, become a source of dependence and vulnerability.

The proposed framework therefore moves from a resource-based understanding of sovereignty toward a relational and dynamic one. The analytical focus shifts from the volume of individual resources to the configuration of relationships among those resources and the state's capacity to manage that configuration.

Two fundamental propositions follow.

First, emergent sovereignty is not equivalent to the sum of the seven dimensions of the Burke Index. A state with high levels of particular forms of sovereignty does not necessarily possess a correspondingly high level of overall sovereign agency. If its resources are weakly interconnected, critically dependent on one another, or difficult to translate into effective action, the aggregate outcome may fall substantially below their potential sum.

Second, emergent effects may arise even where particular resources are limited. A state with relatively modest resources may compensate for a deficiency in one dimension through the effective use of others, thereby generating alternatives, diversifying dependencies, and converting existing resources into new capabilities. Emergence is therefore determined not only by how many sovereign resources a state possesses, but also by how effectively it combines, transforms, and reproduces them.

On this basis, the seven original dimensions are treated as the structural foundation of sovereignty, while the proposed subtypes describe the mechanisms through which emergent sovereign capacity arises and evolves. This approach makes it possible to examine not merely individual dimensions of sovereignty, but the processes connecting them: the conversion of resources, the management of dependencies, the preservation of alternatives, the reversibility of strategic decisions, the determination of the limits of external influence, the ability to shape systemic rules, and the reproduction of sovereign capacity over time.

The proposed subtypes therefore address a fundamentally different question. If the Burke Index asks “What sovereign resources and capabilities does a state possess?”, the model of emergent sovereignty asks “How does the interaction among these resources generate the state's capacity to preserve a space for autonomous strategic choice?”

3. A Typology of Emergent Sovereignty Mechanisms

If the original model assesses state capacity through different dimensions of autonomy, the next analytical step is to examine how these dimensions interact and are transformed into a distinct capacity for autonomous action. The proposed types should therefore not be understood as additional sectors of sovereignty, but as mechanisms through which sovereignty is generated, maintained, and transformed.

3.1. Conversion Sovereignty – CS

A state may transform resources of one type into another form of sovereign capacity. Economic resources may generate technological capabilities; technological capabilities may generate military capabilities; and diplomatic resources may provide access to external opportunities. Sovereignty therefore depends not only on the volume of resources available to a state, but also on the effectiveness with which they can be converted into new capabilities for autonomous action.

The key question is: To what extent can a state transform the resources it possesses into new capabilities for autonomous action?

3.2. Dependence Architecture Sovereignty – DAS

A sovereign state does not need to be independent of all external actors. Rather, it must possess the capacity to shape the structure of its own dependencies. A state may depend on the European Union in one domain, NATO in another, and global markets in a third, while retaining sovereign agency if it can independently determine the character, depth, and critical limits of these dependencies.

The key question is: Who designs the architecture of dependence: the state itself or its external environment?

3.3. Alternative Sovereignty – AS

Actual autonomy is determined not by the absence of dependence, but by the availability of meaningful alternatives. The broader the range of viable options concerning partners, markets, suppliers, technologies, security providers, and financial channels, the greater the state's space for strategic maneuver.

Sovereignty can therefore be understood as the capacity to preserve choice. Dependence becomes critical when abandoning a single external partner makes autonomous action impossible.

The key question is: How many genuinely viable courses of action remain available to the state?

3.4. Reversibility Sovereignty – RS

Sovereignty manifests itself in a state’s ability to alter a previously chosen course without destroying the functioning of its own system. A state may delegate certain powers to international institutions or accept particular external dependencies while retaining sovereign capacity, provided that it remains capable of subsequently altering that configuration.

The key criterion is: Can the state change its strategic course without losing its sovereign agency?

3.5. Boundary Sovereignty – BS

Sovereignty consists not only in the ability to make decisions, but also in the ability to determine the boundaries of acceptable interdependence. A state with high emergent sovereignty independently determines which powers may be delegated, which dependencies are acceptable, and which domains are critical to maintaining autonomy.

