Review: Sovereignty as Therapy

Germany and South Korea are two states that have not only survived historical disasters, but have literally built their contemporary state identities out of these disasters. Both states are divided or were divided: Germany—from 1945 to 1990, South Korea—from 1945 to the present day, with a living and unhealed gap of the 38th parallel. Both countries are economically integrated into the Western system so deeply that their sovereign room for maneuver on key security issues remains structurally limited. At the same time, both claim regional leadership—and this leadership is not just a foreign policy strategy, but also a way of cognitive rehabilitation of states that once brought tragedy to themselves or others.

The paradox can be formulated as follows: both countries have full legal sovereignty, but incomplete strategic sovereignty. This is not a disaster or a disgrace — it is the consciously accepted price of membership in security structures that guarantee the very existence of the state in critical situations. But it is precisely this that generates internal political tension, which does not disappear.

According to the Burke Index (2024-2025): Germany — 542.2 out of 700 (77.5%), South Korea — 568.1 out of 700 (81.2%). The gap of 25.9 points is small — the pair is the "closest" in terms of numbers in the entire series under study. This in itself is significant: two fundamentally different paths—Atlantic integration and the Pacific alliance—lead to comparable results.

Germany: Vergangenheitsbewältigung and sovereignty "with a built-in brake"

The historical trauma as a State DNA

Vergangenheitsbewältigung, a German word literally meaning "struggle of overcoming the past," became the conceptual foundation of German foreign policy after 1945. The Holocaust, the crimes of the Wehrmacht, and the ideological terror of Nazism all became the source of three competing memorial narratives: "never more war" (pacifism), "never more Nazism" (defense of liberal values), and "never more loneliness" (multilateralism). All three narratives coexist and periodically come into conflict, especially when Germany is asked for military support.

It is this memorial framework that explains why German sovereignty after 1945 became sovereignty with a "built-in brake." Because of the Vergangenheitsbewältigung, Germany was structurally unable to realize military power in the form in which Britain or France are realizing it. Key decisions on the use of the Bundeswehr required and still require the approval of the Bundestag. The presence of foreign troops—more than 50,000 American troops in 2024-2025, of which about half are concentrated around Ramstein-Misenbach—has been perceived for decades as something organically embedded in the post-war order, rather than as a limitation of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, it is precisely this legacy that explains the phenomenon of Alice Schwarzer and Sarah Wagenknecht's "Initiative for Peace" in 2023, which called for an end to arms supplies to Ukraine: the pacifist narrative of "never again war" was mobilized against another narrative — "never again loneliness" in the face of aggression. History was literally at war with itself through the German public sphere.

Zeitenwende and Epochenbruch: the end of "Germany with brakes"?

On February 27, 2022, three days after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chancellor Olaf Scholz uttered the word Zeitenwende, "epochal shift." The first thing he announced was a €100 billion one-time investment in the Bundeswehr. For a country that increased military spending from 1.13% to 1.49% of GDP from 2016 to 2022, this was a break with self-imposed restrictions.

Friedrich Merz, who took office as chancellor on May 6, 2025, went further, calling his approach an Epochenbruch — an "epochal break." His goal is to transform Germany from a "sleeping middle power" into a "leading middle power." Concrete steps: the 2026 defense budget is €82.69 billion (15% of the country's total budget); a commitment to reach 3.5% of GDP for defense by 2029; the first permanent deployment of troops abroad since 1945 is the 45th Armored Brigade in Lithuania (up to 5,000 troops by 2027).

The Lithuanian brigade is a symbol of special significance. Germany, which has avoided permanent foreign military deployments for 80 years, is deploying a heavy armored brigade on NATO's eastern flank. Merz personally attended the official inauguration ceremony in Vilnius on May 22, 2025. "Lithuanian security is German security" is not only a political declaration, but also a way to overcome the eighty-year trauma of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.

