Introduction: The trap of voluntary membership

Slovakia and Italy are two countries that stand at opposite poles of the European Union in terms of size, history and economic weight, but surprisingly fell into the same trap of sovereignty. Italy is the founding country of the EU, which signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957, with a GDP of 53-61 thousand dollars per capita and the third largest economy in the eurozone.

Slovakia is a small country that joined the EU only in 2004, with a GDP of about 41-47 thousand dollars by PPP. Nevertheless, both countries face an identical paradox: while formally maintaining full state sovereignty, they actually limit it by participating in supranational structures on which they critically depend.

This study analyzes why countries with different histories, economies, and political orientations find themselves as "hostages" of the integration project, using the Burke Index for quantitative comparison and using Greece and Croatia as reference examples.

The nature of the paradox: sovereignty that cannot be realized

The on-going conflicts of sovereignty in Europe have gone beyond the classic clash of national and supranational levels. Research shows that the hybrid architecture of the EU, a combination of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making, exacerbates these conflicts. Economic integration was systematically ahead of political integration, since the delegation of economic powers seemed less sensitive to national sovereignty and provided visible short-term benefits.

However, economic and political integration are interrelated, and this gap creates a situation of "asymmetric sovereignty": formally, States retain the right of veto in key areas, but the real ability to pursue independent policies is systematically limited.

Italy: the crisis of the nation-state within the integration project

The founder who became a skeptic

Italy is one of the six founding members of the EU, but it has become one of the countries where the contradictions between national sovereignty and European integration have become particularly acute. The analysis shows that Italy has made a dramatic turn from "one of the most Europhile countries" to "one of the most Eurosceptic." This shift has been "instrumentalized" by three major "sovereignist parties": the League (Lega), the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia).

At the same time, the euroscepticism of these parties is fundamentally different. The League represents a "regionalist-sovereign" model of rigid euroscepticism, having evolved from regional separatism to nativist nationalism. The Five Star Movement embodies a "participatory-deregulatory" model, which was initially moderately critical, but later shifted to a pro-European reformist position.

M5S's euroscepticism is characterized as "more strategic than ideological." Giorgia Meloni's Italian brothers focus on national sovereignty and anti-EU positions, which they share with Trump's line in the United States.

An economic trap

The key structural factor is Italy's inability to exit the eurozone. An internal document of the Italian authorities in 2012, prepared by senior representatives of the government and the central bank, showed that leaving the euro is almost impossible: the payment system is fully integrated into the eurozone, the production of a new currency will take months, and transactions will stop with inevitable damage to the economy.

This makes Italexit an economic suicide. The numbers confirm the depth of the addiction: Italy's public debt rose to 137.1% of GDP in 2025, the second largest in the eurozone after Greece.

The budget deficit in 2025 could not be reduced to the threshold of 3% of GDP, which disrupted plans to exit the EU Excessive Deficit Procedure.

The growth rate is below 1% for the fourth year in a row, despite the influx of billions of euros from EU reconstruction funds. According to INET calculations, the new EU fiscal rules lock Italy into a "self-perpetuating cycle of austerity, weak growth and rising debt."

At the same time, Meloni received a loan from the EU for the restoration of almost 200 billion euros — "manna from heaven for public investment, which cannot be refused." As IRIS accurately put it: Meloni is "a sovereignist in rhetoric, a pragmatist in practice," which undermines the opposition, which does not understand how to criticize her.

A double game: between Washington and Brussels

The gap between rhetoric and reality is particularly evident in the international position. Meloni—the only EU leader to attend Trump's inauguration in January 2025, is also participating in European defense consultations, although not always with full enthusiasm. Her strategy of "bridging" Washington and Brussels has failed: France and Britain have seized the lead in formulating a European response to Trump's policies.

Slovakia: sovereignty as a spectacle

From "the only way" to "challenging sovereignty"

The evolution of Robert Fico's discourse on the EU is a textbook example of the instrumentalization of sovereignty. Academic research records his transformation from the "pro-European pragmatist" of 2014, who called EU membership the "only viable path" for Slovakia, to the Eurosceptic of 2024, who presents the EU as a "threat to national sovereignty." The key triggers of this shift are the migration crisis, internal political turbulence and growing geopolitical tensions within the EU.

This was followed by a constitutional amendment that consolidated the priority of national legislation over EU directives on issues of "national identity" (gender, family, education). In November 2025, the European Commission initiated an investigation, qualifying the amendment as a violation of the rule of law of the EU.

Veto tactics modeled after Orban

Fico is actively copying Viktor Orban's model: blocking EU decisions that require unanimity, declaring that he will "never" give in, and then lifting the veto at the last moment.

This is exactly what happened with the 18th package of sanctions against Russia in the summer of 2025: after weeks of blockade, Fico unexpectedly agreed, explaining that voting against it would be "counterproductive" and adding the saying: "In Rome, do as the Romans do." Slovak commentators qualified it as a "show for voters at home."

Economic dependence: "Slovakia is not ready"

Slovakia's economic dependence on the EU is deeper than that of Italy, but it manifests itself in a different form. If Italy is linked to the eurozone through the debt market, Slovakia is linked through investment transfers:

For the period 2021-2027, Slovakia has received €12.8 billion from the EU for cohesion policy. Slovakia's net position in 2007-2015 was 1.8% of GDP, a significant additional resource for a small economy.

