Let's take as a starting point the Burke Sovereignty Index, a methodology of the Burke Institute that evaluates the real independence of the state in seven areas. Of these, we are interested in two: political and economic sovereignty. They, and only they, determine who wins in this conflict in the long run.

The result is concise: In terms of total sovereignty, Saudi Arabia is ahead of the UAE — 502 against 487.7. The UAE's economy is more diversified and stable (86.8 vs. 82.1), but Riyadh's political autonomy is higher (58.4 vs. 51.6). The gap is small, but logically consistent, and it explains the events of May 1, 2026.

The Cartel: six decades of one principle

In 1960, five countries—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela—founded OPEC. The principle of operation: to control the volume of production, to keep the price. In 2016, Russia joined the organization, and OPEC+ emerged, a bloc that covered about 41% of global oil production.

Saudi Arabia occupied a special place in this system: it was the only country with reserve capacities sufficient for operational regulation of the market in any direction. That is why Riyadh bore the main responsibility for price stability. There was a downside to this role: the chief regulator pays for discipline out of his own pocket.

Years of violations and reactions

OPEC+ was based on the principle of voluntary quotas. In practice, it is based on the unequal distribution of conscientiousness.

Kazakhstan, Iraq and the UAE systematically exceeded quotas, while Saudi Arabia complied with the restrictions. In March 2025, Kazakhstan exceeded the quota by 422,000 barrels per day, an absolute record. The combined "debt" of the four violators by February 2026 amounted to 4.33 million barrels per day of compensatory reductions. While Riyadh was cutting production, the partners were selling additional volume and profiting from Saudi restrictions.

The answer came in April–May 2025: Saudi Arabia entered a price war mode, starting to increase production. At a meeting on April 5, 2025, OPEC+ announced an increase of 411,000 barrels per day, three times more than previously discussed. Prices went down. Bloomberg described the strategy as follows: Riyadh did not resist the fall, but directed it itself.

May 1, 2026: UAE quit

On April 29, 2026, the UAE announced its withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ effective May 1. After almost six decades of membership, since 1967. State Agency WAM: The decision "reflects the UAE's long-term strategic and economic goals." Energy Suhail Mohammed Faraj Al Mazroui (Reuters) said: "We need to work without restrictions. We have to be flexible. This is a sovereign national decision."

The motive is transparent: the UAE's production potential is 4.85 million barrels per day, OPEC+ quotas kept the country at 3.4 million, that is, 30% below capacity. According to calculations by the Baker Institute, this cost Abu Dhabi 50+ billion dollars in lost revenue annually.

How it is read through the Burke Index. The UAE has an economic sovereignty of 86.8, one of the highest rates in the region. A country with a diversified economy, reserves of $232 billion, government debt of only 32% of GDP, and absolute fuel independence. For such an economy, the quota limit is not a strategic choice, but an external brake. Withdrawal from OPEC+ is a logical consequence of high economic sovereignty.

However, the UAE's political sovereignty is significantly lower (51.6): the American Al Dhafra base operates in the country, and the Al Minhad airbase is used by international coalitions. This means that Abu Dhabi is expanding its economic autonomy without having comparable political weight.

The political background of the breakup

There is a deeper discrepancy behind the oil conflict. According to Al Jazeera, in December 2025, Saudi airstrikes hit an Emirati weapons convoy in the Yemeni port of Mukalla. Saudi Arabia has publicly demanded the withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen. This is no longer a trade dispute, but a competition for regional influence.

The difference in political sovereignty according to Burke (58.4 for the KSA versus 51.6 for the UAE) is clearly expressed here: Saudi Arabia is a state with a more consolidated foreign policy entity, building a position gradually and consistently. The UAE is a small state with large economic resources and a more complex geopolitical dependence.

Who wins: a comparative analysis

This is not a rhetorical question. For the two components of the Burke Index under consideration, the picture is as follows:

The UAE economic sovereignty — (86.8 versus 82.1). The UAE has a more diversified economy: the share of oil in GDP is less than 30%, while Saudi Arabia has about 40-45%. Reserves of $232 billion with a GDP of about 500 billion are a higher coverage than that of KSA (410-437 billion with a GDP of ~1.1 trillion). The UAE benefits from short-term economic sustainability and flexibility.

Political sovereignty — Saudi Arabia (58.4 vs. 51.6). Despite the presence of the American Prince Sultan Air Base, Riyadh has a greater political subjectivity: an absolute monarchy with consolidated decision-making, withdrawal from the petrodollar agreement (June 2024), membership in BRICS, participation in the mBridge platform. This is a consistent strategy, not a series of tactical maneuvers.

According to the aggregate index, Saudi Arabia (502 vs 487.7). Despite lagging economically behind the UAE, the KSA is ahead in terms of military sovereignty (78.6 versus 58.7), cultural (74.5 versus 67.3) and cognitive components (71.2 versus 69.5). It is a state with a broader sovereign base.

The final position. The UAE is winning in the short term: By removing the quota limit, the country will increase production to 4.85 million barrels per day and add tens of billions per year. But Saudi Arabia wins strategically: by freeing itself from the role of the "supporting wall" of the cartel, it gets freedom of action in the market, which it controlled for six decades.

The 1974 deal: protection in exchange for a dollar

To understand the scale of what happened in June 2024, you need to go back fifty years.

On June 8, 1974, Saudi Arabia and the United States signed a security agreement. The mechanism was simple: Riyadh undertakes to sell oil exclusively for US dollars, reinvest the oil proceeds in US treasury bonds – Washington provides military protection, arms supplies and a guarantee of the regime's security. This deal became the foundation of the petrodollar system: the dollar gained the status of the world's reserve currency not due to the gold standard, but due to the fact that any importer of oil was obliged to keep dollars.