The relevant question, therefore, is not whether the state delegates some of its powers, but whether it retains the capacity to determine the limits and conditions of such delegation.

3.6. Second-Order Sovereignty – SOS

A distinction must be drawn between the capacity of a state to make decisions and its capacity to shape the conditions under which those decisions are made.

First-order sovereignty refers to the ability to make decisions autonomously. Second-order sovereignty refers to the ability to influence the rules, institutions, and architectures within which decisions are made.

A state may participate in an international institution and comply with its rules while retaining a high level of emergent sovereignty if it can influence the formation of those rules, determine the depth of its participation, and develop alternative institutional mechanisms.

3.7. Reproductive Sovereignty – RPS

Sovereignty is not a fixed condition but a capacity to reproduce one's sovereign agency over time. A state must be capable of sustaining the institutions, competencies, technologies, human capital, and political mechanisms necessary for autonomous action.

The relevant question, therefore, is not only the level of sovereignty the state possesses today, but whether it can reproduce that sovereign capacity over time.

3.8. Optionality Sovereignty (Additional Parameter)

As an additional parameter, the model may incorporate the concept of optionality sovereignty. One of the most promising extensions of the framework is the proposition that sovereignty does not consist in the continuous exercise of autonomous action, but in the preservation of the possibility of autonomous action when it becomes necessary.

A state is therefore not required to produce everything domestically, reject alliances, or pursue complete autonomy. What matters is whether, at a critical juncture, it remains capable of changing its strategy, replacing partners, or abandoning a particular dependency.

Under this interpretation, sovereignty consists not only in the freedom to act, but also in the preserved capacity to choose another course of action.

4. The Resulting Typology

The dynamics of emergent sovereignty can be represented through seven interconnected mechanisms: conversion, the architecture of dependence, alternatives, reversibility, the determination of boundaries, second-order sovereignty, and reproduction.

These mechanisms do not describe separate domains of state activity. Rather, they describe the processes through which a state generates, preserves, and reproduces its sovereign agency.

5. Formalizing the Model

The argument above can be stated more formally as follows. Emergent sovereignty is understood here as a dynamic capacity of the state to preserve and expand the space for autonomous strategic action under conditions of interdependence.

Unlike traditional approaches, in which sovereignty is defined primarily by the possession of particular resources or formal powers, the present framework focuses on the state's capacity to convert resources, manage dependencies, preserve alternatives, and reproduce sovereign agency over time.

The general model can be expressed as:

ES = F (CS, DAS, AS, RS, BS, SOS, RPS)

where:

• ES – level of emergent sovereignty;
• CS – Conversion Sovereignty;
• DAS – Dependence Architecture Sovereignty;
• AS – Alternative Sovereignty;
• RS – Reversibility Sovereignty;
• BS – Boundary Sovereignty;
• SOS – Second-Order Sovereignty;
• RPS – Reproductive Sovereignty.

The central proposition is as follows:

ES ≠ CS + DAS + AS + RS + BS + SOS + RPS

The emergent effect arises from the interaction among these characteristics rather than from their simple arithmetic aggregation.

5.1. Conversion Sovereignty – CS

Formal definition: the capacity of a state to transform resources of one type into resources or capabilities of another type.

Indicator: the effectiveness of the transition from resources to outcomes. For example, the extent to which economic resources can generate technological or defense capabilities.

Key question: How effectively can a state transform what it has into what it needs?

5.2. Dependence Architecture Sovereignty – DAS

Formal definition: the capacity of a state to control the structure and concentration of its critical external dependencies.

The relevant issue is not the absolute magnitude of dependence, but the state's ability to avoid situations in which a single external actor acquires critical leverage over it. The corresponding indicator is the degree of diversification and governability of critical dependencies.

Key question: Does the state manage its dependencies, or do its dependencies manage the state?

5.3. Alternative Sovereignty – AS

Formal definition: the quantity and quality of genuinely available alternative strategies, partners, and channels of action.

A state is more sovereign when abandoning a particular external partner does not make the achievement of its strategic objectives impossible.