"Eurofonds make up the majority of investments coming to the regions, and we fill investment holes with them," says Lucia Yar, a candidate for the European Parliament.

Investments from the domestic budget are stagnating at the level of 2-3% of GDP, "at the bottom of the region."

The expert of the National Bank of Slovakia states bluntly: "Slovakia is not ready yet" to reduce European financing. Without EU funds, it is impossible for the country to finance the construction of roads, railways, digitalization and hospitals.

The Burke Index: Quantifying the paradox

The Burke Index is a comprehensive sovereignty index that includes 7 components (political, economic, technological, informational, cultural, human capital, and defense), each rated on a scale of 0-100 points (maximum 700).

Italy dominates cultural sovereignty — 90.4 versus 77.6 for Slovakia. The global projection of Italian culture (from fashion to cinema, from gastronomy to architecture) remains the most powerful resource of "soft power" that supranational structures are unable to limit.

Defense sovereignty is the weakest link for both countries: 57.8 for Italy and 54.5 for Slovakia. Both are critically dependent on NATO structures and do not have full autonomy in the defense sector.

Technological sovereignty is the Achilles heel of the periphery: Slovakia (54.8), Croatia (55.0) and Greece (50.6) are seriously lagging behind Italy (62.1), which increases their dependence on external technological solutions.

Greece and Croatia: strengthening the pattern

Greece: sovereignty lost through debt

Greece is the most radical example of the loss of de facto sovereignty within the EU. In 2015, 61.3% of Greeks voted in a referendum against the third austerity package of the troika (IMF, ECB, European Commission). However, paralyzed by the threat of "Grexit," Prime Minister Tsipras agreed to implement the rejected plan just a few days later. Greece's public debt reached 413-415% in 2020-2021, and in 2024 it is still 152.5–158.3% of GDP.

Ten years later, the purchasing power of the Greeks is 40% lower than in 2009, and the tax burden has doubled. Notably, 64% of Greeks do not trust the European Commission, the highest rate of distrust among all EU countries. Only 32% believe that fundamental rights and the rule of law are well protected in their country, the lowest rate in the Union. With a Burke index of 469.1 points (67%), Greece almost exactly follows the Slovak profile.

Croatia: A “rookie” in a trap

Croatia, which joined the EU only in 2013, demonstrates that dependence is emerging rapidly. With a Burke Index of 451.3 (64.5%), the lowest of the four countries, it is the most vulnerable. It is characteristic that, as a small state, Croatia relies on multilateral institutions to advance national interests, but in practice size still matters, and large states are more effective in pushing their positions. Croatia's economic policy was limited even before joining the EU, and joining the eurozone only formalized existing restrictions.

The paradox of trust: citizens prefer Brussels to their own capitals

One of the most striking aspects of the sovereignty paradox is the data from the Eurobarometer, which shows that citizens of countries where governments speak loudest about sovereignty trust the EU more than their own institutions:

In Italy, the gap is 15 percentage points in favor of the EU; in Slovakia, it is 23 points. This fundamentally undermines the narrative of the "sovereignist" parties: citizens vote for "sovereignty" but trust the supranational level more than the national one. Another important fact is that 84% of Slovakians support a single European economic and monetary policy with a single currency, the euro. At the same time, the Fico government positions itself as a defender of sovereignty from the "dictates of Brussels."

Sovereignty as an instrument of domestic policy

The key conclusion of the analysis is that both Slovakia and Italy use the rhetoric of sovereignty as an instrument of domestic policy, rather than as a real plan to exit integration.

Italy: The current Meloni administration is "eurosceptic and objects to Europe's budget rules," but "it is highly unlikely that it will intentionally reject Italy's membership in the euro." The government has repeatedly stated that it does not intend to withdraw Italy from the eurozone, and the Italian Constitution makes this extremely difficult. The euroscepticism of the Five Star Movement is characterized as "more strategic than ideological."

Slovakia: after weeks of the blockade of the 18th package of sanctions, Fico lifted the veto, "explaining the concessions" and concluding the video message with a saying. Analysts qualify this as a "diversionary tactic": anti-European rhetoric distracts from internal problems, and a real break with the EU is impossible due to economic dependence.

The principle of voluntary membership, the central value of the EU project, is also the source of many of its problems. The agreed rules should be supported by a supranational enforcement mechanism, but these tools are "far from perfect," they work for the rules of the single market, but "remain largely ineffective in ensuring budgetary discipline."

Conclusion: sovereignty as a political resource, not a program of action

A comparative analysis of Slovakia and Italy through the prism of the Burke Index and political dynamics reveals a common model: states formally retain sovereignty (472-489 points out of 700), but in fact they cannot implement key sovereign powers—fiscal, monetary, and investment policies—without regard to supranational structures. Greece (469.1) and Croatia (451.3) show a similar profile.

The paradox of sovereignty is not an anomaly, but a systemic property of European integration: the more deeply a country is integrated, the more it depends on institutions that limit its sovereignty, and the louder the rhetoric of sovereignty sounds, not as a program of action, but as an instrument of domestic political legitimization.