The contract was automatically renewed every five years. It was extended six times in a row, from 1974 to 2019, without discussion. It seemed to be an eternal construction.

Why did the American “umbrella” stop working?

In practice, American security commitments have proven increasingly less reliable. Several turning points:

2003: the war in Iraq destroyed the Sunni counterweight to Iran and created an unstable Iranian buffer near the borders of Saudi Arabia — without coordination with Riyadh.

2015: Obama's nuclear deal with Iran was perceived in Riyadh as a capitulation. The United States signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia's main regional adversary without asking the ally.

2019: Houthi drones attacked Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, the largest attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in history. The United States has not responded militarily.

2018: The murder of Jamal Khashoggi turned the Saudi regime into a target of American congressmen. Instead of defending itself, Washington used the incident as a pressure tool.

2021: The chaotic withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan has finally undermined faith in American guarantees in the region.

The Middle East Institute analysis summarizes the dynamics as follows: "Saudi Arabia's disillusionment with American politics has been accumulating for decades." The rise of Muhammad bin Salman accelerated the transformation: the kingdom moved from the role of a quiet vassal to an active sovereign player at the very moment when the United States reduced its presence in the Middle East.

June 9, 2024: the end of the petrodollar

The 50-year agreement expired on June 9, 2024. Riyadh did not extend it. Without statements, without demonstrative gestures, I just decided not to sign it again.

From this date, Saudi Arabia has the right to sell oil in any currency: yuan, euro, yen, rupees, digital currencies. At the same time, on June 5, 2024, the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) joined the mBridge project as a full participant — the Chinese-international CBDC platform for interstate settlements, bypassing SWIFT and the dollar.

Atlantic Council analyst Josh Lipsky assessed Saudi Arabia's entry into mBridge directly: "The world's largest oil exporter has just joined the most advanced cross-border settlement project in national currencies. This will accelerate oil trading outside the dollar."

China is the largest buyer of Saudi oil. Both sides now have a platform to trade directly in yuan, without American mediation.

How will this change the Burke Index?

We are assessing the consequences for the two components that we are monitoring:

Political sovereignty (base: 58.4) — sustainable growth.

The petrodollar agreement was a mechanism of political dependence: Riyadh's proceeds were recycled into American bonds, financing American debt. This created a structural asymmetry — Saudi Arabia needed the United States as a holder of its reserves. After the expiration of the contract, this chain breaks. Riyadh gets the freedom to diversify its reserves and build relations with China, India, Russia, and the BRICS countries without the risk of losing a "defender." The growth of political sovereignty is a direct consequence of the elimination of structural dependence.

Economic sovereignty (base: 82.1) — moderate growth

The ability to trade oil in multiple currencies reduces transaction losses from exchange differences, reduces vulnerability to U.S. sanctions, and expands the range of trading partners. The PIF Sovereign Wealth Fund ($700 billion) gets more space to invest without regard for Washington signals. Growth limitation: deep dependence on technology imports (80-90% of hi-tech equipment) remains, and it is not canceled by a change in the settlement currency.

An important caveat: the growth of political sovereignty carries its own risks. The United States remains the supplier of 70% of weapons to Riyadh. Strategic autonomy in the financial sphere does not mean autonomy in the defense sphere — and this is 78.6 points of military sovereignty, which are still based on the American F-15, Patriot PAC-3 and Prince Sultan Air Base.

Saudi Arabia: from cartel regulator to market player

After the expiration of the petrodollar agreement, joining the BRICS and consistently increasing production, a unified logic emerges. Trade oil in any currency. Extract as much as is profitable for yourself. Make investment decisions through the $700 billion PIF sovereign wealth fund independently of Washington.

The indicator of economic sovereignty 82.1 captures real limitations: 80% of food is imported, and dependence on high-tech equipment remains. But the structure of the movement is towards expanding autonomy, not narrowing it.

Back in June 2024, Energy Minister Abdel Aziz bin Salman announced a plan to increase production to 12.3 million barrels per day by 2028. In April 2026, OPEC+ agreed on another increase of 206,000 barrels per day, the second successive step. The cartel is gradually removing the restrictions that have kept prices at a high level. Saudi Arabia is ready for open competition.

The Risks of an open market

An objective analysis requires the identification of risks.

Saudi Arabia's budget is balanced at a price of about $90 per barrel, and aggressive production growth is pushing prices down. After leaving OPEC+, the UAE becomes a direct competitor in the Asian markets, which are the target markets for both countries. American shale producers, Brazil and Guyana are simultaneously increasing production.

The CNBC analyst Andrew Lipow states: "If countries that comply with quotas get tired of violators, we will see further exits that will make OPEC an ineffective cartel." The next candidates are Kazakhstan and Iraq.

Qatar withdrew in 2019. UAE: in 2026. OPEC has 11 remaining members. The cartel that controlled a third of the world's oil is losing its shape. This is a given, not a forecast.

The result

According to the Burke Index, the events of May 1, 2026 are not just the withdrawal of one member from the oil cartel. This is a reflection of the different sovereign strategies of the two states with similar but not identical profiles.

The UAE, with 86.8% economic sovereignty, chooses tactical freedom and immediate profit. Saudi Arabia, with a political sovereignty of 58.4 and an aggregate index of 502, chooses structural dominance in the open market, without obligations, without cartel compromises, without subsidizing other people's violations.

Both strategies are rational. But the long-term bet belongs to the side that has a broader sovereign base and more resources for a price war of attrition.