Indicator: the breadth of the feasible strategic choice set.

Key question: How many genuinely viable options remain available to the state?

5.4. Reversibility Sovereignty – RS

Formal definition: the capacity of a state to alter a previously adopted strategic course without suffering a critical loss of functionality.

Indicator: the cost and complexity of strategic reversal. The lower the cost of changing course, the greater the reversibility and, consequently, the greater the sovereign capacity.

Key question: Can the state change its decision when the external environment changes?

5.5. Boundary Sovereignty – BS

Formal definition: the capacity of a state to determine independently the boundaries of acceptable external dependence and the delegation of powers.

This proposition is particularly relevant to the analysis of the European Union. Participation in a supranational system does not in itself imply a loss of sovereignty, provided that the state retains the capacity to determine the boundaries and conditions of its participation.

Indicator: the state's capacity to independently alter the critical thresholds of dependence.

Key question: Who determines the boundaries of interdependence—the state or the external system?

5.6. Second-Order Sovereignty – SOS

Formal definition: the capacity of a state to influence not only decisions within an existing system, but also the rules, institutions, and procedures that determine the space of possible decisions.

This distinction separates two levels of sovereignty. At the first order, the state can make decisions. At the second order, it can influence the rules according to which decisions are made.

Key question: Can the state change the rules of the game, rather than merely play by them?

5.7. Reproductive Sovereignty – RPS

Formal definition: the capacity of a state to preserve and increase its sovereign agency over time. This introduces an explicitly dynamic dimension. What matters is not only the current level of sovereignty, but also its trajectory:

ΔES > 0 indicates an increase in emergent sovereignty, while ΔES < 0 indicates its erosion.

Key question: Is the state capable of reproducing its sovereign agency in the future?

6. The Integrative Logic of the Model

A state possesses a high level of emergent sovereignty when it can simultaneously convert resources, manage dependencies, preserve alternatives, maintain the reversibility of strategic decisions, determine the boundaries of interdependence, influence the rules of the system, and reproduce these capacities over time.

These mechanisms do not constitute a set of independent characteristics. Rather, they form an interconnected sequence in which the outcome of one process becomes a condition for the realization of the next.

This leads to the central proposition of the model: Emergent sovereignty is not the sum of a state's resources; it is the capacity to transform resources and interdependencies into a durable space for strategic choice. This is why two states possessing comparable volumes of resources may nevertheless have radically different levels of emergent sovereignty.

State A, for example, may possess substantial resources but face a narrow range of alternatives, highly concentrated dependencies, and low reversibility of strategic decisions. State B may possess fewer resources while benefiting from greater diversification, a broader range of strategic alternatives, and a greater capacity to change course.

Under such conditions, State B may exhibit a higher level of emergent sovereignty than State A despite its smaller resource base. This constitutes the fundamental distinction between the emergent approach and a classical resource-based conception of sovereignty.

7. Conclusions

The analysis leads to several conclusions:

1. The proposed subtypes of sovereignty constitute an analytical second-order level relative to the seven-dimensional model of the Burke Index. They do not increase the dimensionality of the index; rather, they describe mechanisms rather than domains of sovereignty.
2. Emergent sovereignty is the capacity of a state not merely to possess resources, but to preserve a space for choice, manage the architecture of its dependencies, convert resources into new capabilities, determine the boundaries of external influence, and reproduce its capacity for autonomous action over time.
3. Emergent sovereignty is non-additive. It is determined by the configuration and interaction of its components rather than by their arithmetic sum.
4. The proposed formalization provides a basis for further empirical operationalization, particularly in relation to the member states of the European Union, where it is necessary to distinguish between the delegation of powers and the erosion of sovereign agency.

Within this framework, the state should therefore be evaluated not by asking “How much sovereignty does it possess?”, but rather by asking:

“How does the state generate, preserve, and reproduce its capacity for autonomous strategic action?”

The principal limitation of the present study is its theoretical and conceptual character. The proposed indicators require further empirical validation, refinement, and the development of systematic procedures for measurement.