There are categories in political science that seem self-evident until they are properly gauged. Sovereignty is one of them. We usually share the opinion that States that have gone through war and international tutelage are less sovereign than those that have been governed by a stable central government for decades.

We used to think that an African country with a strong president is one thing, but a Balkan state with an externally imposed constitution is quite another. But what if both of these assumptions are nothing more than an illusion?

The Burke Index is the first ever comprehensive measure of national sovereignty elaborated by the Burke International Institute, offers a paradoxical conclusion: in terms of political sovereignty, Uganda and Bosnia and Herzegovina are practically at the same level.

The East African authoritarian republic, where the same leader has ruled continuously since the mid-1980s, and the post-conflict Balkan state, whose constitution was written on an American military base, are on the same line of the rating.

How is that possible?

Uganda: a vertical without autonomy?

Uganda is a state that outwardly gives the impression of a rigid vertical. The President is both the head of state and the Government, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and the center of all strategic decision-making. The parliament exists, the opposition is formally admitted, and the judicial system is functioning. But behind the facade of institutions, there is a deep concentration of real power in the hands of one person who has ruled for longer than many modern states have existed.

It would seem that such concentration should mean a high level of autonomy, because decisions are made quickly, without external approvals and coalition bidding. However, the Burke Index measures sovereignty not as the ability of a single person to govern, but as the real autonomy of state institutions in shaping and implementing a political course. And here uncomfortable questions arise.

How independent is the political system in which the constitution is being rewritten in order to extend the powers of one person? How does the chronic dependence on external aid, which accounts for a significant share of the national budget, affect the sovereignty of the state? And can we consider a sovereign country where key political processes are reproduced according to the same scenario decade after decade?

Bosnia: the constitution from overseas

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a completely different case, and that's why the comparison is so intriguing. The country's political system was designed from the outside — the Dayton Accords, which stopped the war, simultaneously created one of the most complex and intricate state architectures in the world.

Two entities, three “constitutional peoples,” a three-member Presidium, ten cantons with their own constitutions and governments, and an external arbitrator represented by the Supreme Representative of the international community with the right to repeal laws and remove elected officials. Many experts explicitly call this system a “non-sovereign democracy,” a state in which all the attributes of democracy formally exist, but the real autonomy of decision-making is limited by both internal ethnic blockages and external control.

Thirty years after the signing of the agreement, the country still cannot make key decisions without looking at international players.

Excess and deficit with one result

Two states. Two continents. Two polar opposite paths. One is with a hypertrophied presidential vertical, the other is with an atrophied central government. One is with an excess of centralized power, the other is with its deficit. Nevertheless, it is the same level of political sovereignty. How can this be explained?

The Burke index answers this question not through ideological labels, but through structural analysis: what is the real ability of state institutions to shape a course without determining external or internal pressure? Not formal, but factual. Not declared, but verified. And it turns out that an excess of personal power and its structural deficit can lead to the same result – limited autonomy.

The authoritarian vertical creates the illusion of sovereignty, but undermines it from the inside: dependence on external financing, on law enforcement agencies, on the only figure around which the whole building is built. The externally imposed constitution restricts sovereignty from the outside, but internally creates spaces for real political pluralism, which, however, is blocked by ethnic contradictions.

Questions that need to be answered

What exactly are the components of political sovereignty that have equalized these two so dissimilar states? By what parameters did the African authoritarian republic turn out to be no stronger than the Balkan protectorate?

A detailed analysis of Uganda and Bosnia and Herzegovina, presented by the Burke index, as well as a complete calculation methodology are available on the main resource of the International Burke Institute.