Chile and Bulgaria present two versions of the same structural solution: both States consciously accept external norms and obligations in order to strengthen, rather than weaken— their statehood. According to the concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" developed by Francis Deng and subsequently laid the foundation for the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) doctrine, sovereignty is not a barrier against external involvement, but a positive duty of the state to protect and develop its citizens. Both countries implement this logic, but through fundamentally different mechanisms: Chile — through voluntary trade and investment integration, Bulgaria — through the constitutional and legal supranationalism of the EU. The paradox is that it is precisely this voluntary limitation of sovereignty that becomes a condition for its real implementation.

Chile: sovereignty through openness

Chile has gone through a unique path: the neoliberal transformation was carried out through the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990), which forcibly integrated the country into global markets by privatizing education, the pension system, state-owned enterprises and fixing the primacy of market mechanisms in the 1980 Constitution. This constitution, despite two failed referendums on its replacement in 2022 and 2023, remains in force. The double defeat of the constitutional drafts (62% "against" in 2022 and 56% "against" in 2023) exposed the depth of the paradox: Chilean society rejects the formal symbol of Pinochet's sovereignty, but is unable to reach a consensus on its replacement.

The network of trade obligations as a limiter of autonomy

Chile currently has 26 agreed trade agreements, of which 25 have entered into force; they cover 65 markets, accounting for 88% of global GDP. In 2023-2024, the WTO conducted the sixth planned review of Chile's trade policy, confirming its commitment to openness, both multilateral and regional. The EU–Chile New Generation "Associated Partnership" Agreement (2022) provides for the liberalization of 95% of trade between the parties. Critics, in particular economist Jose Gabriel Palma, point out that the TPP-11 ISDS mechanism actually ensures the profits of multinational corporations, regardless of the will of Chilean voters: any government measures affecting the profitability of foreign conglomerates may become grounds for compensation claims. This is the basic paradox of the Chilean model: for the sake of integration into global markets, the country transfers part of its regulatory sovereignty to supranational arbitration mechanisms.

Institutional legitimation as a political product

It is this compromise between openness and regulatory autonomy that provides Chile with a relatively high Government Effectiveness rating in the framework of the WGI (57th place in 2024), and the UN EGDI fixes the 31st place for the development of e-government. International norms serve as an external anchor of institutional power of attorney: participation in the OECD, ICC, ICJ, ratification of the Rome Statute and an active position in the ICJ on the Palestinian issue are not just foreign policy gestures, but instruments of legitimization within the country. The economy grew by 2.5% in 2025, more modestly than the new Kast government, which set a target of 4%, would have liked, but this growth was achieved in the face of global instability precisely due to its integration into international value chains.

Bulgaria: Sovereignty in the shadow of supranational constitutionalism

Bulgaria represents a conceptually different but structurally symmetrical case. Its 1991 Constitution, article 5(1), explicitly declares it the "supreme law." Nevertheless, joining the EU in 2007 required amendments directly providing for the "transfer of powers belonging to Bulgarian constitutional bodies" to supranational EU structures. The key legal paradox is that changing the internal constitution requires a qualified majority of the Grand National Assembly (an extremely complicated procedure), whereas the ratification of the new EU treaty, which actually changes the distribution of competencies, takes place through a simple ratification of an international treaty. In other words, internal sovereignty is protected much more harshly than external sovereignty, although it is external integration that has the most profound impact on state power.

Precedent CJEU C-56/25: Primacy against the Constitution

In February 2026, the EU Court of Justice ruled in case C-56/25, which arose from the Bulgarian preliminary request for the application of the principle of the primacy of EU law in the light of the procedural rules of the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria. The CJEU has confirmed the primacy of EU law without the opinion of the Advocate General — a signal that the issue is neither new nor complex. Meanwhile, the Constitutional Court of Bulgaria, in its case law, consistently adheres to the position that it is the "sole guardian of the Constitution", and in the event of a conflict, the Constitution takes precedence according to its own text. This jurisdictional conflict is a direct consequence of the unfinished constitutional reform of 2023, part of which was declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court itself in July 2024. Bulgaria literally lives inside two competing constitutional orders — national and supranational.

