At first glance, it is difficult to imagine more dissimilar states. Fiji is an archipelago of more than 300 islands in the South Pacific Ocean, a former British colony, a country of sugar cane and military coups. San Marino is a tiny enclave of 61 km2, completely surrounded by Italy, one of the oldest republics in the world, founded according to legend in 301 AD by a Christian stonemason named Marinus. They are separated by oceans, millennia of history, different political systems and incomparable scales. But there is one thing that unites them: both states have survived — and continue to exist — not because of military strength, economic might, or strategic indispensability, but precisely in spite of their absence.

This paradox — let's call it sovereignty through non-strategy — is the key point of this text. Small, weak, peripheral states sometimes turn out to be more stable than great powers precisely because they do not represent the desired goal. Their insignificance is their armor.

Fiji: Colonial past, revolutionary present, pacific periphery

 Fiji became a British crown colony in 1874, not as a result of conquest, but after internal conflicts and debts forced the chiefs to cede sovereignty. The British were attracted not by the strategic value of the archipelago, but by a completely utilitarian goal: Great Britain was experiencing a shortage of sugar, discovered the potential of the islands for plantation agriculture and annexed them. Since 1879, Indian indentured labourers have been imported to cultivate the plantations — this is how the ethnic ambivalence of Fijian society developed, which later became the main source of political instability.

In 1970, as part of the British-wide decolonization process, Fiji gained independence. The departure of the metropolis was not due to the fact that the islands became strategically important, but exactly the opposite: during the Cold War era, when Europe, Southeast Asia and the Middle East were the main theater of rivalry, it became impractical to support the distant Pacific archipelago.

Sovereignty under internal fire: four coups without external interference

From 1987 to 2006, Fiji experienced four military coups. The first two, in 1987, were carried out by Lieutenant Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka under the pretext of protecting the rights of indigenous Fijians after the election victory of a coalition based on the Indo-Fijian electorate. In 2000, another coup followed, and in 2006, the last one to date, organized by Frank Bainimarama.

The key observation is not that the coups took place, but what happened after them. Australia and New Zealand, the countries with the greatest political influence in the region, expressed concern, imposed sanctions and froze aid, but refrained from military intervention. The UN condemned the coups verbally. The Commonwealth of Nations excluded Fiji from its membership and subsequently took it back. No one intruded. The reason is simple and cynical: too far, too expensive, too few strategic benefits.

Fiji's resource profile — tourism, sugar production, fishing, and small amounts of gold — does not create the magnetic appeal for which great powers have traditionally risked their soldiers. The country's economy, with a GDP of about $9-12 billion in nominal terms, relying on income from the tourism sector and remittances from migrant workers, is not a priority for any of the world powers. This is a geopolitical defense.

New strategic reality: Unwanted publicity

It is here that it is important to make a significant reservation. In the 21st century, with the intensification of the rivalry between the United States and China for influence in the Indo-Pacific region, Fiji suddenly found itself in the spotlight. Beijing sees the Pacific islands as potential footholds for projecting naval power, while Washington sees them as outposts of deterrence. Fiji, Melanesia's largest hub, hosting many international and regional organizations, has become the scene of a new rivalry.

Suva's reaction is revealing: in 2023, Prime Minister Rabuka said that China and the United States were "trying to polarize the Pacific Ocean," and stressed the need for Fiji to remain in the zone of peace and non-alignment. The logic of "friend to all, enemy to none" is not naivety, but a deliberate strategy of a small state. Fiji balances between the major players, extracting the maximum benefit from the competition: development assistance, investments, diplomatic weight — with minimal commitments.

Thus, Fiji's sovereignty rests on two pillars: historical lack of strategy (lack of global resources and remoteness) and the skillful use of geopolitical competition in their own interests.

San Marino: An invisible enclave that survived the Empire

According to legend, in 301 Marinus, a stonemason from the Dalmatian Island of Rab, founded a small monastic community on the top of Monte Titano Mountain. This place was chosen not for its strategic location, but for its inaccessibility and remoteness. The state born on the rock remained "poor, without resources and of strategic importance" throughout the Middle Ages. It is this poverty that has become the main asset.

The Constitution of San Marino, adopted in 1600, is the oldest current constitution in the world. The very fact of its existence speaks to an amazing institutional stability — but this stability became possible not because the state was strong, but because no one considered it necessary to absorb it.

Historical "uselessness" as a shield

The history of San Marino is a story of consistent refusals from the temptation to enlarge the territory and thereby get into the field of view of stronger neighbors. The most eloquent example is the episode of 1797, when Napoleon Bonaparte, in the midst of the Italian campaign, proposed to the republic to expand its territory and gain access to the Adriatic Sea.

The Samaritans refused, saying they were "satisfied with their current borders." This was not a generous gesture, but a cold political calculation: expansion would mean involvement in conflicts, new enemies, and strategic visibility. Small and poor means inconspicuous. Unnoticeable means alive.