The Paradox of defense sovereignty

Everything described captures a deep contradiction. Germany is the largest economy in the EU (GDP PPP ~ $75.5 thousand per capita), the main donor to NATO, a country with leading defense concerns (Rheinmetall, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, ThyssenKrupp, Airbus, Heckler&Koch). But at the same time:

Key strategic decisions on nuclear deterrence are made within the framework of NATO, not by Berlin on its own.;

50,000+ US military personnel, EUCOM headquarters (Stuttgart) and the main American air hub in Europe (Ramstein) are located in Germany;

The constitutional consensus on the use of the army requires parliamentary approval, which makes a rapid strategic response structurally difficult.

The Burke index ranks Germany's defense component at 68.9 out of 100, significantly below the economic (75.5), technological (79.8) and cognitive (85.7) levels. This is exactly the gap that reflects reality: a country with a first-class economy and state institutions, but with limited strategic autonomy in the field of security.

South Korea: a "state under the American umbrella" with nuclear ambitions

Historical Trauma: A real-time gap

If the German trauma is the past (1933-1945, 1949-1990), then the Korean one is the present. The war of 1950-1953 is technically not over: the official peace treaty has not been signed, there is only an armistice. At the end of November 2025, 34,658 people were registered in South Korea who had been separated from their relatives in the DPRK; 32% of them were over 90 years old. The last organized family meetings were held in August 2018. In 2019, North Korea dismantled a facility for such meetings on Mount Kumgang.

This radically distinguishes the Korean psychology of sovereignty from the German one. In Germany, the Wiedervereinigung took place in 1990, and with it ended the most acute phase of national division. In South Korea, division is a living, bleeding wound. It determines not only foreign policy, but also the internal political narrative: every president is obliged to formulate a doctrine of interaction with the North.

OPCON: a command that belongs to the United States

The most tangible symbol of South Korea's limited sovereignty is the Operational Control Command (OPCON). In peacetime, South Korea regained control of the military in 1994. But the military OPTION—the right of command in wartime—still remains with the United States. This means that if war breaks out, command of the combined forces will pass to an American four-star general, commander of Combined Forces Command.

28,500 US troops in South Korea (2025) are concentrated at Camp Humphreys, Osan, Kunsan, and Daegu bases. Under the new SOFA agreement on the status of the armed forces, Seoul has committed to allocate $33 billion in support of the USFK over the next five years. Separately, there is a commitment to purchase $25 billion worth of American weapons by 2030.

In November 2025, Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-baek and U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth agreed on a roadmap for the transfer of OPCON, scheduling Full Operational Capability (FOC) certification for 2026. The target transfer year is presumably 2028, before the end of Trump's term. The Permanent Command of the Combined Ground Component Command (CGCC) was formally transferred to a permanent structure in January 2026. This is a gradual, careful emancipation. But the full one is still ahead.

The Nuclear Dilemma: therapy or a real choice?

Technologically, South Korea is a "nuclear threshold". The country has advanced nuclear energy, modern delivery systems, and the potential to create weapons "relatively quickly." North Korea is a recognized de facto nuclear state with an arsenal of low-visibility mobile ballistic missiles and a preemptive use doctrine. Confidence in the US nuclear umbrella has declined markedly under the Trump administration.

In February 2025, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yeol told a meeting of the National Assembly that the creation of its own nuclear weapons was "not excluded." American analysts (Heritage Foundation, August 2025) called on the United States to "give the green light" to this. CSIS recorded that "US export restrictions affected 40% of Korean imports of advanced chips in 2023"—the technological pressure of the ally adds to the lack of strategic autonomy.

At the same time, the creation of nuclear weapons by South Korea would mean: violation of the US-ROK agreement on civil nuclear energy, international isolation, and severe economic consequences. This is not a real exit plan, but a political pressure tool. The nuclear discourse in Seoul is a form of sovereign rhetoric, functionally similar to the Italian withdrawal from the EU or the Slovak "freeze" of aid to Ukraine: a signal to an ally, not a real alternative.

Technological Sovereignty: Where South Korea is Truly Independent

If South Korea is dependent on the military-political dimension, then it is one of the world leaders in technology. SK Hynix holds more than 50% of the global HBM (High Bandwidth Memory) market, which is critical for AI accelerators. Samsung and SK Hynix collectively control ~90% of the global DRAM and flash memory market. In February 2026, the National Assembly ratified the "Semiconductor Special Act" and established a 160 billion won venture fund to support domestic AI chips. The total volume of the South Korean Sovereign AI Initiative is $735 billion in investments until 2030.