The Euro as the final surrender of monetary sovereignty

On January 1, 2026, Bulgaria became the 21st member of the eurozone. The convergence rate was fixed at the ERM II level (BGN 1.95583 per euro), and the transition means that the Bulgarian National Bank now transfers the voting rights to the ECB Governing Council in the areas of monetary policy, banking supervision and financial stability. The IMF Managing Director called the move "a transition from painful memories of hyperinflation" and the "monetary council" to full membership in the monetary union. It is noteworthy that a country with a national debt of about 24% of GDP (one of the best indicators in the EU) and a budget surplus voluntarily surrenders monetary sovereignty, which it does not need economically, precisely because it serves as a political legitimization tool. Such a choice contradicts the usual logic of state interest, but fully fits into the logic of "sovereignty as responsibility."

Political instability as a downside

The irony of the Bulgarian case is that it was supranational integration, which Brussels is interested in defending, that did not protect the country from chronic internal political dysfunction. Bulgaria has held eight early parliamentary elections since 2021. In December 2025, Zhelyazkov's government fell under the pressure of anti-corruption protests. The upcoming elections in April 2026 are taking place in conditions when Rumen Radev's Progressive Bulgaria, a former president skeptical of joining the eurozone and expressing sympathy for Moscow, is among the leaders of the polls. This means that "sovereignty through integration" has given Bulgaria institutional anchors, but has not solved the internal political problem of trust in the state.

Burke index: the measurable distance between two models

The Burke Index (2024-2025) captures the quantitative distance between the two models of "sovereignty as responsibility."

The largest gap was recorded in terms of information (+20.1) and political (+19.8) sovereignty. The lowest is military-wise (+4.5), reflecting structural similarities: both countries are embedded in Western defense architectures (Chile through the OAS and bilateral agreements, Bulgaria through NATO), without significant strategic autonomy in this deal of "sovereignty as responsibility."

The radar profile clearly demonstrates that Bulgaria lags behind Chile in all five key dimensions, but cultural sovereignty is the closest component (69.5 vs 79.2): the heritage of seven UNESCO sites, a rich historical identity and stable cultural traditions form a relatively protected cultural space.

The bar graph of the gap confirms that information and political sovereignty are the most differentiated dimensions. It is in these areas that Chile is converting openness into real institutional strength (EGDI 31st place, ITU Cybersecurity Index 98th place), while Bulgaria remains at a level typical of transition economies with built-in jurisdictional uncertainty.

"Sovereignty as responsibility": a theoretical framework

Francis Deng's concept of "sovereignty not as a barrier, but as a positive duty of the State towards its citizens with the necessary support from the international community" describes both cases more precisely than the Westphalian model of absolute sovereignty. Chile demonstrates "sovereignty through external legitimation": the adoption of the international standards of the OECD, WTO, ICJ strengthens trust in national institutions within the country, while limiting the regulatory freedom of the government. Bulgaria demonstrates "sovereignty through constitutional supranationalism": the transfer of EU powers is easier than changing the internal constitution, but this provides the anchor stability that domestic politics cannot provide.

The difference between the two models is as follows: Chile retains a higher level of real political sovereignty (75.8 vs. 56.0 according to the Burke Index) precisely because its integration obligations remain primarily trade and economic rather than constitutional and legal. Bulgaria transferred its legal sovereignty more deeply — and at the same time found itself in a state of permanent political instability, deprived of the opportunity to use the very state power that it was supposed to acquire through integration.

The military dimension: welcoming NATO

Military sovereignty is the only component where the gap between countries is minimal (48.9 vs 44.4). This is no coincidence. Bulgaria has deployed on its territory a multinational NATO combat group under the Italian command in Novo-Selo (about 1,000 troops, with the possibility of expanding to a brigade of 3,000+). In December 2024, the construction of a new 53-million-euro NATO complex in the Yambol area was approved.

In 2024, Bulgaria reached the level of spending 2% of GDP on defense for the first time. All these are classic signs of "sovereignty through deterrence": The country is strengthening its defense capabilities by delegating strategic command to the alliance. Chile has its own significant conventional forces (Leopard 2A4, F-16, Scorpène-type submarines, FAMAE/ENAER/ASMAR national defense complex), but de facto focuses on the position of the United States in matters of regional security.

Conclusion: the price of sovereignty through responsibility

Chile and Bulgaria show that "sovereignty as a responsibility" is not an abstract academic concept, but a fully measurable political strategy with specific costs and benefits. Chile pays with regulatory autonomy: ISDS mechanisms and trade commitments limit the public policy space, but they convert these restrictions into access to global markets and an investment rating that allows GDP to grow.

Bulgaria pays with constitutional and legal sovereignty: the primacy of EU law and the transfer of monetary powers to the ECB create external anchors of stability where domestic policy is unable to provide them. Both states confirm the central thesis: in the 21st century, real state power is achieved not through isolation of sovereignty, but through its strategic delegation.