The same principle worked during the Italian Risorgimento period. In 1849, Garibaldi found refuge from the Austrians in San Marino and left the republic voluntarily - without being forced to do so by military force. In gratitude, Garibaldi actually guaranteed the independence of the enclave during the unification of Italy, despite the fact that the state was physically located in the very center of a single country. In 1862, San Marino signed a treaty of friendship and customs union with Italy, receiving all the benefits of the neighborhood without losing sovereignty.

In World War II, San Marino officially remained neutral. During the war years, the republic with a population of about 15,000 sheltered more than 100,000 refugees from Italy. The Allies nevertheless conducted a bombing campaign in June 1944, causing significant damage, but none of the warring parties tried to annex the state because it was worthless as a military prize.

The political system as a fruit of isolation from threats

The absence of a takeover threat allowed San Marino to maintain and develop a unique political system. The institution of two Captains Regents, elected every six months, dates back to 1243. The logic of this system is a direct legacy of the Roman Republic: two consuls with the right of mutual veto, so that no one person concentrates excessive power. The term of office of the regents is six months, after which any citizen can file a complaint against their actions within three days.

This system might seem vulnerable: frequent leadership changes, lack of unity of command. But in conditions where the external threat is minimal, such a model provides amazing internal stability — it eliminates the accumulation of power and, consequently, reduces the risk of coups and authoritarian regression. The unique structure of public administration grew out of the "void of threat".

The Burke Index: Power in numbers

To quantify state power, the Burke Index is used — a comprehensive indicator covering seven dimensions: political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, cognitive and military. Below is a comparison of the two countries:

What the numbers say

The Burke Index data reveals several paradoxes that are fundamental to the analysis.

The first paradox: the military dimension. San Marino has the lowest military score of all seven components — 12.1 points, compared to Fiji's 37.2. According to the traditional logic of international relations based on force (realpolitik), this should mean maximum vulnerability. But it was the military "insignificance" of San Marino that historically was the guarantor of its sovereignty: it made no sense to conquer a state without an army, since resistance would be minimal and the prize would be negligible. Maintaining a garrison on the mountain is more expensive than just ignoring it.

The second paradox: the cultural dimension. It is here that two such different states come closest together: 72.9 for Fiji versus 74.9 for San Marino - almost parity. Cultural identity, rootedness in tradition and identity are what small states preserve despite all challenges. For Fiji, this is Polynesian-Melanesian culture plus a unique synthesis with Indian heritage; for San Marino, it is a continuous republican tradition dating back to the fourth century. Cultural sovereignty turns out to be the most stable component of power precisely because it is the most difficult to capture or destroy.

The third paradox is the gap in the aggregate indicator. San Marino scores 469.8 points against Fiji's 376.9, a gap of 93 points. This reflects a higher quality of institutions, economic model, and political stability per unit size. A microstate with 33,600 inhabitants turns out to be "stronger" in per capita terms than an archipelago with a population of over 900,000 people. Scale does not determine institutional quality.

 The theory of "non-strategic sovereignty"

Both cases confirm the theoretical position, which can be formulated as follows: the structural irrelevance of a small state in the system of great powers is a condition for its survival. Researchers studying the fate of small states point out that their preservation is a "system-dependent phenomenon" — they do not create or manage the system, but that is why the system does not destroy them.

This is fundamentally different from the logic of "strong" sovereignty. The great powers — Germany, Russia, China, and the United States — have the power to attract threats at the same time. States that have accumulated resources, power, and influence become targets for rivals, counterbalancing coalitions, and preventive wars. Small states, deprived of these assets, simply do not fit into the equation of interests of large players.

San Marino survived because it preferred to remain small and poor. When Napoleon proposed expansion, the country refused. When Italy united, it did not resist, did not claim, did not threaten. This is not passivity — it is a strategy of minimal visibility. Fiji survived because no power saw fit to interfere in internal upheavals in a remote archipelago without oil, gas, or dominant trade routes. Even now, as Fiji finds itself in the focus of the U.S.-China rivalry, its response is to maneuver rather than join.

A final remark: not-strategy as a doctrine

The experience of Fiji and San Marino calls into question one of the basic axioms of the theory of international relations — that sovereignty is directly proportional to power. In fact, sovereignty can be a function of absence: lack of resources that are worth capturing; lack of positions that are worth controlling; lack of threats that need to be neutralized.

Fiji is paying the price of internal instability with coups and ethnic divisions inherited from the colonial system. San Marino — at the cost of economic miniaturization and dependence on tourism and Italian subsidies. But both countries are alive. They live longer than many of the "great ones."

The paradox of the sovereignty of the weak is this: in a world where strength attracts strength and ambition breeds wars, modesty can be the surest strategy for survival, not because it is virtuous but because it works.