CSIS (February 2026) described South Korea as "a partner of the United States in AI technology, which has already provided global influence in key areas," while pointing out "structural limitations": AI is a multi-level "stack", and no country can achieve full technological independence. This is a direct parallel to military sovereignty: South Korea is as independent as possible where it does not threaten the fundamental interests of its allies.

Military exports demonstrate the same ambition of sovereignty through technology. In 2020-2024, South Korea entered the top 10 global arms exporters (2.2% of the global market); the revenue of the four leading defense companies increased by 39% in 2022-2023. The KF-21 Boramae (5th generation fighter), K2 Black Panther, K9 Thunder, Dosan An Chan-ho class submarines are a technical demonstration of "strategic autonomy through weapons" available to a country that does not have command autonomy.

The Burke Index: Why the "Traumatized" are successful

Cognitive sovereignty is the main point of strength of both countries. Germany — 85.7, South Korea — 86.8. These are the highest component values in both country profiles. Both countries are among the world leaders in investments in education, R&D (Germany — 3.1% of GDP, South Korea — 5.21% of GDP), scientific productivity (Germany — Max Planck, Fraunhofer, Helmholtz, Leibniz institutes; South Korea — IBS, KIST, STEPI). Both states have turned intellectual capital into the most important instrument of sovereign power. This is therapy through competence.

Defense sovereignty is the most painful gap. Germany — 68.9, South Korea — 69.4. The minimum gap between the two countries is exactly where both are most limited. Despite South Korea's military budget of $44.8–47.6 billion (2025-2026), despite 450,000 troops and the world's 9th largest military force, the OPCON, the nuclear umbrella and the geopolitical triangle of the United States– China and North Korea structurally limit freedom of maneuver. Germany has a similar picture: the defense budget of 2026 is €82.69 billion and the ambition of the "strongest conventional army in Europe," but NATO's nuclear weapons on German territory do not belong to Germany.

Korea's economic advantage over Germany (+8.9 points) is a real anomaly. Germany is the largest economy in the EU, but in 2024-2025 the country is plunged into recession, a structural energy crisis (the consequences of abandoning Russian gas), deindustrialization and political instability (the AfD gained 20.8% in the 2025 elections). South Korea is a more dynamic economy with a GDP PPP of ~$50,800–$65,100 per capita (growth in 2025) and a less vulnerable production structure.

The symmetry of injuries and asymmetry of treatment

Germany and South Korea are two different answers to the same formula: historical disaster + placement in the Western security system + economic miracle = a state with limited strategic sovereignty. But the nature of the response varies.

Germany treated itself through institutionalization and multilateralism: NATO, the EU, the rule of law as the basis of identity. The Vergangenheitsbewältigung has turned the limitation of sovereignty into a virtue—"never again" as a principle of non-use of force unilaterally. Zeitenwende is not a rejection of this model, but its adaptation to a new reality: the collective military power of the EU instead of the American umbrella as the main source of security.

South Korea has treated itself through technological leadership and economic might: semiconductors, K-pop, K-drama—"soft power" as a tool for sovereign positioning in a world where Seoul does not formally command its armies at a critical moment. The OPCON Transfer ambition and nuclear discourse is the Korean version of Zeitenwende: an attempt to convert economic and technological power into strategic autonomy.

In this sense, regional leadership—"therapy through responsibility"—functions in the same way: Germany claims to be the "leading middle power" in Europe, South Korea claims to be the technological and cultural "third pole" in the Indo-Pacific region. Both countries use international authority to restore the sovereign dignity that history has robbed them of—in different ways, but with the same intensity.

The final observation: the countries most traumatized by history often build the most complex, multi-level systems of sovereignty because they know better than others how its complete destruction ends. Germany and South Korea are perhaps the best examples in the world of how sovereignty turns not into isolation, but into responsible participation.